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Abstract
The report presents an exhaustive review of the recent attempt to overcome
the difficulties that standard quantum mechanics meets in accounting for the
measurement (or macro–objectification) problem, an attempt based on the con-
sideration of nonlinear and stochastic modifications of the Schro¨dinger equation.
The proposed new dynamics is characterized by the feature of not contradict-
ing any known fact about microsystems and of accounting, on the basis of a
unique, universal dynamical principle, for wavepacket reduction and for the clas-
sical behavior of macroscopic systems. We recall the motivations for the new
approach and we briefly review the other proposals to circumvent the above
mentioned difficulties which appeared in the literature. In this way we make
clear the conceptual and historical context characterizing the new approach.
After having reviewed the mathematical techniques (stochastic differential cal-
culus) which are essential for the rigorous and precise formulation of the new
dynamics, we discuss in great detail its implications and we stress its relevant
conceptual achievements. The new proposal requires also to work out an appro-
priate interpretation; a procedure which leads us to a reconsideration of many
important issues about the conceptual status of theories based on a genuinely
Hilbert space description of natural processes. Attention is also paid to many
problems which are naturally raised by the dynamical reduction program. In
particular we discuss the possibility and the problems one meets in trying to
develop an analogous formalism for the relativistic case. Finally we discuss the
experimental implications of the new dynamics for various physical processes
which should allow, in principle, to test it against quantum mechanics. The
review covers the work which has been done in the last fifteen years by various
scientists and the lively debate which has accompanied the elaboration of the
new proposal.
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1 Introduction
The twentieth century has seen the birth of what are unanimously considered the two
basic pillars of modern science: relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Both these
theoretical constructions have met an unprecedented predictive success in accounting
for the results of the incredibly refined experiments which have been made possible by
recent technological improvements. Both schemes imply radical changes concerning
the (classical) views about natural phenomena.
Relativity theory has required a drastic modification of our views concerning space
and time, quantum mechanics has compelled the scientific community to attribute a
prominent role to chance in physics and to accept the existence of unavoidable limi-
tations to the attainable knowledge about physical systems. However, the conceptual
status of the two theories is remarkably different. If one accepts that instantaneous
communication is impossible and that the velocity of light represents an upper limit
to the propagation of any physical action, one must reconsider the problem of syn-
chronizing clocks and is led to the conclusion that the space-time continuum is the
correct framework for the description of natural processes. The ensuing theory, spe-
cial relativity, is an example of a precisely formulated and internally consistent theory,
one which, to use A. Shimony’s words [1], allows to close the circle and to base on it
a coherent worldview.
The situation is quite different with the other pillar of modern science, quantum
mechanics, as is evident if one takes into account the lively debate about its inter-
pretation which started soon after its formulation and which is still going on. This
debate concerns one of the most peculiar aspects of the theory, generally known as the
measurement problem, even though a more appropriate term to characterize it would
be the macro–objectification problem. It stems directly from the linear nature of the
theory and the way in which it connects the mathematical entities which are claimed
to represent the most accurate specification which is in principle possible of the state
of a system and the outcomes of prospective measurement processes. ¿From this point
of view, quantum mechanics is an extremely successful and powerful mathematical
device yielding the probabilities of the results of any conceivable measurement pro-
cedure. But, in contrast with this unprecedented efficiency in telling us everything
about what we find the theory is silent, to use J.S. Bell’s words [2], about what it is.
Actually, just due to its linear nature, the quantum description of the measurement
process and of all those measurement–like processes [2] we are obliged to admit ... are
going on more or less all the time, more or less everywhere and lead to the definite
perceptions which characterize our experience, contradicts the idea that all natural
processes and, in particular, the micro–macro interactions occurring in the situations
we have just mentioned are governed by quantum mechanics itself. In brief, the theory
contains two incompatible dynamical principles, the linear Schro¨dinger evolution and
the wavepacket reduction process which is associated to micro–macro interactions.
This serious limitation would not represent by itself a deadlock for the theory: one
could simply accept that it has only a limited field of validity. However, if one takes
such a position one must pretend that the theory itself allows the identification of a
phenomenological area in which the transition from micro to macro, from reversible
to irreversible, from deterministic to stochastic, in short, from quantum to classical,
takes place. But this is not the case. The borderline between these two different
regimes is by no means precisely identifiable. There are for sure many macro–systems
which require a fully quantum treatment.
A significant indication of the peculiar situation we have just outlined comes from
reconsidering the historical debate about the meaning and the interpretation of the
formalism. Such a debate has seen the successive identification of different levels
which, according to the various thinkers, should mark the place at which one has to
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pose the split, which is then characterized by a certain shiftiness. For instance, in
the famous Bohr–Einstein debate, Bohr, who had repeatedly claimed that the split
should be associated to the micro or macroscopic nature of the physical systems under
consideration, was compelled, in order to reject the pressing criticisms by Einstein,
to accept that macroscopic parts of the apparatus (such as macro shutters and macro
pointers) require a fully quantum treatment. An analogous situation occurred subse-
quently: London, Bauer and Wigner were led to identify the split with the borderline
separating physical from conscious processes. But, once more, our present knowl-
edge does not give a clear indication about what is conscious, so that a remarkable
vagueness characterizes also such a proposal.
The recent years have seen a noticeable and renewed interest about the macro–
objectification problem. We can quite confidently state that, nowadays, there is a large
consensus among scientists interested in the foundational aspects of the theory that
the so called orthodox interpretation (a rather ambiguous expression which however
encompasses similar positions concerning the measurement problem) has completely
failed in yielding a consistent and coherent account of natural phenomena. In con-
nection with this renewed interest in the field, new and original attempts to overcome
the difficulties have appeared. What one wants is a quantum mechanical model of
measurements as dynamical processes governed by precise rules agreeing, on the one
side, with the quantum description of microscopic systems, and, on the other, with
the classical aspects characterizing the macroscopic world.
The present report is devoted to a detailed presentation of recent proposals (the
dynamical reduction theories) aimed at overcoming the difficulties of the macro–
objectification process, proposals which stick to the idea that the knowledge of the
statevector represents the maximal information one can have about the state of a
physical system. Accordingly, these attempts differ radically from all those, like hid-
den variable theories, which invoke the incompleteness of the Hilbert space description
to solve the measurement problem. Within the dynamical reduction framework, the
basic idea to get the desired result consists in accepting that the linear and deter-
ministic Schro¨dinger equation has to be modified by the addition of non linear and
stochastic terms. As we will see, this program, which Einstein himself 1 considered
unviable, can be consistently followed leading to a fully satisfactory model at the non
relativistic level.
Obviously, we do not think that the dynamical reduction theories we are going to
discuss in this report might represent instances of the final theory of natural processes.
However, the very fact that they can be consistently developed throws a new light on
the subject, allows us to identify some basic features of any dynamics inducing reduc-
tions, makes precise and allows us to better understand the action at a distance of
the standard theory and might also suggest interesting experiments aimed to identify
possible violations of the superposition principle.
The paper is organized as follows. First of all we discuss in all details the macro–
1We recall that Einstein, in his Reply to critics [3], has explicitly considered the possibility of
giving up, for micro systems, the request that they possess objectively all properties, i.e., he was
prepared to accept the linear nature of their state space. But he has stressed that he could not
renounce to his realistic requirements at the macro level, so that macro objects cannot be in super-
positions of macroscopically different states. In accordance with this position he has contemplated
the idea of abandoning the superposition principle at the macro level. His concluding remarks are
of great relevance for the dynamical reduction program: the macroscopic and the microscopic are
so inter–related that it appears impracticable to give up this program [scientific realism in the clas-
sical sense, as requiring that all systems possess objective properties] in the microscopic alone. The
dynamical reduction program proves that the line that Einstein considered impracticable is actually
consistently viable. More recently analogous remarks — which occurred repeatedly during all the
history of quantum mechanics — have been put forward once more by Shimony. In contemplating
the possibility of reduction at an appropriate level, he has stated that [4] reasonable desiderata [for
the dynamical reduction program] pull in opposite directions.
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objectification problem to make clear how it gives rise to a physically unacceptable
situation which must be faced (part I). We also briefly review many other proposals to
overcome the difficulties of the formalism, to make clear the differences of the dynami-
cal reduction point of view with respect to other attempts to avoid the inconsistencies
of the orthodox position. We then come to the core of the report by reviewing the de-
velopment of the dynamical reduction program and by discussing all the most relevant
mathematical features and physical implications of such an approach (part II). We
pass to analyze the debate about the interpretation of dynamical reduction models
(part III). This analysis will allow the reader to understand and to fully appreciate
the crucial innovative implications of the approach. Part IV of the report is devoted
to an important and to a large extent still open problem, i.e. the one of finding a
fully satisfactory relativistic model inducing reductions. We will conclude our analysis
with a short discussion of some experimental situations which will make clear, on the
one side, how it is difficult to devise experimenta crucis allowing to discriminate such
models from quantum mechanics, and, on the other, will give some indications about
the experiments which seem most appropriate to identify violations (if they are there)
of the linear nature of quantum theory (part V).
Part I
The Measurement Problem of
Quantum Mechanics
2 Basic principles of Quantum Mechanics
We review here the general mathematical structure of Quantum Mechanics, with
special attention to the postulate of wavepacket reduction, the one which gives rise
to the measurement problem. We also introduce formal tools like the statistical
operator formalism, calling attention to some subtle features which can give rise to
misunderstandings concerning some fundamental questions.
2.1 The axioms of Quantum Mechanics
Standard Quantum Mechanics can be synthetically summarized by the following set
of rules:
1. Every physical system S is associated to an Hilbert space H; the physical states
of S are represented by normalized vectors (called “statevectors”) |ψ〉 of H.
Physical observables2 O of the system are represented by self–adjoint operators
in H: the possible outcomes of a measurement of O are given by the eigenvalues
on of the corresponding operator, which we assume here, for simplicity, to have
a discrete and non degenerate spectrum:
O |on〉 = on |on〉. (2.1)
Since O is a self–adjoint operator, its eigenvalues on are real and the eigenvectors
|on〉 form a complete orthonormal set in the Hilbert space H.
2. To determine the state |ψ(t0)〉 of the system S at a given initial time t0, a
complete set of commuting observables for S is measured: the initial statevector
2In the following, we will denote with O both the observable and the corresponding operator in
H; when confusion arises, we will specify whether O refers to the observable or to the operator.
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is then the unique common eigenstate of such observables. Its subsequent time
evolution is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation:
ih¯
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 = H |ψ(t)〉, (2.2)
which uniquely determines the state at any time once one knows it at the initial
one. The operator H is the Hamiltonian of the system S.
3. The probability of getting, in a measurement at time t, the eigenvalue on in a
measurement of the observable O is given by:
P [on] = |〈on|ψ(t)〉|2, (2.3)
|ψ(t)〉 being the state of the system at the time in which the measurement is
performed.
4. The effect of a measurement on the system S is to drastically change its statevec-
tor from |ψ(t)〉 to |on〉, on being the eigenvalue obtained in the measurement:
|ψ(t)〉 before measurement −→ |on〉 after measurement.
This is the famous postulate of wavepacket reduction (WPR).
These, in short, are the postulates of Quantum Mechanics. Of course, we have some-
what simplified the exposition; for example we have ignored the possibility of the
operator O having a continuous spectrum besides or in place of the discrete one; we
have not discussed the case of degenerate eigenvectors, and so on. All such features,
even though important, are not crucial for understanding the measurement problem.
2.2 Schro¨dinger evolution and wavepacket reduction
The Schro¨dinger equation (2.2) has two basic properties. First, it is a first order
differential equation in the time variable; this means that once the initial state of the
system |ψ(t0)〉 is known, its future evolution is completely determined. The evolution
of the statevector of any physical system is thus perfectly deterministic, like in
classical mechanics.
The solution of equation (2.2) can be written as follows:
|ψ(t)〉 = U(t, t0) |ψ(t0)〉, (2.4)
where U(t, t0) is the evolution operator. This is a unitary operator, a necessary
requirement in order that it preserves the norm of the statevector and, accordingly,
to make tenable the probabilistic interpretation of the theory. Its formal expression
is:
U(t, t0) = e
−iH (t− t0)/h¯. (2.5)
The second important feature of the Schro¨dinger equation is that it is linear: if
|ψ1(t)〉 and |ψ2(t)〉 are two possible solution of (2.2), then also α |ψ1(t)〉 + β |ψ2(t)〉 is
a possible solution, where α and β are two arbitrary complex numbers3. This is the
mathematical formulation of the celebrated4 superposition principle.
3If the original vectors are normalized and the two states |ψ1(t)〉 and |ψ2(t)〉 are orthogonal, their
linear combination is normalized when |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
4To be precise, the superposition principle includes also the assumption that all states of the
Hilbert space can actually occur and thus in particular that if |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are possible states for
S, then also α |ψ1〉 + β |ψ2〉 is a possible state.
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The postulate of wavepacket reduction exhibits features which are at odds with
Schro¨dinger’s evolution. First of all it describes a nonlinear evolution of the statevec-
tor, since it transforms the state α |ψ1(t)〉 + β |ψ2(t)〉 into either |ψ1(t)〉 or |ψ2(t)〉 with
probabilities |α|2 and |β|2 respectively. The second important property of wavepacket
reduction is its genuinely probabilistic nature: in general we cannot know to which
one of the eigenstates of O the statevector of S will be reduced as a consequence of
a measurement process; the theory determines only the probability of the reduction
to any particular eigenstate. This is where probability and indeterminacy enter into
play, making Quantum Mechanics so different from classical theories.
Summing up, we have:
Schro¨dinger evolution Wavepacket reduction
linear nonlinear
deterministic stochastic
The above table shows clearly that standard Quantum Mechanics has some peculiar
features: it contains two dynamical evolution principles, one governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation and the other taking place when wavepacket reduction occurs.
They are radically different, and they contradict each other. This fact gives rise to
the measurement problem of the theory, which represents the starting point which
has led to the elaboration of the theories which are the subject of the present report.
2.3 The statistical operator
The quantum mechanical rules sketched in section 2.1 refer only to pure states, i.e.
to physical systems whose statevector is perfectly known. As already remarked, the
state of a system can be determined exactly only by measuring a complete set of
commuting observables.
In practice it is not always possible to perform such kinds of measurements; the
real experimental situation could not even require it. It may very well happen that we
have (or need) only a partial knowledge of the state of the system, pretty much like in
classical statistical mechanics: the statistical operator formalism has been designed
to deal with these situations.
Suppose we know that the statevector describing an individual system is one
among a set {|ψi〉} of vectors, but we do not know which one it actually is: we
only know the probability pi that |ψi〉 is the correct statevector. Equivalently, we can
suppose that we have an ensemble of N systems, a fraction N1 of which is described
by the vector |ψ1〉, a fraction N2 by the vector |ψ2〉 and so on. Taking a system out
of the ensemble, the probability that |ψi〉 is its associated statevector is pi = Ni/N .
We call such ensembles statistical mixtures; they are characterized by the vectors
{|ψi〉} together with their probability distribution pi.
The statistical operator is then defined as follows:
ρ =
∑
i
pi |ψi〉〈ψi|. (2.6)
The operator ρ is a trace class, trace one semi–positive definite operator, and replaces
completely the statevector when only a partial knowledge of the state of the system
9
is available. Of course, for a pure state |ψ〉, i.e. for one representing the most accu-
rate knowledge that the theory considers as possible about a system, the statistical
operator reduces to the projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ|.
A nice feature of statistical operators is that they allow us to use a compact
formalism to deal both with pure states and with genuine statistical mixtures and,
at the same time, they allow us to distinguish between them. In fact the following
property holds:
ρ2 = ρ for pure states
ρ2 6= ρ for statistical mixtures.
The quantum axioms 2–4 are expressed as follows in this new language. The
evolution equation for ρ is:
ih¯
d
dt
ρ(t) = [H, ρ(t)] , (2.7)
which is again a linear first order differential equation to be solved taking into account
the initial condition ρ(t0). The probability that the outcome of a measurement of an
observable O is one, on, of its eigenvalues is given by
5:
P [on] = Tr[Pn ρ(t)], (2.8)
Pn being the operator which projects onto the linear manifold associated to the eigen-
value on. Finally, at the end of a measurement process giving on as its outcome, the
statistical operator changes in the following way:
ρ before measurement −→ Pn ρPn
Tr[Pn ρPn]
after measurement.
This is of course the appropriate expression for the wavepacket reduction postulate.
A final remark. The statistical operator formalism allows us to handle also non
selective measurements, which we are now going to define, in a quite natural way.
Suppose we perform a measurement on an ensemble of systems in the same state
(pure or mixed); in general each of them will give different outcomes and, after the
measurement, due to wavepacket reduction, they will be described by different stat-
evectors. If we decide to keep all the systems, independently of the outcomes we
have obtained, we perform a non selective measurement: we do not have a pure state,
even when the state is pure before the measurement is performed. The measurement
process turns it into the following statistical mixture:
ρ before measurement −→
∑
n
Pn ρPn after measurement,
Pn being the projection operators associated to the eigenmanifolds of the observable
which has been measured. Since the measurement is non selective, the operators Pn
sum up to the identity: it is easy to check that all the mathematical properties of ρ
are preserved.
2.4 Property attribution in standard quantum mechanics
As already remarked, the characteristic trait of standard Quantum Mechanics is that,
in general, it allows only probabilistic predictions about the possible outcomes of mea-
surements. Such probabilities have a truly nonepistemic character, i.e. they are not
due to our ignorance about the precise state of the system, like in classical statistical
mechanics: rather, quantum theory is such that physical systems by themselves do
5“Tr” denotes the trace of the operator.
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not possess all properties one can think of. Another way to put it — following the
Copenhagen doctrine — is to say that, in general, we are not allowed to speak of the
properties of a system concerning most of its observables: the best we can do is to
speak of what we can observe about the system.
However, it is possible to rescue, still remaining within the standard formalism, a
sort of “minimal ontology” for physical systems. This was first formulated by Einstein,
Podolski and Rosen [5]:
If, without in any way disturbing the system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to
this physical quantity.
Following axiom 3, an eigenvalue on of an observable O has probability 1 of being
found in a measurement of O if and only if the statevector |ψ(t)〉 of the system is
an eigenstate of O pertaining to the considered eigenvalue. We can then say that a
system possesses a property if and only if its statevector belongs to the
eigenmanifold associated to the eigenvalue corresponding to that property.
Any measurement aimed to test this statement will give a positive result. Of course,
we can develop a similar argument when the probability of an outcome is equal to
zero and we can claim that the corresponding property is certainly not possessed by
the system.
It is not difficult to understand that within this “minimal ontology” physical
systems do not possess all the properties one would be inclined to attach to them (like
position and momentum at any given time), because a vector cannot be a simultaneous
eigenvector of too many operators, due to the non–abelian character of the algebra
of the operators. Worse than that, individual systems in entangled states possess in
general no properties at all [6].
In particular, one can almost never attach definite macro–properties, specifically
precise locations in space, even to macroscopic systems, so that they cannot be con-
sidered as being in a definite region of space. This fact gives rise to the so called
macro–objectification problem, i.e. to the necessity of accounting for the emer-
gence of the properties corresponding to our definite perceptions for such systems.
This crucial point, another aspect of the quantum measurement problem, will be
extensively analyzed in the following section.
When dealing with statistical mixtures, property attribution is rather delicate
since there is an interplay between epistemic (classical–like) and nonepistemic (quantum–
like) probabilities. To be precise, let us consider an arbitrary mixture of states {|ψi〉},
with probabilities pi; in analogy with classical statistical mechanics, the state of any
system of the ensemble is described by a precise vector of the set {|ψi〉}, but we are
ignorant about which is the correct one: we only know the probability characterizing
each of them. Accordingly, the probability distribution pi has an epistemic character.
On the other hand, each such vector has a probabilistic physical content which, as
before, is genuinely nonepistemic.
3 The quantum measurement, or macro–objectifi-
cation, problem
This section is devoted to a general and detailed discussion of the measurement, or
macro–objectification, problem of Quantum Mechanics. The nature of the problem
has already been anticipated: the linear nature of Quantum Mechanics allows the
occurrence of superpositions of macroscopically different states of a macro–object,
e.g. concerning their location, in spite of the fact that macroscopic systems are
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always located, or at least we perceive them as being located, in a well defined region
of space.
We will first analyze the measurement problem within the framework of the von
Neumann scheme for an ideal measurement process (subsection 3.1): this is a very
simple and elegant measurement model which goes directly to the root of the problem.
Nontheless, von Neumann’s argument has been repeatedly criticized for the over–
simplified assumptions on which it is based. In subsection 3.2, we will show that even
by adopting a very general and realistic measurement model, one can derive the same
conclusions reached by von Neumann: superpositions of different macroscopic states
cannot be avoided within the quantum framework.
3.1 The von Neumann measurement scheme
The first explicit example of the quantum description of a measurement process was
presented by John von Neumann [7] and is usually referred to as the “ideal” mea-
surement scheme. It gained great popularity since, due to its simplicity, it allows us
to grasp immediately the key points of the problem; nowadays almost all textbooks
on the foundations of Quantum Mechanics make reference to it. The von Neumann
argument goes as follows.
Let us consider a microscopic system S and one of its observables O. Let on be the
eigenvalues of O (we assume, for simplicity, that its spectrum is purely discrete and
non–degenerate) and |on〉 the corresponding eigenvectors. Let us callM the apparatus
devised to measure the observable O of the microsystem S. M has a ready–state
|A0〉, i.e. a state in which the apparatus is ready to measure the considered property,
plus a set of mutually orthogonal states |An〉 corresponding to different macroscopic
configurations of the instrument, like, e.g., different positions of a pointer along a
scale.
Finally, we assume that the interaction between the microsystem S and the ap-
paratus M is linear (since the Schro¨dinger equation is supposed to govern all natural
processes) and that it yields a perfect correlation between the initial state of S and
the final state of the apparatus, i.e.
Initial state: |on〉 ⊗ |A0〉 −→ Final state: |on〉 ⊗ |An〉; (3.1)
in this way we are sure that if the final state of the apparatus is |An〉 (i.e. the pointer
for example is in the n–th position along the scale), the final state of the particle is |on〉
and the observable O has the value on, in accordance with the property attribution
discussed in section 2.4.
The measurement problem arises when the initial state of the particle, previous
to the measurement, is not just one of the eigenvectors |on〉 like in equation (3.1), but
a superposition of them, for example:
|m+ l〉 = 1√
2
[|om〉+ |ol〉],
which can be very easily prepared in our laboratories. In this case, if the linear
evolution equation of the theory is assumed to govern all physical processes, the final
state of the microsystem+apparatus will be:
|m+ l〉 ⊗ |A0〉 = 1√
2
[|om〉+ |ol〉]⊗ |A0〉 −→
−→ 1√
2
[|om〉 ⊗ |Am〉+ |ol〉 ⊗ |Al〉]. (3.2)
Such a state is an entangled state of the microscopic system and of the apparatus,
which is not an eigenstate of the relevant observable M of the apparatus, i.e. the
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position of the pointer. In situations like this, as already discussed, it is not legitimate,
even in principle, to state that the properties associated to the states |Am〉 or |Al〉
are possessed by the apparatus: as a consequence the apparatus is not in any of the
macroscopic definite configurations we perceive it to be. This is the first part of the
quantum measurement problem.
The standard way out from this difficulty is given by the wavepacket reduction pos-
tulate (axiom 4 listed in section 2.1), which states that “at the end of the measurement
process” the final vector in equation (3.2) reduces to one of its terms:
|om〉 ⊗ |Am〉 or |ol〉 ⊗ |Al〉,
with a probability given by the square modulus of the coefficient associated to that
term (1/2 for both cases, in our example).
We have already mentioned, and we have proved now, that the postulate of
wavepacket reduction contradicts the assumption of the general validity of the Schro¨dinger
equation; this of course is a very unsatisfactory feature of standard Quantum Mechan-
ics: it incorporates two contradictory dynamical evolutions, something we cannot ac-
cept for a physical theory. Moreover, the real physical difficulty is not only the one
of the consistency of the Schro¨dinger evolution and wavepacket reduction6; the even
more serious problem is that the theory does not tell us in which precise cases the lin-
ear hamiltonian evolution has to be suspended and wavepacket reduction takes place.
As we will see, dynamical reduction models offer a natural, precise and unambiguous
solution to both problematic aspects of the measurement problem.
Coming back to the standard theory, we mention that, in spite of the above diffi-
culties, various authors [8, 9, 10, 11] have maintained that the measurement problem
does not derive from the structure of quantum mechanics (in particular from the
linear character of the quantum evolution), or from the postulate of wavepacket re-
duction, but from adopting the over–simplified model of measurement processes put
forward by von Neumann. If one takes into account more realistic models, they ar-
gue, the measurement problem turns into a false one: the postulate of wavepacket
reduction is not anymore necessary and, consequently, there is no need to modify the
interpretation of the theory, or even to put forward a new theory.
In particular, the following assumptions have been criticized:
• That the measuring apparatus can be prepared in a precise state |M0〉: since
the instrument is a macroscopic object with many degrees of freedom, it is
impossible to know its precise state at any given time.
• That one can safely neglect the interactions between the apparatus and the
surrounding environment. Such interactions with the environment (which are
referred to as decoherence) produce essentially a randomization of the phases
associated to the different components of the wavefunction, a process which can
be seen as an apparent collapse of the wavefunction into one of its components.
• That the final states of the apparatus, corresponding to perceptively different
macroscopic configurations of the apparatus itself, are orthogonal: actually,
different states usually correspond to different positions of some part of the
instrument, and since no wavefunction can have compact support in configura-
tion space (because of the quantum evolution), wavefunctions corresponding to
different states cannot, in general, be orthogonal.
• That the final state of the apparatus gets perfectly correlated to the initial state
of the microscopic system: this is an highly idealized characteristic which is not
shared by any realistic physical instrument.
6Such a difficulty could be circumvented by assuming that the theory has only a limited field of
validity and, in particular, it does not apply to macro–systems.
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In the next subsection we will consider a very general measurement scheme [12]
which takes into account all the above criticisms. We will show that superpositions of
states corresponding to different macroscopic configurations of macro–objects cannot
be avoided within a strict quantum mechanical context. Correspondingly, the appear-
ance of macroscopic situations which are incompatible with our definite perceptions
about such objects is inescapable. This “empasse” can only be circumvented either by
adopting a precise and unambiguous interpretation which differs from the orthodox
one, or by modifying the theory itself7.
3.2 A completely general measurement scheme
In this subsection we re–derive von Neumann’s conclusions on the basis of what, in
our opinion, is the most general possible description of a measurement instrument
and of a measurement process. We begin first by defining the microscopic system
whose properties we want to measure.
3.2.1 The Microscopic System
For simplicity we consider the simplest system upon which non–trivial measure-
ments can be performed, i.e., a system S whose associated Hilbert space HS is two–
dimensional — like the one describing the spin of an electron, or the polarization
states of a photon — and we consider an observable O having two different eigen-
values; let us call |u〉 and |d〉 the eigenstates associated to these eigenvalues. For
definiteness, we will consider an individual such system and we will call “spin” its
degree of freedom; we will say that the particle has “spin Up” when it is in state |u〉,
and that it has “spin Down” when it is in state |d〉. Besides these two states, also
their superpositions can be taken into account, in particular the following one:
|u + d〉 = 1√
2
[ |u〉 + |d〉 ],
a vector describing a new state, “spin Up + spin Down”, of the particle. Without
any loss of generality, we will assume that, by resorting to appropriate procedures,
one can “prepare” the system S in any one of the three above considered states |u〉,
|d〉 and |u + d〉.
We remark that we could have considered more general physical systems, like
compound ones, and observables having a more complicated spectrum. However, in
accordance with the generally accepted position that microsystems can be prepared
in a precise quantum state and with the nowadays common experimental practice to
handle single particles and to measure their discrete properties, we have chosen to
work with a very simple microsystem like the one we are considering here.
Accordingly, after the preparation, the system is in a precise and known state,
and it can be treated as isolated from the rest of the universe, at least until the
measurement process begins8. We stress that if one denies these assumptions it is not
even clear what he takes quantum theory to be about.
3.2.2 The Measuring Apparatus
A measuring apparatus is a macroscopic system which, interacting with the microsys-
tem whose properties one is interested in ascertaining, ends up into a state more or
7An explicit proof that releasing the request of an ideal measurement does not allow us to circum-
vent the measurement problem can be found in the well known book by d’Espagnat [13]; however,
his proof is much more complex and much less general than the one we are going to present here.
8In mathematical terms, we assume that, prior to the measurement process, the wavefunction of
the universe factorizes into the wavefunction of the particle times the wavefunction of the rest of the
world.
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less strictly correlated with the eigenstates of the observable it is devised to measure.
The different possible outcomes of the measurement are supposed to be associated
to perceptively different macroscopic configurations of a part of the apparatus, e.g.
different positions of the pointer (for analogic instruments), different numbers on a
display (for digital ones), different spots on a photographic plate, different plots on
a screen, and so on. For simplicity, in what follows we will assume that the appa-
ratus has a pointer movable along a scale, whose position registers the result of the
measurement.
Contrary to microsystems, the measuring apparatus, being a macroscopic object,
has many degrees of freedom, most of which — in particular the microscopic ones
— we cannot control at all; and of the macroscopic ones, like the position of the
pointer, we can have only a very limited control. Moreover, due to its dimensions, the
apparatus is always interacting with the environment, whose degrees of freedom are
also essentially out of control. Following this line of reasoning, one can remark that
the apparatus — or at least its constituents — existed quite a long time before the
measurement is performed, so it had all the time to interact, even if only weakly, with
a large part of the universe. All these interactions make to a large extent unknown
and uncontrollable the state of the macroscopic system which enters into play. In
spite of this difficulty, in order to keep our analysis as general as possible, we will take
into account all the above mentioned facts which make the measurement non–ideal.
With reference to the above discussion, we should in general speak of different
situations of the “whole universe”, even though our “reading” refers only to the
degrees of freedom of the pointer; accordingly, we will indicate the statevectors we
will deal with in the following way:
|A α〉.
These vectors belong to the Hilbert space associated to the apparatus, the environ-
ment, and, in the most general case, to the whole universe. A is a label indicating
that the pointer of the apparatus is in a specific macroscopic configuration, i.e. one
which we perceive and we identify with a specific position along the scale. In first
approximation, we could say that A is essentially the value x characterizing the “pro-
jection operator” |x〉〈x| (|x〉 being an “improper” statevector of the Hilbert space of
the pointer) giving the exact position of e.g. the centre of mass of the pointer along
the scale. But it is evident that no system can be prepared in such a state since it is
impossible to measure a continuous variable with perfect accuracy; and even if it were
possible to do so, the hamiltonian evolution would immediately change that state.
We could try to improve our description by taking into account, in place of precise
positions along the scale, small intervals ∆(x) = [x− δ, x+ δ], and to claim that “the
pointer is at position x” when the wavefunction is an eigenstate of the projection
operator onto the interval9 ∆(x) of the center of mass position. If one makes such a
choice, the label A characterizing our general state |A α〉 refers to any wavefunction
having such a property, of course with the interval ∆(x) replaced by the interval
∆(A): as a consequence, for the considered state we could claim that “the pointer is at
position A”. However, also this approach is not viable since the hamiltonian evolution
transforms any wavefunction with compact support into a wavefunction with a non–
compact one; this fact gives rise to what has been called the “tail problem”, a problem
which cannot be avoided, and which renders rather delicate the task of making precise
the idea of “an object being somewhere” within a quantum mechanical framework.
More about this in what follows.
Following the above analysis, we consider a very general physical situation: we call
VA the set of all (normalized) vectors |A α〉 for which we are allowed to say that “the
9Of course, here we are considering for simplicity a one–dimensional situation; the argument can
be easily generalized to the three–dimensional case.
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pointer of the apparatus is at position A” or, stated differently, that “the universe
is in a configuration which we perceive as one corresponding to the statement: the
pointer is at A”. We do not put any restriction to the vectors belonging to VA:
they can represent wavefunctions with or without tails, more or less localized in
space, and so on; we do not even resort to projection operators to characterize these
states. The only physical requirement we put forward is that, if the pointer admits
two macroscopically and perceptively different “positions” along the scale (let us call
them A and B), then any two vectors corresponding to such different configurations
must be “almost orthogonal”. This requirement can be translated into the following
mathematical relation: denoting by VB the set of all normalized vectors corresponding
to the statement “the pointer is at B” while VA, as before, contains all the vectors
corresponding to the statement “the pointer is at A”, we must have:
inf
|A α〉 ∈ VA
|B β〉 ∈ VB
‖|A α〉 − |B β〉‖ ≥
√
2− η η ≪ 1, (3.3)
i.e. the minimum distance between the vectors of the two above sets cannot differ
too much from
√
2, which is the distance between two orthogonal normalized states.
We recall that the orthogonality request of the standard measurement theory is done
to be sure to be dealing with strictly mutually exclusive situations. Obviously such a
request can be partially released (as we are doing here) but not given up completely
if one wants to be able to “read” the outcome in a fundamentally non ambiguous
way. It is evident that (3.3) is a necessary requirement if one pretends that different
macroscopic positions of the pointer (and of any other system) represent practically
mutually exclusive configurations of the object10 (see also the final remark of this
subsection).
Let us now comment on the second parameter α characterizing our states: this
is an index which takes into account all other degrees of freedom that are out of
control11; thus two vectors labeled by A but with different values for α, refer to the
“same” macroscopic configuration for the pointer (or, in general, of the “part of the
universe we perceive”), while they describe two different states for the rest of the
universe (e.g., given a certain atom of the pointer, it might be in the ground state
when the state is |A α〉, while it might be in an excited state when it is |A β〉).
Since we are interested in the two spin states of the microscopic particle, if we
want to use the apparatus to distinguish them we have to assume that the pointer
admits at least two macroscopically different positions (U and D) along the scale12.
The previous argument requires then that there exist two sets VU and VD, the first
one containing all the vectors corresponding to the situation in which the pointer can
be said to point at “U”, the second all those vectors associated to the statement “the
pointer is at D”. Moreover, these two sets must be almost orthogonal in the sense of
(3.3):
inf
|U α〉 ∈ VU
|D β〉 ∈ VD
‖|U α〉 − |D β〉‖ ≥
√
2− η η ≪ 1, (3.4)
10Obviously, here we are making reference to a genuinely quantum description (with the com-
pleteness assumption). In alternative interpretations or formulations of the theory, orthogonality
is not necessary to guarantee macroscopic differences. Typically, in hidden variables theories one
could have non orthogonal wavefunctions and different values for the hidden variables such that the
associated physical situations are macroscopically different and mutually exclusive.
11From the mathematical point of view, α stands for the eigenvalues of a complete set of commuting
observables for the whole universe, exception made for the “location” of the pointer.
12The idea is that, if we perform the measurement and we find the pointer in the position labeled
by U , then we can claim the “the result of the measurement is that the spin of the particle is Up”;
similarly, if we find the pointer in D, then we can say that “the spin of the particle is Down”.
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One interesting property of VU and VD (which is shared by any pair of sets for which
(3.4) is satisfied) is that they have no vectors in common: in fact, it is easy to see
that if VU and VD had such a common vector, then the left hand side of (3.4) would
take the value zero, a fact which would contradict (3.4). From the physical point of
view, this property is obvious since a vector belonging both to VU and to VD would
be a vector for which we could claim both that “the pointer points at U” and that
“the pointer points at D”, a contradictory situation since “U” and “D” correspond
to macroscopically and perceptively different situations.
3.2.3 The Preparation of the Apparatus
A measuring instrument must be prepared before one performs a measurement, i.e.
one has to arrange the apparatus in such a way that it is ready to interact with
the microscopic system and give a result; following the discussion of the previous
subsection, it is evident that the initial statevector must carry an index α which takes
into account the state of the rest of the universe. Accordingly, we will denote the
initial statevector as |A0 α〉, where A0 indicates that the pointer “is” in the ready
(A0) state.
However, we note that, besides the measuring instrument, we have also to prepare
the microsystem in a precise state, and moreover we have assumed that after the
preparation and immediately before the measurement process, the microsystem itself
is isolated from the rest of the universe; the initial statevector for the whole universe
can then be written as:
|A0 α〉 = |spin〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉,
where α specifies the state of the whole universe, with the exception of the initial
state of the micro–particle and the initial “position” of the pointer; |spin〉 is the
initial statevector of the particle.
Obviously, also in the process of preparing the apparatus we cannot control the
state of the universe, so that we do not know the precise initial state |A0 α〉: in
practice, in any specific situation any value for the index α will occur with a given
probability p(α), which in general is unknown to us — but of course it has to satisfy
appropriate requirements we will discuss in what follows. Accordingly, the initial
setup for the apparatus and the microscopic particle will be described as follows:
Initial Setup = { |spin〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉, p(α)} ,
where p(α) gives the probability distribution of the remaining, uncontrollable, degrees
of freedom.
3.2.4 The Measurement Process
If one assumes that Quantum Mechanics governs all physical systems, the measure-
ment process, being an interaction between two quantum systems, is governed by a
unitary operator U(tI , tF ). Suppose the initial state of the microsystem is |u〉 and
the one of the apparatus (plus the rest of the universe) is |A0 α〉; then, during the
measurement, the whole universe evolves in the following way:
|u〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉 −→ U(tF , tI) [ |u〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉] = |F u α〉, (3.5)
while, if the initial state of the microsystem is |d〉, one has:
|d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉 −→ U(tF , tI) [ |d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉] = |F d α〉. (3.6)
Some comments are needed.
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• Note that in the above equations (3.5) and (3.6) the index α distinguishes var-
ious possible and uncontrollable situations of the measuring apparatus in its
“ready” state. Once the initial state is fully specified also the final one, since
the evolution is unitary, is perfectly and unambiguously determined. Accord-
ingly, such a state is appropriately characterized by the same index α. Note also
that, while the state |A0 α〉 belongs to the Hilbert space of the whole universe
exception made for the micro–particle, the state |F d α〉 now includes also the
particle.
• Contrary to what one does in the ideal measurement scheme of von Neumann,
we do not assume that the final state is factorized; thus, in general
|F u α〉 6= |u〉 ⊗ |AU α〉.
• In particular, we do not suppose that the final state of the microsystem be
the same as the initial one: we allow the measurement process to modify in a
significant way the state of the particle; it could even destroy the particle.
The only thing we require is that the measuring apparatus is reliable to a
high degree, i.e. that it can safely be used to measure the state of the microsystem
since in most cases it gives the correct answer. This means that if the initial state of
the microsystem (prior to the measurement) is |u〉, then the final state |F u α〉 must
belong in most of the cases to VU , while, if the initial state of the particle is |d〉, the
final state |F d α〉 must almost always belong to VD. Note that by not requiring full
reliability, we take into account also the possibility that the measuring instrument
gives the wrong results, though pretending that such mistakes occur quite seldom.
It is possible to formalize the above reliability requests in the following way. Let
us consider the set K of all subsets J of the possible values that the index α can
assume and let us equip it with the following (natural) measure:
µ(J) =
∑
α∈J
p(α).
Let us also define the two following sets:
J−U = {α such that: |F u α〉 6∈ VU} ,
J−D = {α such that: |F d α〉 6∈ VD} .
J−U is the sets of all the indices α such that the states |F u α〉 do not correspond to the
outcome “the pointer is at position U”, despite the fact that prior to the measurement
the state of the particle was |u〉. Similarly, J−D corresponds to the states |F d α〉 for
which we cannot claim that “the pointer points at D”, even if the initial state of the
system was |d〉. Let also J+U = CJ−U be the complement of J−U , and J+D = CJ−D the
complement of J−D .
Given this, the requirement that the instrument is reliable can be mathematically
expressed in the following way:
µ(J−U ) ≤ ǫ µ(J−D ) ≤ ǫ, ǫ≪ 1, (3.7)
i.e. the probability that the final position of the pointer does not match the initial
spin–value of the particle is very small, this smallness being controlled by an ap-
propriate parameter ǫ expressing the efficiency of the measuring device and which, as
such, can change (always remaining very small) with the different actual measurement
procedures one can devise.
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Of course, it is easy to derive also limits on the measure for the complements of
the above sets:
µ(J+U ) ≥ 1− ǫ µ(J+D) ≥ 1− ǫ.
We need to take into account also the two sets: J− = J−U ∪ J−D and J+ = CJ− =
J+U ∩ J+D ; they satisfy the following relations:
µ(J−) ≤ 2ǫ µ(J+) ≥ 1− 2ǫ.
Again, all these limits simply state that, since the apparatus is reliable, the probability
that — at the end of the measurement process — the pointer is not in the correct
position is very small, if the initial state of the particle is either |u〉 or |d〉.
It is useful to remark that, having taken into account the possibility that the
measuring instrument can make mistakes, we can easily include also the possibility
that it fails to interact at all with the microsystem, thus giving no result: in such a
case, the pointer remains in the “ready–state”, and the corresponding vector belongs
to the set J−. In fact, let us consider the set V0 associated to the “ready–state”,
as we did for the two sets VU and VD referring to the “U” and “D” positions of the
pointer. By the same argument as before, V0 is disjoint from the two sets VU and VD,
since the “ready–state” is assumed to be macroscopically different from the “U” and
“D” states; consequently if the vector at the end of the measuring process belongs to
V0, it cannot belong either to VU or to VD.
We have mentioned the possibility that the apparatus misses to detect the par-
ticle because such an occurrence affects, in some case in an appreciable way, many
experimental situations; for example the efficiency of photodetectors is usually quite
low. This does not pose any problem to our treatment: we can easily circumvent this
difficulty by simply disregarding, just as it is common practice in actual experiments,
all cases in which a detector should register something but it doesn’t. The previous
analysis and the sets we have identified by precise mathematical criteria must then be
read as referring exclusively to the cases in which the apparatus registers an outcome.
3.2.5 The Measurement Problem
We recall the two basic assumptions we discussed in the previous subsections:
1. The quantum evolution of any physical system is linear and unitary, since it is
governed by the Schro¨dinger equation;
2. Any two sets, like VU and VD, containing vectors corresponding to macroscopi-
cally different configuration of a macro–object are almost orthogonal:
inf
|U α〉 ∈ VU
|D β〉 ∈ VD
‖|U α〉 − |D β〉‖ ≥
√
2− η η ≪ 1. (3.8)
We think that everybody would agree that any real measurement situation, if it has to
be described in quantum mechanical terms, shares the above two properties. Starting
with these very simple premises we can now easily show that quantum mechanics must
face the problem of the occurrence of superpositions of macroscopically different states
of the apparatus, and in general of a macro–system13.
In our terms, the “measurement problem” arises (as usual) when the initial spin–
state of the particle is not |u〉 or |d〉, as we have considered in the previous subsections,
13As already remarked, request 2) can be violated in hidden variables theories. On the other hand,
request 1) is purposedly violated in dynamical reduction theories. Since both theories account for
the objectification of macroscopic properties, they must necessarily violate one of the two requests.
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but a superposition of them, like the state |u + d〉 of section 3.2.1, which can be easily
prepared in the laboratory. In such a case, due to the linearity of the evolution, the
final state of the particle+apparatus system will be:
|u + d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉 −→ U(tF , tI) [ |u + d〉 ⊗ |A0 α〉] = |F u+d α〉
=
1√
2
[|F u α〉+ |F d α〉].
It is now very simple to prove that for each α belonging to J+, |F u+d α〉 cannot
belong either to VU or to VD. In fact, let us suppose that it belongs to VU ; the proof
in the case in which it is assumed to belong to VD is analogous. Since the distance
between |F u+d α〉 and |F d α〉 is:
‖|F u+d α〉 − |F d α〉‖ = ‖1/√2 |F u α〉+
(
1/
√
2− 1
)
|F d α〉‖ ≤
≤ 1√
2
+ 1− 1√
2
= 1,
we get a contradiction, because |F u+d α〉 is supposed to belong to VU while |F d α〉
belongs to VD, and relation (3.8) must hold between any two vectors of these two
sets. This completes our proof. Of course, by the same argument we can also prove
that, for all α ∈ J+, the index of the apparatus cannot be in any other macroscopic
position different from “U” and “D”.
The conclusion is: for all α ∈ J+ and for all measurements processes in which the
apparatus registers an outcome, the vector |F u+d α〉 does not allow us to assign
any macroscopic definite position to the index of the apparatus, not even
one different from “U” or “D”. Stated differently, the large majority of the initial
apparatus states, when they are triggered by the superposition |u + d〉, end up in a
state which does not correspond to any definite position or, in our general language,
to any definite situation of the part of the universe we perceive, i.e. one paralleling
our definite perceptions.
We believe that the above argument represents the most general proof of the
unavoidability of the macro–objectification problem for the absolutely minimal and
physically necessary requests on which it is based: that one can prepare microscopic
systems in well defined states which are eigenstates of a quantum observable and that
when this is done and the considered observable is measured, one can get reliable
information about the eigenvalue of the observable itself, by appropriate amplification
procedures leading to perceivably different macroscopic situations of the universe.
In the next section we will analyze the various proposals which have been put
forward to overcome the macro–objectification problem; we will briefly describe them
and discuss their pros and cons.
4 Possible Ways Out of the Macro–Objectification
Problem
Various ways to overcome the measurement problem have been considered in the
literature: in this section we briefly describe and discuss them. It is useful to arrange
the various proposals in a hierarchical tree–like structure [14], taking into account the
fundamental points on which they differ: in the figure below we present a diagram
which may help in following the argument. Subsequently we will comment on the
various options.
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4.1 Listing the possible ways out
A first distinction among the alternatives which have been considered in the literature
derives from taking into account the role which they assign to the statevector |ψ〉 of
a system. This leads to the Incompleteness versus Formal Completeness option:
Incompleteness: this approach rests on the assertion that the specification of the
state |ψ〉 of the system is insufficient: further parameters, besides the wavefunc-
tion, must be considered, allowing us to assign definite properties to physical
systems
Formal Completeness: it is assumed that the assignment of the statevector repre-
sents the most accurate possible specification of the state of a physical system.
When the assumption of Formal Completeness is made, two fundamentally different
positions can be taken about the status of an ensemble — a pure case in the standard
scheme — all individuals of which are described by the same wavefunction:
Formal Completeness with Different Individuals: the same wavefunction de-
scribes individuals which can have different properties, even though there is no
further element in the formal theory that specifies such properties.
Formal Completeness with Identical Individuals: all individuals associated to
the same statevector have the same properties. Pure cases correspond to gen-
uinely homogeneous ensembles.
The two options we have just mentioned require different strategies to circumvent the
difficulties related to the objectification problem. The first case can be analyzed in
greater detail by considering the three following alternatives:
Limiting the Observables: The specification of what is actually observable in the
case of a macro–system has to be reconsidered: by taking into account appropri-
ate and unavoidable limitations of the class of observables one can legitimately
consider the macro–properties to be actual.
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Enlarging the Criteria for the Attribution of Properties: The possibility of con-
sidering a property actual is related in a more subtle way than in standard
Quantum Mechanics to the statevector; in particular, an individual system can
possess a property even though it is not in an eigenstate of the corresponding
observable.
Enriching Reality: Many real happenings can occur together; all potentialities of
the statevector become actual.
When the option of Formal Completeness with Identical Individuals is chosen the
strategy to circumvent the difficulties consists in reconsidering the dynamics of the
theory. One contemplates the possibility of a Modified Dynamics: the unitary evo-
lution law of the theory is not always or not exactly right; the modifications which
have to be taken into account make the potentialities actual. This case too leads to
further alternatives:
Two Dynamical Principles: different physical situations require different evolu-
tion laws.
Unified Dynamics: the evolution equation of Quantum Mechanics has to be modi-
fied. The new dynamical principle does not lead to a violation of tested quantum
predictions for microsystems but it is able to induce the dynamical objectifica-
tion of macro–properties.
4.2 Incompleteness: the specification of the state is insufficient
This option corresponds to challenging the completeness of the quantum description
of physical systems: the statevector is not all. To complete the theory, new “hidden
variables” besides the statevector |ψ〉 are introduced: these are putative parameters
related to properties of a physical system which are not specified by the statevector.
The intended aim is that of making legitimate an epistemic interpretation of quantum
probabilities.
The best known example of a hidden variable theory is Bohmian Mechanics [15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20], where the new variables are the positions xi of the particles. The
basic rules are:
1. The state of a physical system S at an initial time t0 is given by the wavefunction
ψ(q1,q2, . . .qn; t0) together with the positions x1(t0), x2(t0), . . .xn(t0) of all
the particles of S.
2. The wavefunction evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation:
ih¯
∂ ψ(q1,q2, . . .qn; t)
∂t
= H ψ(q1,q2, . . .qn; t),
while the equations of motion for the positions xi(t) of the particles are:
dxi(t)
dt
=
h¯
mi
Im
ψ∗(q1,q2, . . .qn; t)∇i ψ(q1,q2, . . .qn; t)
|ψ(q1,q2, . . .qn; t)|2
∣∣∣∣
qi=xi
3. The Schro¨dinger equation can be solved with the given initial condition. Once
the solution has been found, it is used to solve the equations of motion for the
“hidden” variables xi(t).
Bohmian Mechanics has two basic features. First of all, the theory assigns always
a definite position in space to all particles; in particular, macroscopic objects have def-
inite properties, and they are where we see them to be: this is how Bohmain mechan-
ics solves the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. The second basic feature
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is the following: let us consider an ensemble of physical systems described by the
same wavefunction ψ(q1,q2, . . .qn; t), each containing n particles whose positions are
x1,x2, . . .xn. Let us also suppose that the probability distribution ρ(x1,x2, . . .xn; t0)
of the positions of the particle in the ensemble, at a given initial time t0 is:
ρ(x1,x2, . . .xn; t0) = |ψ(x1,x2, . . .xn; t0)|2.
It follows that the trajectories followed by the particles of the systems in the ensemble
are such that, at any later time t:
ρ(x1,x2, . . .xn; t) = |ψ(x1,x2, . . .xn; t)|2.
This means that the theory is predictively equivalent to standard Quantum Mechanics
concerning the positions of all the particles of the universe.
However, one has to call attention to a peculiar aspect (shared by all hidden vari-
able theories) of Bohmian Mechanics, i.e. to its contextual nature. Various authors
[21, 22] have exhibited general proofs showing that the very algebraic structure of
quantum formalism implies14 that any complete specification of the state of a system
can assign, in general, a definite truth value to most of the propositions concerning
its properties only with reference to a specified context. This means that within such
a framework, the most complete specification of the state of an individual physical
system is not sufficient, by itself, to determine the outcome of a measurement process
for most of the observable quantities one can consider, but that such an outcome de-
pends from the overall factual situation. For instance within Bohmian Mechanics, a
system with a precise wavefunction and a precise position, when subjected, e.g., to a
measurement of its momentum, may give one or the other of the outcomes compatible
with its wavefunction, depending on the specific apparatus one chooses to perform
the measurement.
This situation, which at first sight might be considered as puzzling, in reality
gives simply important indications about the ontology which is appropriate for the
theory. The way out derives from taking the attitude that the only physical entities
the theory is about are the noncontextual ones. In Bohmian Mechanics the positions
of the particles play such a privileged role: they are the only non contextual, objective,
real variables (the “local beables” [23, 24]) of the theory15. What about the other
observables? [20] “Properties that are merely contextual are not properties at all;
they do not exist, and their failure to do so is in the strongest sense possible”.
A weakness, in our opinion, of the theory is that one can exhibit [25] infinitely
many inequivalent hidden variable theories — whose hidden variables are the position
of the particles of the universe — different from Bohmian Mechanics. They are all
perfectly consistent, differing among themselves only for the trajectories they assign
to the particles.
Of course, this is not a mathematical fault of Bohmian Mechanics; however, it
casts some shadow over the “ontological” basic position of the theory: that particles
have always definite positions and follow precise trajectories. If many inequivalent
Bohmian–like theories assigning different trajectories to particles are possible, which
trajectories are the correct ones? Is there a criterion to choose only one among them?
Some authors [26] have tried to identify such criterion with the so called “request of
compoundational invariance” of the theory. However, such a request does not seem
logically necessary16.
14For a Hilbert space of more than two dimensions.
15Of course at the formal level one can easily work out models making e.g. the momentum variables
non contextual. However, the ensuing contextual nature of positions makes it quite difficult to build
up a coherent description of natural phenomena based on such a scheme.
16S. Goldstein [private communication], has raised the objection that also within dynamical re-
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In spite of this difficulty, Bohmian Mechanics is undoubtedly one of the (few)
promising and consistent theories solving the measurement problem of Quantum Me-
chanics; of course, the great challenge is to formulate a relativistic invariant version
of it.
4.3 Limiting the class of observables
The attempts to get objectification through a limitation of the class of observables
have received great attention [27, 28, 29, 9, 10, 30]. We consider it appropriate to
distinguish two different positions which have been taken when trying to implement
such an approach:
Strict Superselection Rules: the set of the observables which can actually be mea-
sured for any macro–system does not coincide with the set of self–adjoint opera-
tors of the associated Hilbert space; it admits superselection rules. In particular,
the eigenmanifolds corresponding to different macroscopic properties are super-
selected.
De Facto Superselection Rules: The impossibility of putting into evidence macro-
scopic coherence is not a matter of principle but derives from practical, but
practically insurmountable, limitations.
Notice that both the above programs require the consideration of the dynamics of the
theory; the possibility and the consistency of assuming limitations of measurability
cannot be analyzed at the kinematical level only. We turn now to discuss the two
cases.
4.3.1 Strict Superselection Rules
Suppose that, at a certain level — in the present case, the macroscopic one — the
set of observables of the system admits strict superselection rules, i.e. that the set
of operators associated to all physical quantities which are actually measurable is an
abelian set. In such a case, as well known, the phase relations between components
of the statevector belonging to different superselected manifolds become physically
irrelevant. This amounts to saying that what actually characterizes the states of
physical systems (ensembles) are not the statevectors or the statistical operators,
but the equivalence classes [ρ] of statistical operators with respect to the allowed
observables Ω, i.e.:
[ρ] = {ρ∗ ∈ T1 : Tr(ρΩ) = Tr(ρ∗Ω), ∀ Ω} (4.1)
where we have denoted by T1 the set of positive trace–class operators of trace 1. The
basic idea for circumventing the difficulties of Quantum Mechanics goes as follows.
Consider, e.g., the evolution characterizing an ideal measurement process:
1√
2
[|u〉+ |d〉]⊗ |A0〉 −→ 1√
2
[|u〉 ⊗ |Au〉+ |d〉 ⊗ |Ad〉] , (4.2)
where |A0〉, |Au〉 and |Ad〉 denote the “ready”, “points at u” and “points at d” states
of the macroscopic pointer. The states |Au〉 and |Ad〉 are macroscopically different
duction models “there is a good deal of arbitrariness, in the choice of parameters, of smoothing
functions, of basic observables, and the like”, suggesting that if this arbitrariness is not a problem
for collapse models, it should not be a problem also for Bohmian mechanics. We do not agree on
this point, since the situation is radically different in the two theories. Within dynamical reduction
models, changing the values of the parameters or of the smoothing functions one modifies the theory
in a — at least in principle — testable way (this will become clear after the analysis of the following
sections). In Bohmian mechanics, on the other hand, the different formulations are equivalent and
lead exactly to the same physical predictions.
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and therefore, according to our assumptions, belong to superselected eigenmanifolds;
one can then legitimately assert that the final situation consists of the equal weights
statistical mixture E = (Eu) ∪ (Ed) of the pure cases |u〉 ⊗ |Au〉 and |d〉 ⊗ |Ad〉.
The program is appealing, even though to take it seriously as a candidate for
a coherent worldview one should make it more precise. In particular, one should
exhibit the formal elements accounting for the way in which the superselection rules
emerge (the location of the split between two types of physical systems, i.e., those for
which no limitation of observability occurs and those for which it does), allowing the
precise identification of the superselected manifolds (the “preferred basis problem”).
There is, however, a more fundamental reason which forbids us to take it seriously: it
meets insurmountable difficulties when one takes into account the dynamics [31]. This
is easily proved by taking into account that the initial and final system+apparatus
states in a measurement process, being necessarily macroscopically distinguishable,
must belong to different equivalence classes. As a consequence, the hamiltonian itself,
since it connects different superselected manifolds, is not an allowed observable: this
is quite peculiar.
Another related problem derives from considering the “reversibility” of the process.
To discuss this let us consider, e.g., the final state (4.2) and the equivalent statistical
mixture E = (Eu) ∪ (Ed). Suppose then one can “evolve back” or “reverse” the
measurement process. According to whether one starts from the state (4.2) or from
the statistical mixture, one goes back either to the state 1/
√
2 [|u〉+ |d〉]⊗ |A0〉 or to
the equal weights mixture of the states |u〉 ⊗ |A0〉 and |d〉 ⊗ |A0〉. Should one then
perform, by means of another apparatus, a measurement process to ascertain the value
of the observable σx, he would, in the first case, get the result +1 with certainty,
while in the second case there is a probability 1/2 of getting the result −1. The
combined “reversal of the process” and “measurement of σx” would then constitute
a measurement process which allows us to distinguish the final pure state from the
equivalent statistical mixture, contradicting the assumption that only superselected
observables are allowed17.
To conclude, the previous analysis should have made clear why the strict supers-
election program cannot be fulfilled.
4.3.2 The De Facto Superselection Rules option
Recall that what makes the strict superselection program not viable is the fact that the
Hamiltonian connects eigenmanifolds corresponding to different macroscopic proper-
ties, and the related fact that the possibility of reversing the evolution leading to
superpositions of macroscopically different states contradicts the assumption that the
superposition is in the same equivalence class as the corresponding statistical mixture.
This provides the basic idea of the de facto superselection option. Since, when
macroscopic objects are involved it is practically impossible to distinguish pure states
from statistical mixtures or to “undo” a measurement process, one could be tempted to
assert that for such systems a de facto limitation of observability must be recognized.
Such a position has actually been taken in many interesting papers [28, 29, 9, 10,
30]. In these papers attention has been called to various features and mechanisms
inducing the de facto impossibility we have just mentioned: the extreme complexity
of a macroscopic object, its unavoidable and uncontrollable interactions with the
environment, and so on.
In the previous section we have shown that such proposals cannot overcome, in
principle, the measurement problem of Quantum Mechanics; however a deeper anal-
17Note that the only way out from this problem would be to deny the reversible nature of quantum
evolution at least for processes involving macroscopic systems. But this would amount to accept that
[32] “Scrho¨dinger’s equation is not always right”.
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ysis may be helpful to clarify the matter. We begin with a digression. We have used
the expression “de facto”, in place of the fashionable acronym (introduced by J. S.
Bell [2]) FAPP (for all practical purposes), for a precise reason. It seems to us that
describing this position as FAPP suggests accusing people following this line of taking
an instrumentalist position about science. We do not think that most of the propos-
als for a de facto superselection solution to the objectification problem require such
instrumentalism. Most people taking the de facto attitude would claim that this is as
legitimate as accepting the de facto validity of the second law of thermodynamics, in
spite of the reversibility of the basic mechanical laws. Obviously it would be inappro-
priate to maintain that accepting thermodynamics involves taking an instrumentalist
position.
Having stated this we would like, however, to call attention to the fundamental
conceptual differences between the case of thermodynamics in relation to classical
mechanics and the case of the de facto superselection assumption in relation to the
unitary evolution. To do this we start by considering the two premises:
1C The reversible classical laws are the “correct” laws of nature;
1Q The superposition principle has unlimited validity;
and the legitimate classical statement:
2C Under appropriate circumstances the irreversible thermodynamical laws are “de
facto” correct.
Taking the de facto superselection position amounts to claiming that the correspond-
ing quantum statement:
2Q Under appropriate circumstances the irreversible process of wavepacket reduction
and the replacement of a pure state with a statistical mixture are “de facto”
correct
is equally legitimate.
Can we take such a position consistently? To answer this question let us consider
the classical case. It is obviously true that the irreversible thermodynamical laws
cannot describe correctly the behaviour of e.g. a gas for arbitrarily large times since
it is a consequence of assumption 1C that the point representing the system in phase
space will, after Poincare` recurrence times, return as close as one wants to its present
value. One could then raise the question: does this fact imply that the assertion that
“de facto, in an ensemble of gases almost all of them are now evolving irreversibly
towards equilibrium” will be falsified by the future behaviour? Surely not.
Zurek [9, 10], in his detailed analysis seems to suggest that, since the situation
in the quantum case is analogous to the classical one, statement 2Q has the same
conceptual status as 2C. To this purpose he proves that, due to the unavoidable
interactions with the environment, in the case of a macroscopic system in a super-
position of macroscopically distinguishable states the off–diagonal elements of the
reduced statistical operator (i.e. the one obtained by tracing out the environment
variables) become rapidly negligibly small and remain so for times comparable to the
Poincare` recurrence times for a gas. This is certainly true; but does it prove that the
situation is conceptually analogous to that of thermodynamics? We think not. In fact
in the quantum case the assumption 1Q that the linear laws of Quantum Mechanics
are correct and have universal validity implies that the result of a prospective mea-
surement on an ensemble in the very far future would falsify not only our statements
about future events but also the assertion that now the ensemble is the union of the
pure subensembles corresponding to definite macroscopic positions. Such an assertion
would turn out to be in no sense, even approximately, correct. The argument we have
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presented briefly has been expounded with great clarity and precision by d’Espagnat
in [33], to which we refer the reader for a deeper analysis.
We can further clarify the matter by repeating the previous analysis within the
context of the pilot wave theory; which, we recall, is fully equivalent to Quantum
Mechanics in its physical predictions and which assigns definite positions to all par-
ticles of a system at all times. The approximation which corresponds to assuming
that wavepacket reduction occurs, consists in disregarding, in the description of the
evolution of an “up” (“down”) pointer position (after the measurement is over), the
contribution to the wave function coming from the term corresponding to the “pointer
down” (“pointer up”) in the statevector. Again, such an assumption will surely be
proved false by events in the very far future. However, both the approximate and the
“true” versions of the theory assert that presently the pointer is either up or down,
or equivalently that all pointers of the ensembles are in one of the two positions, and
the future happenings neither falsify this statement nor deny that the approximate
description is extremely accurate for extremely long times. Therefore, within the pilot
wave framework, the analog of assertion 2Q has the same conceptual status as 2C.
As discussed above, this is not the case for the de facto superselection program.
Other significant differences between the thermodynamical and the de facto su-
perselection situations deserve to be mentioned. For instance, in the classical case the
following three statements are correct:
3C The assignment of the phase–space distribution identifies with sufficient precision
the corresponding physical ensemble.
4C The approximation made in using thermodynamical equations to describe the
behaviour of a system is under control. The split between mechanical and
thermodynamical systems is not shifty. Just to give an example, while few
molecules are not a gas, an Avogadro’s number of them is a gas.
5C The exact (mechanical) and the approximate (thermodynamical) laws both make
sense and both allow simple and sensible assumptions about the psycho–physical
correspondence allowing us “to close the circle” for the appropriate classes of
phenomena.
But the corresponding statements in the quantum case are fully inappropriate. In
fact:
3Q The same statistical operator corresponds to completely different physical ensem-
bles.
4Q The approximation made in breaking linearity is shifty: macroscopic systems
exist which require a genuine quantum treatment (more on this in section 5.1).
5Q The correct (linear evolution) law leads to a situation which does not make sense
from the point of view of our (definite) perceptions, only the approximation
allows a sensible psycho–physical correspondence.
Statement 3Q further emphasizes the difficulties in relating the states of the system
to our perceptions. Even ensembles corresponding to the same statistical operator
can be very different in their compositions in pure subensembles [34]. This proves
once more that the simple recognition that two ensembles can be de facto in the
same equivalence class is not sufficient to explain why our perceptions unavoidably
correspond to a specific composition, i.e. the one whose subensembles have definite
macroscopic properties. As recognized by Joos and Zeh [30] who have presented one
of the most interesting proposals along these line: “perhaps (this fact) can be justified
by a fundamental (underivable) assumption about the local nature of the observer”.
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Our conclusion is that one cannot consider the de facto superselection proposals as
yielding a consistent way of “closing the circle”. We will come back again to this point
in what follows since, from the mathematical point of view, it has strict connections
with Dynamical Reduction Models.
4.4 The Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
These approaches [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42] rest on the introduction of appropriate
rules which allow us to attribute some properties to the subsystems of a composite
system even when there is no observable whose outcome can be predicted with cer-
tainty. To illustrate the general lines of the program we make reference to the proposal
by Dieks [37].
Consider a composite system containing several (let us say N) constituents and
suppose that we are dealing with a pure case associated to an entangled statevector.
The proposal goes as follows. Any subsystem of the whole system has at any time
definite properties, identified by the following procedure. Suppose we are interested
in the subsystem SM constituted by a group of particles (let us say the firstM < N);
the case of only one particle or even of a specific degree of freedom of a particle is not
excluded. We also denote by SN−M the system of the remaining particles. One then
considers the whole Hilbert space as the direct product of the Hilbert space referring
to the considered group and to the rest:
H ≡ H(1)⊗H(2)⊗ ...H(N) = H(1, ...,M)⊗H(M + 1, ..., N) (4.3)
Accordingly, one takes into account the biorthonormal decomposition of the statevec-
tor:
|ψ(1, ..., N)〉 =
∑
i
√
pi |χi(1, ...,M)〉 ⊗ |Ωi(M + 1, ..., N)〉; (4.4)
in the above equation, the parameters pi are positive constants summing up to 1:
they are the eigenvalues of the reduced statistical operators obtained by taking the
partial trace of |ψ〉〈ψ| either on H(1, ...,M) or on H(M + 1, ..., N). The states |χi〉
and |Ωi〉 satisfy:
〈χi|χj〉 = 〈Ωi|Ωj〉 = δij . (4.5)
As proved by von Neumann [7], such a decomposition is uniquely determined by
|ψ(1, ..., N)〉 except in the case of degeneracy of the above eigenvalues. Ignoring the
complications arising from accidental degeneracy, we can now state the rule for as-
signing properties to the subsystems SM and SN−M : when dealing with a pure case
associated to the state (4.4) the subsystems SM and SN−M have definite properties.
They are those associated to the observables having the states |χi〉 and |Ωi〉 as eigen-
vectors. The probability of the i-th property to be actually possessed (or better: the
fraction of systems in the ensemble which have such a property) is given by pi (in other
words, the model is basically a hidden variable model [42], whose hidden variables are
identified via the biorthonormal decomposition (4.4)).
As usual we indicate the way in which the proposal circumvents the problems
of the theory of measurement. According to the ideal von Neumann measurement
scheme the final state in a measurement process consists, typically, of a superposition
of states each term of which involves an eigenvector referring to a different reading
of the apparatus (compare equation (3.2)): this final state already gives the von
Neumann biorthonormal decomposition for the system+apparatus so that, according
to the previous criterion one can assert that the appropriate fractions of the apparata
have their pointers in precise and different positions.
Such proposals are surely interesting but they meet various difficulties which have
been discussed e.g. in [31, 43, 44, 45]. We refer the reader to the above papers for
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details. Apart from this, we would like to call attention on the fact that the proposal
raises other problems, in particular, it lacks what we might call “structural complete-
ness”. The situation can be summarized in the following simple terms. Quantum
mechanics, in its general formulation, allows the treatment of statistical ensembles.
We are considering now theoretical models which accept that systems associated to
the same statevector have different properties.
Suppose now we are dealing with an ensemble which is a pure case associated to
the state (4.4). What meaning can be attached to the statement that the considered
subsystems have properties? Even within very weak varieties of realism, this amounts
to asserting that the ensemble is inhomogeneous, that it actually is the union E =
∪iEi of different subensembles. One can then raise the question: can we prepare such
an ensemble in the standard way, i.e. by taking (for all i) a fraction pi of subensembles
in the state |χi〉|Ωi〉? Obviously not. In fact, if we were to prepare the subsystems
in the states |χj〉|Ωj〉 it would be false to assert, contrary to what this interpretation
holds true, that the composite system has with certainty the properties associated
according to the above procedure to an ensemble described by |ψ〉. This means that
the model deals with two kinds of statistical ensembles: the one associated to the
state (4.4) and the one prepared by taking a fraction pi of subsystems in the state
|χj〉|Ωj〉. They both are the union E = ∪iEi of the same kind of subensembles (each
taken with the same probability pi), but they are structurally different since one of
them has specific hidden features to which one does not have access.
4.5 The Decoherent Histories approach
The main purpose of this proposal [46, 47, 48, 49, 50] is to assign definite probabilities
to alternative histories of a physical system, which may also be the whole universe.
The idea goes as follows. One defines histories as sequences of events yielding a sort
of motion picture of the evolution of a system, and attaches appropriate probabilities
to them. Let us first define the notation we will use.
We consider, for a given k, a set of orthogonal projection operators P kαk yielding
a resolution of the identity:∑
αk
P kαk = 1; P
k
αkP
k
βk = δαkβk (4.6)
The index k labels the “question” or “property” we are interested in, while the pa-
rameter αk, which runs over an appropriate range, labels a set of “alternative values
for the considered property” which are, according to (4.6), exhaustive and mutually
exclusive. It is important to have clear the meaning of the considered projection
operators. For this purpose we refer, for simplicity, to the spin space of a spin 3/2
particle. In such a case, specifying k could mean, e.g., to specify a spin component, so
that k = 1 could be related to Sz and k = 2 to Sx. For fixed k the index αk identifies
a set of mutually orthogonal manifolds (each of them being either one or the direct
sum of various eigenmanifolds of the k–th operator) whose direct sum is the whole
space. So one could have, for k = 1, α1 taking e.g. 3 values:
• P 111 projects on the eigenmanifold spanned by the eigenstates belonging to Sz =
3/2 and Sz = 1/2.
• P 121 projects on the eigenmanifold spanned by the eigenstate belonging to Sz =−1/2.
• P 131 projects on the eigenmanifold spanned by the eigenstate belonging to Sz =−3/2.
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Analogously P 2α2 could represent, for α2 taking only two values, the two projection
operators on the positive and negative parts of the spectrum of Sx. We will denote
by P k{αk} the set of all the projection operators associated to the “property k” when
αk runs through its range. One then considers the corresponding projectors in the
Heisenberg picture at time t:
P kαk(t) = e
iHt P kαk e
−iHt (4.7)
A history is defined by a succession of times t1 < t2... < tn and a sequence of
projection operators. It will be denoted by (αn, tn)...(α2, t2) (α1, t1). If the initial
conditions are fixed by specifying the initial statevector |ψ(0)〉, one attributes to the
above history the probability:
P [αn, tn; ... α2, t2; α1, t1] =
Tr
[
Pnαn(tn)...P
1
α1 (t1) |ψ(0)〉〈ψ(0)|P 1α1 (t1)...Pnαn(tn)
]
(4.8)
One then considers the set of all alternative histories, which we will denote with self–
explanatory notation as ({αn}, tn)...({α2}, t2) ({α1}, t1), i.e., the set of all quantum
histories obtained by letting each αj take all values in its range. Due to quantum
interference, the probabilities of the histories of this set turn out not to satisfy, in
general, the additivity conditions which are necessary in order that they could be
interpreted as true probabilities. For instance one usually has:
P (α2, t2) 6=
∑
α1
P (α2, t2;α1, t1) (4.9)
To circumvent this difficulty one introduces the idea of a decoherent set of alterna-
tive histories. This can be implemented mathematically by defining the decoherence
functional:
D[αn, tn; ... α1, t1 |βn, tn; ... β1, t1] =
Tr
[
Pnαn(tn)... P
1
α1(t1) |ψ(0)〉〈ψ(0)|P 1β1 (t1)... Pnβn(tn)
]
(4.10)
If such a functional vanishes whenever at least one of the βk differs from αk, one
says that the considered set of alternative histories is consistent since the associated
probabilities satisfy all necessary requirements. For a given set of histories one may
construct coarser–grained histories by summing over the finer–grained projections.
We do not want to be more specific about this program. We refer the reader to
the references quoted above, particularly to the book [49] by Omne`s for a thorough
analysis. We prefer to comment about the relations between the Decoherent Histories
approach and some of the approaches we have already discussed.
Let us look at the Decoherent Histories approach from the point of view of the
strict superselection option. If the conditions presupposed by the strict superselec-
tion rules were satisfied, i.e. if there were a level at which macroscopically different
eigenmanifolds are strictly superselected and are not connected by the Hamiltonian,
all histories attributing macroscopic properties to the physical system at the consid-
ered level would decohere: one could then truly describe the unfolding of the evolu-
tion by a consistent snapshot–like motion picture. This comparison with the strict
superselection case immediately reveals an interesting advantage of the Decoherent
Histories approach. Namely, within the strict superselection scheme the assignment
of the statevector at various times tells us which fractions of systems have various
macro–properties but it does not attach probabilities to time sequences of events; the
snapshots at different times cannot be organized in motion pictures as in the case of
Decoherent Histories.
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Since, as already remarked, the assumptions of strict superselection rules cannot
hold consistently, it becomes quite natural to look at Decoherent Histories from the
point of view of the de facto superselection rules. In particular, by taking advantage
of the many proofs that the environment induces “de facto” superselection rules asso-
ciated to macroscopic position variables, one could limit one’s considerations, within
the Decoherent Histories approach, to alternative histories specifying e.g. the inter-
vals in which the macroscopic pointer lies at various times. Again this point of view
represents an interesting improvement with respect to the simple de facto superselec-
tion program since it allows the consideration of a time–chain of events. Moreover, it
gives precise criteria to select decoherent histories from non decoherent ones.
Decoherent Histories supporters maintain that the decoherent sets of histories
can be considered completely in general, i.e. with reference both to macroscopic
and microscopic systems, that one can assign probabilities to them if the consistency
conditions are met, and that within the scheme decoherence replaces the notion of
measurement. This seems to suggest that some objective meaning is given to consis-
tent alternative histories. Here a serious problem arises. It can easily be seen that
alternative histories involving only one time always decohere. One can then consider,
at a given time, different sets of incompatible alternative histories. If the probabilities
are related to possessed properties, then one should assign objective meaning to the
different possible incompatible sets of decoherent histories. In references [51, 52]18 we
have proved that this cannot be done in a consistent way. The problem is the same
as the one of contextuality in hidden variable theories: not too many properties can
be assigned to quantum systems. As a consequence it is not clear the meaning which
should be given to decoherent histories.
A last remark: decoherent histories can also be considered as strictly referring
only to the universe as a whole. When one takes such an attitude one invokes the
natural de facto decoherence of histories about the universe. As appropriately re-
marked in [55] one can then raise the question: what is the status of two histories
belonging to incompatible sets of alternative histories? References [55] and [56] have
also called attention to peculiar difficulties that the Decoherent Histories approach
meets concerning the future–past relation.
We do not pursue the analysis further. Concluding, it seems to us that even
Decoherent Histories do not allow us to attribute consistently an objective meaning
to statements about possessed properties.
4.6 Enriching reality
Such proposals [57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62] maintain that the unitary evolution holds
in all circumstances and dispose of the embarrassment arising from the occurrence
of superpositions of perceptively different states by assuming that in a sense, all
potentialities of the wavefunction become actual. The most widely known proposal
of this type is usually referred to as “The Many Universes Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics” [60, 61, 62].
According to this proposal, each time an interaction leading to superpositions of
macroscopically distinguishable situations occurs, the universe literally splits into (in
general infinitely many) replicas of itself: each replica corresponds to one of the terms
in the superposition and occurs with the appropriate probability. So, in a situation
like the one of equation (4.2) one would state that, after the measurement is over,
there are actually two types of universes; in those of the first type there is an apparatus
whose pointer “points at u” and in the second an apparatus whose pointer “points
at d”. Needless to say, if one wants to describe the situation at later times one has
to go on with the unitary evolution taking into account all interactions which take
18See also [53, 54] for further discussion on this issue.
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place and then, having expressed the final statevector as a superposition of states in
each of which all macro—objects have definite macroscopic properties, associate each
term of the superposition to universes of a different type.
A serious limitation for the proposal comes from the fact that it leaves largely
undefined how and when the multifurcation of the universe takes place. This ambigu-
ity reflects the basic difficulty that Quantum Mechanics meets in locating the “shifty
split” between micro and macroscopic phenomena.
Detailed analyses of the many universes theories have been presented [60, 61, 62].
Here we want to stress that, since to close the circle one needs also some assumptions
about the process of perception, there are at least two choices for this, which give
rise to two quite different alternatives. If one makes simple assumptions about the
psycho–physical correspondence one has the “genuine” many world interpretation: in
the process of replicating the universe also the perceiving subject is replicated, so that
in the above example there will be universes in which we perceive that the pointer
points up and universes with replicas of ourselves having the other perception. Within
each universe the perception is strictly correlated to statevectors corresponding to
different macroscopic situations.
On the other hand, one can take the attitude that it is the perception mechanism
which is more complex than we usually assume; this leads to what has been referred
to as “the many minds interpretation” of the theory. Such a formulation has the
advantage of allowing us to circumvent the ambiguities about the branching of the
universe; there is only one universe and there are many minds (i.e. each mind exhibits
some sort of a full spectrum of perceptions reflecting the macroscopically different
states in the superposition). Many interesting problems arise when one takes this
attitude, the most relevant ones having to do with the intersubjective agreement and
with the reliability of our beliefs. We will not discuss, for lack of space, the details of
these approaches.
We conclude this subsection by stating that, even though we consider these “en-
riching reality” proposals interesting, they seem to require a too radical change in our
views about reality and the adoption of a rather strange ontology. For, according to
them science does not deal any longer with the one world we live in or the perceptual
processes we experience, but at the same time with the totality of all possible worlds
and all possible perceptions.
4.7 Modifying the dynamics
When one assumes that the theory is complete and that pure cases describe genuinely
homogeneous ensembles, the only way to dispose of the embarrassing superpositions
is to say that in one way or another the dynamical equations of the theory are not
always or not exactly right. At this point, two completely different positions can
be and have actually been taken. We will briefly discuss them in the two following
subsections.
4.7.1 Two dynamical principles
This line of thought plainly accepts that there are two dynamical principles which
must be used for describing different physical situations. The best known example of
this attitude consists in accepting wavepacket Reduction: the evolution of microscopic
quantum systems is governed by the unitary and reversible linear Schro¨dinger equa-
tion; the measurement process is governed by the nonlinear process of wavepacket
reduction transforming, in general, pure states into statistical mixtures. The reasons
for this different treatment of physical systems are traced back to the recognition
that there are two classes of phenomena in nature, the quantum and the classical,
the reversible and the irreversible, the microscopic and the macroscopic ones. Further
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support to this attitude is given by saying that, in a sense, classical concepts are a
prerequisite for the very formulation of quantum formalism.
One could find many reasons for considering legitimate such a position; after all,
all physical theories have a limited range of applicability. In this respect Quantum
Mechanics would be claimed to find its limit in the description of the micro–macro
interactions taking place in the measurement process. However, as repeatedly stressed
by J. Bell and as already discussed in the previous section, the real difficulty which
this line meets does not stem from its dualistic attitude about our understanding
of natural phenomena, but derives from the fact that there is nothing in the theory
which allows us to locate the “split” between the two considered classes of phenomena.
When trying to follow this line, as J. Bell has stated [2], are we not obliged to admit
that measurement like processes are going more or less all the time, more or less
everywhere?
The remark is so appropriate that E.P. Wigner [63], having recognized the un-
avoidability of accepting two dynamical principles, felt the necessity of following von
Neumann’s proposal: to solve the problem one has to go to the extreme end of the
chain of observation and to assume that reduction does not take place until somebody
knows that it must, i.e. up to when conscious observers are involved. This position
leads to a quite peculiar conclusion, i.e. that the world as we know it, is very much a
product of conscious mind. In spite of this, one could say that such a position repre-
sents a simple and effective solution (reduction actually takes place) to the problems
we are debating except that it suffers once again from an intrinsic ambiguity. For the
question: “what is conscious?” does not admit any unambiguous answer on the basis
of our present knowledge about nature and human beings.
The impossibility of locating the split between the two types of physical systems
(quantum–classical) which should be governed by different laws as well as the impos-
sibility of clearly identifying the processes involving consciousness clearly show that
also the program outlined here does not allow one to “close the circle”. We pass then
to consider the other option: the dynamical equation of the theory is not right.
4.7.2 Unified dynamics: Dynamical Reduction Models
The program seeks a modification of the evolution law in such a way that measurement–
like processes have definite outcomes as a consequence of the unified dynamics gov-
erning all physical processes [64, 65, 66, 67, 68]. In this search some guidance is of
course given by the fact that the modified dynamics should imply wavepacket reduc-
tion as a consequence of the interaction of the microsystem and the macro–apparatus
and, more generally, forbid the persistence of linear superpositions of macroscopically
different states. With this in mind, one remarks that the characteristic features dis-
tinguishing quantum evolution from wavepacket reduction are that, while Schro¨dinger
equation is linear and deterministic, wavepacket reduction is nonlinear and stochastic.
It is then natural to entertain the idea of nonlinear and stochastic modifications of
the standard Hamiltonian dynamics.
Obviously such a programmust respect strict constraints, in particular, it must not
contradict any known fact about micro–phenomena. Secondly, to meet the requests we
have repeatedly mentioned in this paper, it must allow a clearcut identification of the
split between phenomena for which standard Quantum Mechanics holds (obviously
this has now to be read: for which the approximation consisting in disregarding the
nonlinear terms of the “exact” theory is legitimate and under control) and those for
which the new dynamics leads to relevant differences with respect to the standard
theory, more specifically to a “classical behaviour”. The analysis of proposals of this
type, of what they have accomplished and of the difficulties they meet will be the
subject of the rest of the report.
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Part II
Non Relativistic Dynamical
Reduction Models
5 Preliminary considerations
The aim of Dynamical Reduction Models is to account for the process of wavepacket
reduction and the Schro¨dinger evolution in terms of a unique dynamical equation
leading to the spontaneous suppression of the superpositions of different macroscopic
states of a macro–system; at the same time, the new dynamics must not change in
any appreciable way all the known properties of microscopic quantum systems. As
already stated, one tries to achieve this goal by introducing nonlinear and stochastic
modifications of the standard Hamiltonian dynamics.
In this section we want to prove that both non linearity and stochasticity are
necessary ingredients in order to account for an acceptable spontaneous reduction
mechanism. More specifically, we will show that neither a nonlinear but deterministic
modification nor a stochastic but linear one, can lead to a consistent theory of dy-
namical reductions. A linear and stochastic modification induces at most an apparent
collapse of the wavefunction; a nonlinear but deterministic modification, on the other
hand, unavoidably violates basic relativistic constraints. Before discussing these is-
sues, we will answer the following question: should the localization mechanism act
at the wavefunction level, or is it sufficient, as suggested by some authors [9, 10, 11],
that it suppresses the the off–diagonal elements of the statistical operator? The an-
swer will be clear: a consistent dynamical reduction theory must induce localizations
directly at the wavefunction level (we speak in this case of individual or Heisemberg
reductions [69]), and not only at the statistical operator level (which we refer to as
ensemble or von Neumann reductions).
5.1 Individual and ensemble reductions
We have widely discussed in the previous section the fact that the macro–objectification
problem arises when a superposition of macroscopically different states of a macro-
scopic object — for example the superposition with equal weights of two such states
|Here〉 and |There〉 — occurs, e.g. as the result of a measurement process:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[ |Here〉 + |There〉 ] . (5.1)
In the language of the statistical operator, state (5.1) is represented by:
ρ ≡ |ψ〉〈ψ| = 1
2
[ |Here〉〈Here| + |There〉〈There| +
|Here〉〈There| + |There〉〈Here| ] , (5.2)
whose matrix representation with respect to the basis19 |Here〉 and |There〉 is:
ρ =
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
. (5.3)
Let us consider now N identical macroscopic systems whose state is (5.1). Our
declared goal is to find a universal mechanism which transforms such an ensemble into
19Of course, here we make a gross simplification, treating a macroscopic object like a simple
two–dimensional system; however, this does not invalidate the basic conclusions of our analysis.
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the statistical mixture in which half of the systems are in the state |Here〉, and the
other half in the state |There〉, in accordance with the wavepacket reduction postulate:
1
2
systems in state |Here〉 and 1
2
systems in state |There〉. (5.4)
The ensemble (5.4), in which all systems have definite macro–properties, can be easily
described within the statistical operator formalism:
ρ′ =
1
2
[ |Here〉〈Here| + |There〉〈There|] ; (5.5)
the corresponding density matrix is:
ρ′ =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (5.6)
Thus we see that, in order to eliminate the embarrassing superposition of different
macroscopic states, the dynamics we are looking for must induce the following change
of the statistical operator:
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
evolution−→ 1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
, (5.7)
i.e. it must suppress the off–diagonal terms of the density matrix, corresponding to
matrix elements connecting different macroscopic states.
Here comes the crucial point: does a dynamical evolution like (5.7) really guar-
antee by itself the suppression of superpositions of different macroscopic states? The
answer is negative. The reason for this lies in the fact that the statistical operator
describing a statistical mixture, describes at the same time infinitely many
inequivalent statistical mixtures — this is the weak point (for the problem we
are interested in) of the statistical operator formalism. In fact, let us consider the
following statistical mixture:
Half systems in state
1√
2
[|Here〉+ |There〉] (5.8)
and half systems in state
1√
2
[|There〉 − |There〉]. (5.9)
Of course, (5.8) describes a statistical ensemble which is completely different from
the one defined in (5.4); however, it is easy to check that the statistical operator
describing it is (5.5), i.e. the same one associated to the mixture (5.4).
The root of the problem should be clear: working only at the statistical operator
level, we cannot be sure that a dynamical evolution like (5.7) transforms the pure
state (5.1) into the statistical mixture (5.4) — a mixture whose elements have definite
macroscopic properties — instead of transforming it into a mixture like (5.8), whose
elements are still superpositions of different macro–states. This means that, in order
to work out a fully consistent and unambiguous theory of dynamical reductions, we
have to assume that the localizations affect directly the wavefunction, not only the
statistical operator.
5.2 Linear and stochastic modifications of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion
The easiest way to implement a dynamical evolution like (5.7), which suppresses the
interference terms arising from superpositions of different macro–states of a macro-
scopic system, is to add a white noise stochastic potential V (t) to the standard
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Schro¨dinger equation for the wavefunction [70]. Here we give a simplified description
of how this can be achieved, considering the case of one particle in one dimension.
We disregard the Hamiltonian evolution and discretize the real axis R into intervals
∆i of appropriate length. We define the projection operators
Pi ψ(x) = χi(x)ψ(x), (5.10)
where χi(x) is the characteristic function of the i–th interval.
Let us now consider the following equation:
ih¯
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i
Pi Vi(t) |ψ(t)〉. (5.11)
Vi(t) are white noise processes characterized by the expectation values
20:
〈〈Vi(t)〉〉 = 0 〈〈Vi(t)Vj(t′)〉〉 = γ δij δ(t− t′). (5.12)
The formal solution of equation (5.11) is:
|ψ(t)〉 = e
− i
h¯
∫ t
0
dτ
∑
i
Pi Vi(τ)
|ψ(0)〉 =
∑
i
e
− i
h¯
∫ t
0
dτVi(τ)
Pi |ψ(0)〉. (5.13)
If one defines the statistical operator
ρ(t) = 〈〈|ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)|〉〉, (5.14)
the stochastic average is easily evaluated and one discovers that ρ(t) obeys the evo-
lution equation:
d
dt
ρ(t) = γ
∑
i
Piρ(t)Pi − γ
2
∑
i
{
P 2i , ρ(t)
}
, (5.15)
which, as we shall see, is basically the same equation as the one characterizing the
dynamical reduction models we will discuss in great detail in the following sections.
Let us now consider the vectors |∆i〉 whose position representation is 〈x|∆i〉 =
χi(x); then, equation (5.15) leads to the following equation for the matrix elements
〈∆i|ρ(t)|∆j〉 of the statistical operator:
d
dt
〈∆i|ρ(t)|∆j〉 = γ (δij − 1) 〈∆i|ρ(t)|∆j〉. (5.16)
We see that the diagonal elements do not change in time, while the off–diagonal
elements are exponentially damped, with a rate given by γ; this means that equation
(5.16) embodies precisely an evolution like (5.7). Does equation (5.11), then, lead to
the reduction of the statevector into one of the states |∆i〉, as it seems to follow from
equation (5.16)? The answer is no, for the following reason.
Let us consider the average values 〈ψ(t)|Pi|ψ(t)〉, measuring the portion of the
wavefunction ψ(x, t) = 〈x|ψ(t)〉 which is contained within the interval ∆i. If equation
(5.11) induces, as one could naively believe due to (5.16), the reduction of ψ(x, t) into
one interval, let us say ∆k, then the following relation would necessarily hold:
〈ψ(t)|Pi|ψ(t)〉 −→ δik for t→∞. (5.17)
20We indicate with 〈〈·〉〉 the average value of the quantity contained within the “brackets”.
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On the contrary, for any realization of the stochastic potential and for any time t,
since Pi commutes with the evolution operator:
〈ψ(t)|Pi|ψ(t)〉 = 〈ψ(0)|Pi|ψ(0)〉. (5.18)
This means that, if |ψ(0)〉 corresponds to a non localized function, the individual
members of the ensemble are always associated to non localized functions. The di-
agonalization of ρ arises from the random phases acquired by the states in different
intervals ∆i, not from a real reduction of the statevector.
Stapp [69] has considered this problem and has suggested to accept a stochastic
mechanism of this type, relating it to fluctuations associated to the background radi-
ation. We do not like this proposal. At the macro–level we want that each individual
has actualities: those of being in a given region. If this does not happen, how can
one avoid the problem arising from the many to one relation of ensembles with statis-
tical operators, discussed in the previous subsection? This shows that the fact that
equation (5.11) leads to a statistical operator of type (5.4) is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition in order that the ensemble (5.14) can be considered a union of
pure cases corresponding to localized states. This is why, in the following sections,
we will confine our considerations to models yielding Heisenberg reductions for the
statevector.
To conclude: we have presented a stochastic equation for the statevector, equation
(5.11), leading to equation (5.15) for the statistical operator, which induces precisely
an evolution like the one of equation (5.7), i.e. an evolution which would be considered
as transforming ensembles of non localized states into ensembles of localized ones.
Equation (5.11) is characterized by a hermitian coupling of the stochastic noise to
the operators Pi, and is linear; however, it gives rise only to the diagonalization of
the statistical operator leaving the individual wavefunctions spatially extended. This
strongly suggests that the introduction of stochasticity into the evolution equation
(i.e. the possibility that a given state evolves in different states according to its
own story) combined with the requirement that in the long run the statevector ends
up in one of the eigenmanifolds characterizing the preferred basis (actual individual
reductions) implies that the dynamics must be nonlinear. As a matter of fact, the
evolution laws of the dynamical reduction models are stochastic and nonlinear.
As we will see in the next section, in a certain sense also the converse is true, i.e.
the consideration of nonlinear modifications of the evolution equation requires, when
some basic relativistic constrains are added, the introduction of stochasticity into the
equation.
5.3 Nonlinear and deterministic modifications of the Schro¨-
dinger equation
Within standard quantum formalism the postulate of wavepacket reduction is chosen
in such a way that, even though the state of the system can be instantaneously changed
by a distant measurement, such change cannot be used to send faster than light signals
between distant observers [71, 72, 73, 74]. This is a nice feature in absence of which an
unacceptable violation of relativistic requirements would occur. In fact, even though
quantum mechanics as considered here, and in particular the process of wavepacket
reduction, does not pretend to be a relativistically invariant theoretical scheme, the
fact that the instantaneous changes induced by wavepacket reduction itself do not
depend in any way whatsoever from the distance between two constituents one of
which is subjected to a measurement, forbids us to think that wavepacket reduction
itself might represent some non relativistic approximation of a relativistic process. If
the considered changes permit one observer to become instantaneously aware of the
fact that the other (far away) constituent has been subjected to a measurement, an
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explicit clash with basic relativistic requirements would emerge, making the process
unacceptable.
Obviously the problem of possible instantaneous and detectable effects at a dis-
tance must be faced when formulating a dynamical reduction model, since, a priori,
one cannot be sure that they do not occur. In this respect it is appropriate to take
into account a quite general and interesting result obtained by N. Gisin [75]. Let us
consider a map from statistical ensembles to statistical ensembles (we remember that
we characterize a statistical ensemble by specifying the pure states appearing in it
and the associated statistical weights):
MtE(0) −→ E(t). (5.19)
In accordance with the analysis of section 4.3.1, we say that two statistical ensem-
bles E and E′ are equivalent if the corresponding statistical operators belong to the
same equivalence class:
E ∼ E′ iff: ρ(E), ρ(E′) ∈ [ρ]. (5.20)
We can prove the following theorem: a necessary condition in order that the mapMt
describes an evolution which does not conflict with relativity in the sense specified
above (i.e. it does not permit faster than light signaling), is that the equivalence
relation be preserved by Mt, i.e.
E(0) ∼ E′(0) =⇒ E(t) ∼ E′(t) (5.21)
Technically one expresses this requirement by stating that the evolution equation for
the statistical operator is closed.
Let us sketch the proof: assume E1(0) ∼ E2(0) but E1(t) 6∼ E2(t), i.e. ρ1(t) 6=
ρ2(t); this means that E1(t) and E2(t) do not belong to the same equivalence class.
E1(0) and E2(0) are ensembles which are union of pure cases |ψi〉 with associated
weights xi and of pure cases |χi〉 with weights yj, respectively. Then one can show21
that it is possible to choose an Hilbert space K and two orthonormal sets |αi〉 and
|βj〉 in it such that, in H⊗K one has∑
i
√
xi |ψi〉 ⊗ |αi〉 =
∑
j
√
yj |χj〉 ⊗ |βj〉 = |S +K〉. (5.22)
Moreover one can make the state |S+K〉 correspond to the system S and the auxiliary
system K (associated to the Hilbert space K) being located in two distant regions R1
andR2 respectively. The idea is then very simple: one prepares an ensemble of systems
S+K, all of which are in the pure “composite state” |S+K〉. Then, in region R2 one
measures either the observable A whose eigenstates are |αi〉 or the observable B whose
eigenstates are |βj〉. Because of wavepacket reduction, the ensemble of systems S (in
region R1) becomes equivalent either to the ensemble E1(0) or to the ensemble E2(0),
according to the measurement which has been performed on the auxiliary system at
the time t = 0. These two ensembles are equivalent. However, by hypothesis, they will
no longer be equivalent at a later time t, and consequently the corresponding statistical
operators will be different: ρ1(t) 6= ρ2(t). The evolution of the two ensembles then
yields, at subsequent times, physically distinguishable situations in R1. In this way
the observer in R2 can let another observer in R1 know what measurement he has
decided to perform on his (distant from R1) auxiliary system, and this allows faster
than light signaling. It is important to remark that the dynamics for the statevector
given by the dynamical reduction models which are the subject of the present report
21See, e.g., ref.[76] and references therein.
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actually leads to a closed evolution equation for the statistical operator, a necessary
condition, according to Gisin’s theorem, in order that they satisfy the no faster than
light constraint22.
The most interesting aspect of Gisin’s result, from the point of view we are inter-
ested in here is that, in a sense, it proves “that nonlinearity requires stochasticity”.
In fact, suppose we consider a deterministic map of pure states into pure states
St |ψ(0)〉 −→ |ψ(t)〉 (5.23)
Then a mixture of states |ψi〉 with weights xi evolves into a mixture of states St |ψi〉
with the same weights. In particular∑
i
xi |ψi〉〈ψi| −→
∑
i
xi St|ψi〉〈ψi|S†t . (5.24)
Let us consider now, at the initial time t = 0, two physically different ensembles E(0)
with states |ψi〉 and weights xi and E′(0) with states |χi〉 and weights yj, which are
equivalent, i.e. ρ(0) =
∑
i xi |ψi〉〈ψi| =
∑
j yj |χi〉〈χi|. Two cases are then possible:
1. In at least one such case the evolved ensembles are inequivalent. Then an
unacceptable conflict with relativity arises, as implied by Gisin’s theorem.
2. The evolved ensembles are always equivalent. Then, by a general theorem of
Davies [78], one can conclude that the evolution given by St must be linear and
unitary.
It is interesting to note that the above argument [79] shows that the attempt by Wein-
berg [80] of introducing nonlinear deterministic modifications of quantum mechanics
turns out to be unacceptable.
Taking the risk of being pedantic, we stress once more that from our point of
view the interest of Gisin’s theorem lies in the fact that it proves that if one wants
to consider nonlinear modifications of quantum mechanics one is forced to introduce
stochasticity and thus, in particular, the dynamics must allow the transformation of
ensembles corresponding to pure cases into statistical mixtures.
5.4 Brief history of dynamical reduction models
We conclude the section with a brief review of the historical development of dynamical
reduction models. The history goes back to the years 1970–1973, when G.C. Ghirardi,
L. Fonda, A. Rimini and T. Weber were working on quantum decay processes and in
particular on the possibility of deriving, within a quantum context, the exponential
decay law [81, 82]. Some features of their approach have been extremely relevant for
the subsequent elaboration of the dynamical reduction program:
1. One deals with individual physical systems.
2. The statevector is supposed to suffer random processes occurring at random
times, leading to appropriate sudden changes of it:
|ψ〉 −→ Pu|ψ〉‖Pu|ψ〉‖ ;
when Pu is identified with the projection operator on the unstable state mani-
fold, one gets the desired result.
22A. Kent [77] has proposed a dynamical reduction model which allows a simple treatment of
systems with identical constituents; however, this can be easily shown to imply that equivalent
ensembles can evolve into inequivalent ones, with the possibility of faster than light signaling, so
that the proposal has to be disregarded.
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3. To make the treatment quite general (the apparatus does not know which kind
of unstable system it is testing) the authors have been led to identify the ran-
dom processes with localization processes of the relative coordinates of the decay
fragments. Such an assumption, combined with the peculiar “resonant dynam-
ics” of an unstable system, yield completely in general the desired result. The
“relative position basis” is the preferred basis of this theory.
4. The authors have also applied their ideas to measurement processes [83].
5. The final equation for the evolution at the ensemble level is of the quantum
dynamical semigroup type [84, 85] and has a structure extremely similar to the
final one of the GRW theory.
In 1973 P. Pearle was the first to suggest to account for the reduction process in
terms of stochastic differential equations. He pursued this line for various years. How-
ever, he did not succeed in identifying the appropriate states to which the dynamical
equation should lead and consequently a mechanism whose effectiveness could have
been negligible for microsystems but extremely relevant for the macroscopic ones.
The lack of the identification of the preferred basis, i.e. of what ”is out there”, was
the main obstacle for the success of the program.
The breakthrough is dated 1984. In that year the research program suggested by
Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [64, 65, 86] started to be developed23. In these papers,
the first consistent and satisfactory model (QMSL) of dynamical reductions, the one
on which all subsequent attempts are based, was presented and discussed in detail.
The key assumption is that each elementary constituent of any system is subjected,
at random times according to a Poisson distribution with mean frequency λ = 10−16
sec−1, to random and spontaneous localization processes around appropriate posi-
tions. One assumes that the probability distribution of these processes is such that
hittings, i.e. spontaneous localizations around specific points in space, occur with a
higher probability at those places where, in the standard quantum description, there
is a higher probability of finding the particle. As will be clear in the following sec-
tion, the above prescriptions can be satisfied by introducing precise non–linear and
stochastic elements in the dynamics.
It is extremely easy also to convince oneself that the model embodies the so–called
trigger mechanism, i.e. that the spontaneous reductions become more and more
frequent with increasing the number of particles of the system under consideration.
The models thus “has the property required ... of having little impact for small
systems but nevertheless suppressing macroscopic superpositions” [87].
In the years 1989–90 the efforts of Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber on the one side and of
P. Pearle on the other, were joined together and CSL (the Continuous Spontaneous
Localizations model) was developed [88, 66]. CSL is based on a modified Schro¨dinger
equation containing new stochastic and nonlinear terms besides the standard hamil-
tonian. These new terms induce a diffusion process for the statevector which acts like
a continuous hitting: it is precisely this diffusion process which is responsible for the
reduction of the statevector.
The next obvious step was to generalize dynamical reduction models to relativistic
quantum field theories. Various attempts have been made [89, 67], typically by con-
sidering models in which quantum fields are locally coupled to scalar white noises. All
the desired properties of the non relativistic theory, the most important one being the
localization in space of macroscopic objects, hold also in the relativistic case. How-
ever, the reduction mechanism induces an infinite increase of the energy of physical
systems per unit time and unit volume: such models are then physically unacceptable.
23Actually, even though ref.[64] has been published in 1985, it appears among the proceedings of
a Conference held at Heidelberg in 1984.
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The work on relativistic dynamical reduction models is still in progress; there are
some hints that the difficulties so far encountered can be solved by generalizing the
coupling of the fields to the stochastic noises [90, 91, 92]; such generalizations however
have still to be studied in detail.
6 Quantum Mechanics with Spontaneous Localiza-
tions (QMSL)
The guiding lines which led Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber to formulate the first con-
sistent dynamical reduction model, called Quantum Mechanics with Spontaneous Lo-
calizations (QMSL) [64, 65], are basically two:
1. The “preferred basis” — the basis on which reductions take place — must be
chosen in such a way to guarantee a definite position in space to macroscopic
objects.
2. The modified dynamics must have little impact on microscopic objects, but at
the same time must reduce the superposition of different macroscopic states
of macro–systems. There must then be an “amplification” mechanism when
moving from the micro to the macro level.
The section is devoted to the analysis of how these ideas have been successfully imple-
mented. We first list the axioms defining the universal (i.e. valid both at the micro-
scopic and at the macroscopic level) dynamics of QMSL and we show, by resorting to
a simple example, how the reduction mechanism works; the general discussion of stat-
evector collapse is more easily accomplished within the framework of the continuous
model (CSL) analyzed in the following sections, so it will be postponed. In subsection
6.2 we derive the dynamical evolution law of the statistical operator, and we discuss
the effect of the modified dynamics on a free particle.
Subsections 6.3 and 6.4 are the core of the section. In 6.3 we specialize our anal-
ysis to the case of a simple macroscopic system, a free macroscopic particle, proving
that the reducing terms of QMSL yield a classical description for the macro–particle:
this is how the macro–objectification problem of Quantum Mechanics finds a natu-
ral solution within QMSL. In subsection 6.4 we deepen our analysis of macroscopic
systems, showing how their classical properties emerge from the quantum properties
of their constituents. This means that QMSL embodies a single universal dynamics
which takes into account both the quantum properties of microscopic systems and
the classical properties of macroscopic objects.
In 6.5 we discuss the possible numerical choices of the two parameters appearing in
the modified dynamics. They must be chosen in such a way that all known properties
of microscopic quantum systems are not altered in any significant way, while the
classical properties of macroscopic systems must be guaranteed. The final subsection
is devoted to a mathematical review of quantum dynamical semigroups, a class of
evolution dynamics to which the QMSL basic equation belongs.
6.1 The assumptions of the model
Quantum Mechanics with Spontaneous Localizations [64, 65] is based on the following
assumptions:
1. Each particle of a system of n distinguishable particles experiences, with a mean
rate λi, a sudden spontaneous localization process.
2. In the time interval between two successive spontaneous processes the system
evolves according to the usual Schro¨dinger equation.
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3. The sudden spontaneous process is a localization described by:
|ψ〉 localization−→ |ψ
i
x〉
‖|ψix〉‖
, (6.1)
where |ψix〉 = Lix |ψ〉. Lix is a norm–reducing, positive, self–adjoint, linear oper-
ator in the n–particle Hilbert space H, representing the localization of particle
i around the point x.
4. The probability density for the occurrence of a localization at point x is assumed
to be
Pi(x) = ‖|ψix〉‖2 : (6.2)
This requires that ∫
d3x
[
Lix
]2
= 1 (6.3)
5. The localization operators Lix have been chosen to have the form:
Lix =
(α
π
)3/4
e
−α
2
(qi − x)2
, (6.4)
qi being the position operator for particle i.
Before going on, we want to make clear a fundamental conceptual point. Here, and
in the following, when we speak of “particles” we are are simply using the standard,
somehow inappropriate, quantum mechanical language. Within dynamical reduction
models particles are not point–like objects which move in space following appropri-
ate trajectories according to the forces they are subjected to (as it is the case of,
e.g., Bohmian mechanics). In dynamical reduction models, like in standard quantum
mechanics, particles are represented just by the wavefunction which, in general, is
spread all over the space. As we will see, the basic property of the models analyzed
here is that, when a large number of “particles” interact with each other in appro-
priate ways, they end up being always extremely well localized in space, leading in
this way to a situation which is perfectly adequate for characterizing what we call a
“macroscopic object”. Thus, strictly speaking [32] the are no particles in dynamical
reduction models at the fundamental level; there is simply a microscopic, quantum,
wave–like realm which gives rise to the usual classical realm at the macroscopic level.
It is easy to see how the reduction mechanism works with the help of the following
simple example. Let us consider the superposition of two gaussian functions, one
centered around position −a and the other around position a (for simplicity we deal
with the one–dimensional case):
ψ(z) =
1
N
[
e
−γ
2
(z + a)2
+ e
−γ
2
(z − a)2
]
; (6.5)
N is a normalization constant. Let us assume that 1/√γ ≪ 1/√α and a≫ 1/√α: the
distance between the two gaussians is much greater than the localization amplitude,
while their width is much smaller than it.
Let us now consider a hitting centered around a; the wavefunction changes as
follows:
ψ(z) −→ ψa(z) = 1Na

e−2αa2 e−γ2 (z + a)2 + e−γ + α2 (z − a)2

 . (6.6)
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We see that the gaussian function centered around position −a has been exponentially
suppressed with respect to the other term, whose width is practically left unchanged:
the new wavefunction describes a particle very well localized around position a. More-
over, it is easy to check that the probability for such a hitting to occur, as given by
(6.2), is almost equal to 1/2 i.e. the quantum mechanical probability to find the
particle in a. Of course, a similar argument holds if the hitting takes place around
position −a.
Finally, let us consider the case in which a hitting takes place in a region far
from both gaussians, e.g. around the origin 0. In such a case it is easy to verify
that the wavefunction does not change in any appreciable way. The reduction to a
localized state does not occur. However, the probability for such an hitting to occur
is extremely small, about e−αa
2
. Concluding, reductions are more likely to occur
where the probability to find a particle, according to the standard interpretation of
the wavefunction, is greater.
6.2 The equation for the statistical operator
Within QMSL, the reduction mechanism transforms pure states into statistical mix-
tures; we can then resort to the statistical operator formalism to investigate specific
physical consequences of the theory, such as the time evolution of the mean values of
dynamical variables. However, it is important to stress once more that the reduction
mechanism must be effective at the wavefunction level, as it should be clear according
to the analysis of section 5.1, and as we have already proved with the help of the very
simple example of the previous section (the general situation will be discussed in the
next section).
Let us consider a single particle. Suppose it suffers a hitting process: its wavefunc-
tion |ψ〉 changes it into the new wavefunction |ψx〉. We do not know where the hitting
occurs, but only the probability for it to occur around position x. Accordingly, the
pure state is transformed into the following statistical mixture:
|ψ〉〈ψ| −→
∫
d3xP (x)
|ψx〉〈ψx|
‖|ψx〉‖2 =
=
∫
d3xLix|ψ〉〈ψ|Lix ≡ T [|ψ〉〈ψ|]. (6.7)
Of course, if the initial state of the particle is not pure but a statistical mixture given
by the operator ρ, the effect of a hitting process is the same as the one described
above: ρ changes into T [ρ].
We derive now the evolution equation for ρ(t). In a time interval dt, the statistical
operator evolves in the following way: since the localization mechanism is Poissonian,
there is a probability λdt for a hitting to occur during that time interval, in which
case ρ changes to T [ρ], and a probability 1− λdt for no hittings to occur so that the
statistical operator evolves according to the usual Schro¨dinger equation:
ρ(t+ dt) = (1− λdt)
[
ρ(t)− i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)]dt
]
+ λdt T [ρ(t)],
i.e.:
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] − λ (ρ(t) − T [ρ(t)]) . (6.8)
This is the master equation of QMSL, describing the quantum evolution of a single
particle which undergoes random localization processes; it has a quantum–dynamical–
semigroup structure, which we will discuss at the end of the section.
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In the coordinate representation one has, according to assumption 5:
〈q′|T [ρ]|q′′〉 = e−
α
4
(q′ − q′′)2〈q′|ρ|q′′〉. (6.9)
Since, owing to equation (6.9),
〈q|T [ρ]|q〉 = 〈q|ρ|q〉, (6.10)
equation (6.8) is obviously trace preserving. Moreover, using equation (6.8), it can
be easily proved that
d
dt
Tr[ρ2] < 0. (6.11)
This implies that the dynamical evolution transforms pure states into statistical mix-
tures.
Let us now consider equation (6.8) in the case in which H is the Hamiltonian for a
free particle; for simplicity we work in one dimension. In the coordinate representation
we get
∂
∂t
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉 = ih¯
2m
[
∂2
∂q′2
− ∂
2
∂q′′2
]
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉
−λ
[
1− e−
α
4
(q′ − q′′)2
]
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉. (6.12)
One can express the solution of the above equation satisfying given initial conditions in
terms of the solution 〈q′|ρSch(t)|q′′〉 of the pure Schro¨dinger equation (λ = 0) satisfying
the same initial conditions, according to [65]:
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉 = 1
2πh¯
∫ +∞
−∞
dk
∫ +∞
−∞
dy e
− i
h¯
ky
F (k, q′ − q′′, t) 〈q′ + y|ρSch(t)|q′′ + y〉
(6.13)
where
F (k, q, t) = e
−λt+ λ
∫ t
0
dτ e
−α
4
(
q − kτ
m
)2
. (6.14)
The Hermitian symmetry of ρ(t) follows from the property F (k, q, t) = F (−k,−q, t).
To understand the dynamical evolution described by equation (6.12) we can eval-
uate the mean values, spreads, and correlations for the position and momentum op-
erators for all times. In the considered case, it turns out [65] that these variables are
related to those of the pure Schro¨dinger evolution by:
〈〈q〉〉 = 〈〈q〉〉Sch (6.15)
〈〈p〉〉 = 〈〈p〉〉Sch (6.16)
{q} ≡ 〈〈[q − 〈〈q〉〉]2〉〉 = {q}Sch + αλh¯
2
6m2
t3 (6.17)
{qp} ≡ 〈〈[(q − 〈〈q〉〉)(p − 〈〈p〉〉)]sym〉〉 = {qp}Sch + αλh¯
2
4m
t2 (6.18)
{p} ≡ 〈〈[p− 〈〈p〉〉]2〉〉 = {p}Sch + αλh¯
2
2
t. (6.19)
In equation (6.18) we have denoted by [ · ]sym the Hermitian part of the quantity in
square brackets. The shorthands {q}, {qp}, {p} have been introduced to simplify
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the notation of the formal developments of the following sections. We note that the
mean values are not affected by the non Hermitian term in equation (6.8). For what
concerns spreads and correlation, the corrections depend only on the combination αλ
of the parameters α and λ.
6.3 Discussion of the non Hamiltonian dynamics for a free
macroscopic particle
In this subsection we begin the analysis of the effects of the modified dynamics on
macroscopic systems; for simplicity, we first consider the case of a free macroscopic
particle. Its time evolution is embodied into equation (6.12), where the mass m now
has the order of magnitude of the mass of a macroscopic object.
We remark that the standard quantum dynamics, in the case of a free particle,
induces for the mean values 〈〈q〉〉Sch and 〈〈p〉〉Sch exactly the classical evolution. More-
over, for any reasonable choice of the initial spreads of the position ∆ q =
√{q} and
of the momentum ∆ p =
√{p}, the increase of ∆ q when time elapses, in virtue of
the smallness of the Planck constant and of the large value of the mass of a macro-
scopic object, can be completely disregarded for all interesting times. However, the
recognition of this fact does not exhaust the problem of the derivation of the classical
behaviour of a macroscopic object from quantum principles, since problems remain
open when linear superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states can occur.
In such cases, as already discussed, a satisfactory classical description would require
that the statistical ensemble decomposes into a statistical mixture of macroscopically
distinguishable states. Let us discuss the above points within the framework of the
non Hamiltonian dynamics introduced in the previous subsections.
First of all we can observe that Ehrenfest’s theorem holds true also for the modified
dynamics. In fact, for any dynamical variable X , which is a function of the operator
q only, it is easily shown that
Tr{X(q)T [ρ]} = Tr[X(q) ρ]. (6.20)
This in turns implies
d
dt
〈〈X(q)〉〉 = Tr
[
X(q)
d ρ
dt
]
= − i
h¯
Tr{X(q) [H, ρ]}, (6.21)
as it happens for the Schro¨dinger evolution. It follows that
d
dt
〈〈q〉〉 = 1
m
〈〈p〉〉. (6.22)
For the operator p one finds
Tr{p T [ρ]} = Tr{p ρ}. (6.23)
Then, if H = p2/2m+ V (q), we have
d
dt
〈〈p〉〉 = −
〈〈
∂V
∂q
〉〉
. (6.24)
In accordance with this property, equations (6.15) and (6.16) show that in the case
of a free macroscopic particle24 the mean values of position and momentum are not
affected by the non–Hamiltonian terms. On the contrary, in the expression for the
spreads additional terms appear. These terms increase with time, so that one can
24Actually, of any free particle.
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identify a characteristic time interval T during which they remain small with respect
to those expressing the Schro¨dinger evolution. T turns out to be of the order of the
smaller of the two times T1 and T2 given by
T1 =
[
6m2(∆qSch)
2
αλh¯2
]1/3
T2 =
2(∆pSch)
2
αλh¯2
. (6.25)
For the time interval T the spreads given by equations (6.17)–(6.19) coincide prac-
tically with the Schro¨dinger values, which in turn are negligible for any reasonable
choice of their initial values. We shall discuss below the values taken by T when the
parameters of the model are appropriately chosen.
The fact that ∆ q2 and ∆ p2 are very close to the Schro¨dinger values for an appro-
priate time interval is strictly related to the small influence of the non–Hamiltonian
term on the matrix elements of the statistical operator 〈q′|ρ|q′′〉 when |q′ − q′′| ≪
1/
√
α. On the contrary, the non–Hamiltonian dynamics has a drastic effect on the
off–diagonal elements when |q′ − q′′| ≥ 1/√α. This can be easily understood by ob-
serving that the properties of the function F (k, q, t) are remarkably different in the
two cases q = 0 and q 6= 0. In fact, when q = 0 the integral in the exponent in equation
(6.14) for sufficiently small t behaves like t, yielding the cancellation of the factor e−λt
and making F (k, 0, t) very near to 1. Since F = 1 implies 〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉 = 〈q′|ρSch(t)|q′′〉,
this shows that the (almost) diagonal matrix elements of the statistical operator in the
coordinate representation are practically unaffected for an appropriate time interval
by the non–Hamiltonian term in the evolution equation. On the contrary, for q 6= 0,
the integral in equation (6.14) cannot cancel, even for small times, the damping factor
e−λt, so that the off–diagonal elements are rapidly suppressed.
To make these statements more precise we derive two inequalities for the function
F (k, q, t) for the two cases q = 0 and q > 0.
a) q = 0 Since
1
t
∫ t
0
dτ e
−αk
2τ2
4m2 ≥ e−
αk2t2
4m2 , (6.26)
it follows that
F (k, 0, t) > e
−λt
(
1− e−αk2t2/4m2
)
≥ 1− αλk
2t3
4m2
, (6.27)
the last inequality being useful for αλk2t2/4m2 < 1. We then have
1− F (k, 0, t) ≤ αλk
2t3
4m2
. (6.28)
b) q > 0 The function F can be written as
F (k, q, t) = e
−λt
[
1− h
(
(
√
α/2)
kt
m
, (
√
α/2)q
)]
, (6.29)
where
h(x, y) =
1
x
∫ x−y
−y
dz e−z2 . (6.30)
The function h(x, y) is the mean value of e−z
2
on the interval (−y, x−y). Clearly
one has
h(x, y) < h(y, y) = h(2y, y) (6.31)
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for x < y, and
h(x, y) < h(2y, y) (6.32)
for x > 2y. For y < x < 2y one finds
h(x, y) <
1
x
∫ y
−y
dz e−z2 < 1
y
∫ y
−y
dz e−z2 = 2 h(2y, y), (6.33)
so that, on the whole,
h(x, y) < 2 h(2y, y) =
√
π
y
erf(y). (6.34)
In turn the function F obeys the inequality
F (k, q, t) < e−λβt, (6.35)
where
β = 1 −
√
π
(
√
α/2)q
erf [(
√
α/2)q]. (6.36)
Inequalities (6.27) and (6.35) prove the correctness of our previous statements about
the behaviour of F (k, q, t) and, consequently, about the features of the dynamics con-
cerning the diagonal and off–diagonal elements of the density matrix in configuration
space.
We come back to the discussion of the diagonal elements of the statistical operator,
using the just derived inequalities (6.27) and (6.35) for the function F (k, q, t). From
equation (6.13) we see that
〈q|ρSch(t)|q〉 − 〈q|ρ(t)|q〉 = 1
2πh¯
∫ +∞
−∞
dk [1− F (k, 0, t)]
∫ +∞
−∞
dy e
− i
h¯
ky
〈q + y|ρSch(t)|q + y〉. (6.37)
To illustrate the implications of this equation, we discuss a simple example. Sup-
pose that 〈q|ρSch(t)|q〉 is a mixture of Gaussian terms whose spreads are ∆i with
minimum ∆0. Then the Fourier transform appearing in equation (6.37) yields terms
containing Gaussian factors e−∆
2
ik
2/2h¯2 , whose maximum width is h¯/∆0, so that the
integral in k is concentrated in a region |k| < h¯/∆0. Inequality (6.28) shows then
that the integrand in equation (6.37) contains a factor smaller than (αλh¯2/4m∆20)t
3.
The condition t≪ T1, the time T1 being given by equation (6.25), implies
〈q|ρ(t)|q〉 ≃ 〈q|ρSch(t)|q〉. (6.38)
Obviously this result holds for those matrix elements which are appreciably different
from zero.
For the off–diagonal elements we consider the case q′ > q′′. Obviously the same
results are valid for q′ < q′′ due to the Hermitian symmetry of ρ(t). Inequality (6.35)
gives, for q′ − q′′ > 2√π/α, a significant bound on F independent of k. This shows
that expression (6.13) for 〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉 contains an exponentially damping factor whose
lifetime is τ = 1/λβ, a consequence of the fact that (in a time interval of the order of
τ) linear superpositions of states separated by distances larger than the characteristic
localization distance 1/
√
α are transformed into one or the other of their terms.
As we shall see, one can choose the parameters λ and α in such a way that the time
T = min (T1, T2) is very large and τ extremely small so that we can conclude that the
modified dynamics leads to an evolution agreeing with the classical one in the case of
a macroscopic object and overcomes the problems arising from linear superpositions
of states localized in far apart regions.
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6.4 Macroscopic dynamics from the microscopic one
In the previous subsection we have introduced a non–purely–Hamiltonian dynamics
to describe the motion of a macroscopic particle and we have outlined how this mod-
ification can be used to overcome some of the difficulties in the description of such
objects. However, macroscopic objects are composite systems and standard quantum
mechanics gives definite prescriptions for their description. It is an important feature
of quantum mechanics that, under suitable conditions, the internal and the center–
of–mass motions of the composite systems decouple and, moreover, that the equation
of motion for the center of mass is formally identical to the equation prescribed by the
theory for the description of a single particle. Here we want to investigate whether it
is possible to obtain the non–purely–Hamiltonian dynamics for macroscopic particles
described in the previous subsections from a modification of the standard quantum
dynamics for their microscopic constituents. If such a modification leaves practically
unaltered the behaviour of microscopic systems as accounted for by quantum me-
chanics we can say we have laid the foundations of a possible unified description able
to account for both the quantum and the classical behaviours of microscopic and
macroscopic systems, respectively.
In section 6.1 we have assumed that the localization process T [ · ] occurs individ-
ually for each constituent of a many–particle system. We consider now a system of
N particles in one dimension. Assuming that the accuracy of the localizations is the
same for all constituents, the evolution equation for the composite system is
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] −
N∑
i=1
λi (ρ(t) − Ti[ρ(t)]) , (6.39)
where
Ti[ρ(t)] =
√
α
π
∫ +∞
−∞
dx e
−α
2
(qi − x)2
ρ e
−α
2
(qi − x)2
, (6.40)
qi being the position operator for the ith particle of the system (throughout the
subsection, we will keep working in 1 dimension).
It is worthwhile to illustrate the physical consequences of the above equation for
the important conceptual problem of the possible occurrence of linear superpositions
of states corresponding to different locations of a macroscopic object. Such a sit-
uation occurs, for instance, in the quantum theory of measurement, in connection
with possible macroscopically different pointer positions. With reference to such a
case we consider the linear superposition ψ = ψ1 + ψ2 of two states corresponding to
two different pointer positions. We remark that in the case under discussion there is
a macroscopic number N of particles which are located in macroscopically different
positions when the state is ψ1 or ψ2 (to be precise, in our model this means located
at a distance larger than 1/
√
α). If a spontaneous localization process takes place
for one of such particles, this particle is constrained to be either in the spatial region
which it occupies when the state is ψ1, or in the one corresponding to ψ2. The linear
superposition is consequently transformed into a statistical mixture of states ψ1 and
ψ2. Since the number of differently located particles is N , the reduction of states ψ1
and ψ2 occurs with a rate which is amplified by a factor N with respect to the one,
λi, which characterizes the elementary spontaneous localizations.
The model yields therefore a natural solution to the puzzling situation originating
from the occurrence of linear superpositions of differently located states. These con-
siderations, however, do not exhaust the problems to be discussed. In fact, we must
still check that the modification of the dynamics for the microscopic constituents does
not imply physically unacceptable consequences for the dynamics of the system as a
whole. Actually, according to the previous discussions, we would like to have for the
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macroscopic object a dynamical equation of the type considered in section 6.3. To
discuss this point, let us introduce the center of mass and relative motion position
operators Q and rj (j = 1, 2, ..., N − 1), related to the operators qi by
qi = Q +
N−1∑
j=1
cij rj . (6.41)
Equation (6.39), when the Hamiltonian H can be split into the sum of the center
of mass and internal motion parts HQ and Hr acting in the respective state spaces,
reads
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[HQ, ρ(t)] − i
h¯
[Hr, ρ(t)] −
∑
i
λi (ρ(t) − Ti[ρ(t)]) , (6.42)
where the operator Ti[ρ] can now be written as
Ti[ρ] =
√
α
π
∫ +∞
−∞
dx e
−α
2

Q+ N−1∑
j=1
cijrj − x


2
ρ e
−α
2

Q + N−1∑
j=1
cijrj − x


2
.
(6.43)
The dynamical evolution of the center of mass of the system is described by the
statistical operator
ρQ = Tr
(r)[ρ], (6.44)
obtained by taking the partial trace on the internal degrees of freedom of the statistical
operator ρ for the complete N–particle system. Taking the r trace of the operation
Ti[ρ] one gets
∫
dr1 . . . drN−1
√
α
π
∫ +∞
−∞
dx e
−α
2

Q + N−1∑
j=1
cijrj − x


2
·
· 〈r1 . . . rN−1|ρ|r1 . . . rN−1〉 e
−α
2

Q+ N−1∑
j=1
cijrj − x


2
, (6.45)
so that, by shifting the integration variable x by the amount
∑
j cijrj , one finds
Tr(r)(Ti[ρ]) = TQ[Tr
(r)(ρ)], (6.46)
where
TQ[ · ] =
√
α
π
∫ +∞
−∞
dx e
−α
2
(Q− x)2
[ · ] e−
α
2
(Q− x)2
. (6.47)
If one takes the r trace of equation (6.42) one then gets
d
dt
ρQ(t) = − i
h¯
[HQ, ρQ] −
∑
i
λi (ρQ − T [ρQ]) . (6.48)
We have thus shown that the equation describing the reduced dynamics of the center
of mass has exactly the same form of equation (6.8), the parameter λ being replaced
by the sum of the λi’s for the individual constituents of the many–body system. This
is a direct consequence of the formal property (6.46).
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It is worthwhile stressing that the non–Hamiltonian term in equation (6.48) is
directly generated by the analogous terms of equation (6.39) and is not due to the
elimination of the internal degrees of freedom. In fact, if within the standard for-
malism one considers a composite system with an Hamiltonian H = HQ + Hr, the
reduced dynamics for the center of mass motion is necessarily Hamiltonian, and there-
fore it allows for the occurrence of linear superpositions of widely separated states of
the center of mass. To avoid this, one could couple the system to some other sys-
tem whose dynamics is then eliminated [93]. This, however, gives rise to a chain
process when larger and larger external parts are included. If one wants to reach a
point where linear superpositions of far–away states cannot actually occur, one has to
break this chain in an arbitrary way. In our approach the non–Hamiltonian dynamics
for a macroscopic object is induced by a basic non–Hami1tonian dynamics for its
microscopic constituents.
Let us now investigate briefly the effect of the modified dynamics on the relative
variables. From a physical point of view it is particularly simple and interesting to
consider the case in which the internal motion Hamiltonian gives rise to a sharp (with
respect to 1/
√
α) localization of the internal coordinates, as it happens, for an appro-
priate choice of α, in an insulating solid. In such a case it is evident that localizing
with an accuracy 1/
√
α any one of the points of the almost rigid structure of the solid
induces a corresponding localization of the center of mass. In this situation something
more can be proved, i.e., that the internal and the center of mass motion decouple
almost exactly and the internal motion is not affected by the non–Hamiltonian terms
in (6.39). To be precise, we assume that the matrix elements 〈Q′, r′|ρ|Q′′, r′′〉 are
non–negligible only when the conditions
|
N−1∑
j=1
cij r
′
j − ai| ≪ 1√
α
|
N−1∑
j=1
cij r
′′
j − ai| ≪ 1√
α
, i = 1, . . . , N (6.49)
are satisfied, ai being the equilibrium position of constituent i relative to the center
of mass. Since conditions (6.49) imply
|
N−1∑
j=1
cij(r
′
j − r′′j)| ≪ 1√
α
i = 1, . . . , N, (6.50)
〈Q′, r′|ρ|Q′′, r′′〉 is negligibly small unless condition (6.50) is satisfied. From the defi-
nition (6.40) one gets
〈Q′, r′|Ti[ρ]|Q′′, r′′〉 =
√
α
π
∫ +∞
−∞
dx e
−α
2

Q′ + N−1∑
j=1
cijr
′
j − x


2
·
· 〈Q′, r′|ρ|Q′′, r′′〉 e
−α
2

Q′′ + N−1∑
j=1
cijr
′′
j − x


2
=
= e
−α
4

Q′ −Q′′ + N−1∑
j=1
cij(r
′
j − r′′j)


2
〈Q′, r′|ρ|Q′′, r′′〉.
(6.51)
The exponential factor appearing in the last line of equation (6.51) is a Gaussian in
the variable Q′−Q′′ displaced by the amount ∑j cij(r′j − r′′j). Because of equation
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(6.50), the displacement of the Gaussian can be neglected with respect to its width,
so that in this approximation
Ti[ρ] = TQ[ρ]. (6.52)
The physical meaning of equation (6.52) is that, as foreseen, a localization of a single
constituent of a rigid system is equivalent to a localization of the center of mass.
Equation (6.42) shows that, if the initial statistical operator has the form of a direct
product ρQ ρr, it remains of the same type, and the statistical operators ρr and ρQ
obey the equations
d
dt
ρr = − i
h¯
[Hr, ρr] (6.53)
and (6.48) respectively. We conclude that in the considered case the internal and the
center of mass motions decouple, the internal motion of the solid being unaffected by
the localization process introduced in equation (6.39) and the center of mass motion
being affected by such a process with a characteristic rate equal to the sum of the
rates for all single constituents.
The considerations which can be done in the case of an almost rigid body ensure
that the density operator retains the form ρ = ρQ ρr, when it is initially of this
form. Therefore, the non Hamiltonian terms of equation (6.48), which appear as a
consequence of the localization mechanism, expresses meaningfully the destruction
of the long–distance coherence, as they entail the suppression of the off–diagonal
elements of ρQ. The situation we have just discussed can be considered, with some
idealization, typical of the case in which one is dealing with a macroscopic body.
To conclude this subsection we observe that if one assumes for simplicity that the
localization rates λi of all microscopic (e.g., atomic) constituents of a macroscopic
body are of the same magnitude (λi = λmicro), the center of mass is affected by the
same process with a rate λmacro = Nλmicro, where N is of the order of Avogadro’s
number. As we shall see in the next subsection, this will allow us to choose the pa-
rameters λmicro and α in such a way that standard quantum mechanics holds exactly
for extremely long times for microscopic systems, while for a macroscopic body pos-
sible linear superpositions of far–away states are rapidly suppressed, the dynamical
evolution of the center–of–mass position is the classical one and the internal structure
remains unaffected.
6.5 Choice of the parameters and its consequences
A crucial feature of the point of view which has been adopted in QMSL, i.e., that of
considering all elementary constituents of any system as subjected to localizations,
consists in the fact that one can choose the parameters of the elementary processes
in such a way that (i) the quantum–mechanical predictions for microscopic systems
are valid for extremely long times, (ii) the dynamics of a macroscopic object, when it
is consistently derived from that of its microscopic constituents, turns out to coincide
with the classical one for a sufficiently long time interval, (iii) the suppression of long–
distance coherence for macroscopic objects be effective enough to imply that, after
a microscopic system has triggered a measuring apparatus, the dynamical evolution
leads to the reduction of the wavepacket with well–defined pointer positions.
To give orientative indications on the numerical values of the parameters appear-
ing in our model, we start by remarking that, as it is clear from the formulas of the
previous subsections, all physically significant effects of the modified dynamics for a
macroscopic object are governed (for a remarkably large range of variability of these
parameters) by the product αλmacro. For the choice of the parameter αλmacro we have
some important criteria which must be taken into account. First of all we want the
mean time 1/λmacro elapsing between two successive localizations to be such that the
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transition to statistical mixtures for states spreading over distances larger than the
localization distance 1/
√
α takes place in a very small fraction of a second. A further
requirement which has to be taken into account is that, when one is trying to identify
particle trajectories for a macroscopic system using the selective form of our equation,
the disagreement with the classical predictions which, as shown in [65], unavoidably
arises for large times, be unimportant for times which are long with respect to those
during which one can keep the macroscopic system isolated. Finally, and more impor-
tant, we want the modification of the dynamics for microscopic systems with respect
to the standard one to be totally irrelevant. The simplest way to obtain this is to
assume that the mean rate λmicro = λmacro/N of the spontaneous localization processes
for a microscopic system be extremely small.
For what concerns the parameter α it is necessary to choose the localization dis-
tance 1/
√
α large with respect to the atomic dimensions and to the mean spreads
around the equilibrium positions of the lattice points of a crystal. In this way, even
when one of the extremely infrequent localization processes takes place for a con-
stituent of an atomic system, the localization itself does not modify the internal
structure of that system and the decoupling of the center of mass and relative mo-
tions discussed in section 6.4 still holds. On the other hand 1/
√
α represents the
distance after which a linear superposition is transformed into a statistical mixture.
This parameter must then be chosen in accordance with the requirement of avoiding
the embarrassing occurrence of linear superpositions of appreciably different locations
of a macroscopic object.
These considerations lead us to discuss the following choice for the order of mag-
nitude of the parameters. For the localization rate of the microscopic constituents of
any system we choose
λmicro ≃ 10−16 sec−1. (6.54)
This means that such systems are localized once every 108–109 years. For the param-
eter 1/
√
α we choose:
1/
√
α ≃ 10−5 cm. (6.55)
The fact that a microscopic system is practically never localized, entails that
standard quantum mechanics remains fully valid for this type of system. Moreover,
for a composite system for which the relative coordinates are confined within a spatial
range much smaller than the localization distance 1/
√
α, as it happens for atoms and
molecules, the process T [ · ] is almost ineffective even when it takes place, a fact that
strengthens the above conclusion.
For what concerns macroscopic objects (containing a number of constituents of the
order of Avogadro’s number), according to the considerations of section 6.4 showing
that the individual tests on the constituents add for the center–of–mass dynamics, we
get as characteristic localization rate:
λmacro ≃ 107 sec−1. (6.56)
If we take, for the sake of definiteness, the mass of such an object to be of the order
of 1 g, and the initial spread of the position ∆ q0 again of the order of 10
−5 cm,
we know that the quantum increase of the spread in the position is negligible for
extremely long times (∼ 1010 yr), so that the quantum evolution is practically the
same as the classical one. In such a case [compare equation (6.25)], the additional
term appearing in ∆ q2 equals ∆ q20 at the time T1, which is of the order of 100 yr.
This is a very long time for keeping isolated a macroscopic object. A much longer
time T2 is required in order that the additional term in ∆ p
2 has an appreciable effect
for any reasonably chosen initial spread of the momentum. As far as the occurrence
of linear superpositions of far away states is concerned, as we have seen, the off–
diagonal elements of the statistical operator are exponentially suppressed with the
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lifetime τ = 1/λβ. For |q − q′| = 4 × 10−5 cm we have τ = 10−6 sec [see equation
(6.36)]. Therefore after times of this order linear superpositions of states separated
by distances larger than 10−4 cm are transformed into statistical mixtures.
Considerations of this type are important for the quantum theory of measurement.
In fact, at least in the case in which the interaction leading to the triggering of
the apparatus takes place in a very short time, we can apply our treatment to the
macroscopic parts of the apparatus itself, obtaining in this way a consistent solution
of the difficulties related to the quantum theory of measurement for what concerns
wavepacket reduction and the definite final position of the pointer.
It has to be remarked that the basic evolution equation (6.8), due to the appear-
ance of the non–Hamiltonian terms, implies a nonconservation of energy. Let us give
an estimate of this effect in the case of the free particle on the basis of a choice for
the parameters we have just made. From equations (6.19) we see that, in our case
〈〈E〉〉 = 〈〈E〉〉Sch + λαh¯
2
4m
t. (6.57)
where 〈〈E〉〉Sch is the conserved energy for free Schro¨dinger evolution25. Energy non-
conservation is then expressed by the term
δE =
λαh¯2
4m
t. (6.58)
Let us evaluate this term for the case of a microscopic system. Since λmicro = 10
−16
sec−1, m ≃ 10−23 g,
δE
t
≃ 10−25 eV sec−1, (6.59)
which means that to have an increase of 1 eV il takes a time of 1018 yr. In the
case of the center–of–mass equation for a macroscopic system, since both the rate
λ and the mass increase proportionally to the number of constituents, the energy
non conservation is of the same amount. However this argument applies only to the
increase of the energy of the center of mass. There is also an increase of energy in
the internal motion which, as can be easily understood considering a system of free
particles, is the same for all constituents. When this fact is taken into account one
can conclude that the estimated energy increase for a system of N [≃ Avogadro’s
number] atoms is
δE
t
≃ 10−14 erg sec−1, (6.60)
Referring to an ideal monoatomic gas the increase in temperature with time is then
of the order of 10−15 K per year.
We conclude that QMSL reproduces in a consistent way quantum mechanics for
microscopic objects and classical mechanics for macroscopic objects, and provides the
basis for a conceptually appealing description of quantum measurement process26,
and of the behavior of macroscopic systems.
6.6 Quantum dynamical Semigroups
Among the non–Hamiltonian evolution equations which have been considered in the
literature, there is a class which has been studied in great detail and has proved to
25It is easy to prove that the relation d〈〈H〉〉/dt = λαh¯2/4m, from which (6.57) can be derived,
holds in general even when a potential term V (q) is present in the Hamiltonian.
26Actually, this conclusion, to be taken seriously, requires also the proof, which will be presented
in what follows, that the macroscopic outcomes which emerge in a measurement process, occur with
the probabilities attached to them by the standard formalism.
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be useful in the description of various physical processes, which is particularly simple.
This class of equations is usually referred to as quantum dynamical semi–group
(QDS) equations [84]. Let as give a precise definition of a QDS.
Consider the Banach space TS(H) of the self–adjoint trace–class operators (equipped
with the trace norm, denoted as usual by ‖ · ‖Tr) on the Hilbert space H of the con-
sidered physical system. A QDS is a one parameter family of linear operators:
Σt : TS(H) −→ TS(H) defined for t ≥ 0,
satisfying:
1) ρ ≥ 0 =⇒ Σt(ρ) ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0
2) Tr[Σt(ρ)] = Tr[ρ] ∀ ρ ∈ TS(H), t ≥ 0
3) ΣtΣs(ρ) = Σt+s(ρ), ∀ ρ ∈ TS(H), t, s ≥ 0
4) lim
t→0
‖Σt(ρ)− ρ‖Tr = 0 ∀ ρ ∈ TS(H).
We note that, when ρ is the statistical operator describing the state of a quantum
system, the first two conditions correspond to the requirements which are necessary
for probability conservation and the third one expresses the Markovian nature of the
process (which implies the independence of the evolution law from the time origin).
In terms of the map Σt one can define the infinitesimal generator Z of the QDS
by the equation
Z[ρ] = lim
t→0
[
Σt(ρ)− ρ
t
]
, in the norm ‖ · ‖Tr. (6.61)
Obviously, the simplest case of a QDS is represented by the standard Hamiltonian
evolution equation
Σt(ρ) = e
− i
h¯
H t
ρ e
i
h¯
H t
, (6.62)
where H is self–adjoint; in such case
Z[ρ] = − i
h¯
[H, ρ]. (6.63)
As we have already stated, QDS equations have been studied in great detail [78] and
many general results have been obtained. Lindblad [84] has been able to identify the
most general form for the infinitesimal generator of a QDS when two more conditions
are added to those previously considered, i.e.
5) Z is bounded,
6) Σt is completely positive definite.
Complete positiveness has to be understood in the sense of Stinespring [94]. In such
a case, the evolution equation for the statistical operator ρ can be written as
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] + λ
{
T [ρ(t)] − 1
2
ρ(t)J − 1
2
Jρ(t)
}
. (6.64)
where
T [ρ] =
∑
i∈K
Ai ρA
†
i , J =
∑
i∈K
A†iAi. (6.65)
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Here K is a finite or countable set, H is a bounded self–adjoint operator, and Ai are
operators satisfying ∑
i∈K0
A†iAi ≤ 1 ∀ K0 ⊂ K.
The series in equation (6.65) converges in the trace norm topology. Davies [78] has
proved that equation (6.64) generates a QDS even when H is not bounded. The basic
QMSL equation (6.8) is a particular type of QDS equation, where J is the identity
operator:
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] + λ {T [ρ(t)] − ρ(t)} . (6.66)
The map T [ · ] appearing in equations (6.64) and (6.65) is a particular case of what is
usually called an operation. An operation T [ · ] is, in general, a map
T : T (H) −→ T (H),
of the set of trace class operators into itself which is linear, positive and bounded with
respect to the trace norm, with bound less or equal to one.
Non–Hamiltonian equations of type (6.64) have been proved useful for the de-
scription of many interesting physical processes. We recall here, in particular, the
successful use of such equations in the description of the Wigner–Weisskopf atom and
of beam foil spectroscopy (see, e.g., reference [78], section 7 and references therein).
The quantum description of decay processes, and in particular the exponential na-
ture of the decay law, have obtained an important clarification by the use of such an
equation as describing the evolution of an unstable quantum system in the presence
of apparatuses devised to detect the decay [81]. A very interesting investigation [30],
aimed to find a solution to the problems raised by the quantum theory of measure-
ment, has led Joos and Zeh to derive an equation of the above type starting from the
Hamiltonian dynamics describing the unavoidable coupling of macroscopic systems to
their environment.
7 Stochastic processes in Hilbert space
QMSL is the first consistent proposal to overcome the measurement problem of Quan-
tum Mechanics in which wavefunction collapse is naturally induced by the unique
dynamical principle governing the evolution of all physical systems. QMSL exhibits
all the desired features one seeks in a theory of spontaneous reductions; nontheless,
it has to face two problems, one “aesthetic” and one physical.
The aesthetic drawback is that the modified dynamical evolution of QMSL, though
perfectly definite, is not expressed in terms of a compact mathematical equation for
the statevector leading to equation (6.8) for the statistical operator. The physical
problem is that the dynamics does not preserve the symmetry character of wavefunc-
tions describing systems of identical particles. Both problems have been solved by
CSL, the Continuous Spontaneous Localization model [88, 66].
In this section we review the formalism of stochastic processes in Hilbert spaces,
which is the mathematical background of CSL. In subsection 7.1 we resort to Itoˆ’s
formalism to derive a modified Schro¨dinger equation for the evolution of the stat-
evector. This equation is linear, but it does not conserve the norm, so it needs to be
supplemented by further formal prescriptions which we will analyze. In 7.2 we derive
the corresponding norm–preserving equation, which is non linear.
Subsection 7.3 is devoted to the general discussion of statevector reduction: we
show that the modified Schro¨dinger equation introduced previously leads to the spon-
taneous reduction of the statevector into one, among a set, of appropriate manifolds
characterized by the equation itself.
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In subsection 7.4 we re–derive the results of subsections 7.1–7.3, resorting to the
Stratonovich in place of the Itoˆ formalism. This is an alternative, and physically more
intuitive formalism to deal with stochastic differential equations.
In the final subsection we show that the modified Schro¨dinger equation of CSL
yields an evolution equation for the statistical operator of the quantum dynamical
semigroup type, analogous to the equation of QMSL.
7.1 Raw and physical processes: Itoˆ linear equation
Within the Hilbert space, let us consider the Markov process |ψB(t)〉 satisfying the
Itoˆ stochastic differential equation [95]:
d |ψ〉 = [C dt + A · dB] |ψ〉 (7.1)
where C in an operator, A = {Ai} is a set of operators, and B = {Bi} is a set of real
Wiener processes such that
〈〈dBi〉〉 = 0, 〈〈dBi dBj〉〉 = γ δij dt, (7.2)
γ being a real constant. The index i can be continuous, in which case the sum
becomes an integral and the Kronecker δ becomes a Dirac δ. Given an initial state
|ψ(0)〉, equation (7.1) generates at time t an ensemble of statevectors |ψB(t)〉, where
B denotes a particular realization Bi(t) of the Wiener processes. To simplify the
notation, the dependence of |ψ(t)〉 on t and Bi will be often dropped, as in equation
(7.1). The process (7.1) and the ensemble generated by it will be called the raw
process and ensemble. In the raw ensemble, each statevector |ψB(t)〉 has the same
probability as the particular realizations Bi(t) that originates it through equation
(7.1).
The raw process (7.1) does not conserve the norm of vectors, in general. In fact,
using Itoˆ calculus, one finds
d ‖|ψ(t)〉‖2 = 〈dψ|ψ〉 + 〈ψ|dψ〉 + 〈〈〈dψ|dψ〉〉〉
= 〈ψ|(A+A†)|ψ〉 · dB + 〈ψ|(C + C†)|ψ〉 dt +
〈ψ|A† ·A|ψ〉 γ dt, (7.3)
where we have used the notation |dψ〉 = d |ψ〉. If the statevectors |ψB(t)〉 were of
norm 1, the probabilities of occurrence for them, which are characteristic of the raw
ensemble, could naturally be interpreted as the physical probabilities. Since this is
not the case, we consider the ensemble of the normalized vectors
|χB(t)〉 = |ψB(t)〉‖|ψB(t)〉‖ , (7.4)
having the same probabilities as the corresponding vectors |ψB(t)〉 [i.e., as the real-
izations Bi(t) of the Wiener processes] and the ensemble of the normalized vectors
|φB(t)〉 = |ψB(t)〉‖|ψB(t)〉‖ , (7.5)
whose probabilities are those of the vectors |ψB(t)〉 times their squared norms ‖|ψB(t)〉‖2.
We use different symbols for the vector functions |χB(t)〉 and |φB(t)〉, in spite of the
fact that the right–hand sides of equations (7.4) and (7.5) coincide, because the asso-
ciated probabilities are different, so that as random vector functions they are different.
In fact, as we shall see and as it is obvious, they obey different stochastic differen-
tial equations. We choose as the physical probabilities (which we shall often call
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“cooked” probabilities) those of the vectors (7.5) rather than those of the vectors
(7.4). The ensemble of vectors |φB(t)〉 and the stochastic process in the Hilbert space
that generates it will be called the physical ensemble and process. The prescription
leading to the physical ensemble is the counterpart of the assumption 4 of QMSL and
of the postulate of standard quantum mechanics on the probabilities of the outcomes
of measurement processes.
Let us now investigate the relation between the raw and the physical processes.
Indicating by PRaw[Bi(t, t0)] the probability of the realizations Bi(t, t0) of the Wiener
processes (or, equivalently, of the statevector |ψB(t)〉) and by PCook[Bi(t, t0)] the prob-
ability of the statevector |φB(t)〉, one has by definition
PCook[Bi(t, t0)] = PRaw[Bi(t, t0)] ‖|ψB(t, t0)〉‖2. (7.6)
It is easily shown that, because of linearity of equation (7.1) together with the Markov
nature of the Wiener process Bi, the procedure leading from the raw to the physical
ensemble can be performed just at the considered final time or, in addition, any
number of times between the initial and the final times. It follows that equation (7.6)
can be replaced by its specialization to the infinitesimal time interval (t0, t0+dt), i.e.,
PCook[dBi] = PRaw[dBi]
[
1 + d ‖|ψB〉‖2
]
. (7.7)
The possibility of considering the physical ensemble depends on the fulfillment of the
condition that the total probability associated with the distribution PCook is 1. This
amounts to requiring that, for any |ψ〉, the average relative to the distribution PRaw
of the weighting factor ‖|ψ〉‖2 is 1, i.e. d 〈〈‖|ψ〉‖2〉〉 = 〈〈d ‖|ψ〉‖2〉〉 = 0. From equation
(7.3), one finds
C + C† = − γA† ·A. (7.8)
When this condition is taken into account, denoting by −(i/h¯)H the anti–Hermitian
part of C, equation (7.1) becomes:
d |ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt + A · dB − γ
2
A† ·A dt
]
|ψ(t)〉. (7.9)
7.2 Itoˆ non linear equation
The linear Itoˆ equation (7.9) and the cooking prescription (7.6) can be joined into a
single non linear stochastic differential equation for the physical vectors |φ(t)〉. Let
us see how this can be accomplished.
Because of relation (7.8), equation (7.3) simplifies to
d ‖|ψ(t)〉‖2 = 〈ψ(t)|(A +A†)|ψ(t)〉 · dB. (7.10)
Then equation (7.7) becomes
PCook[dBi] = [1 + 2R · dB] PRaw[dBi], (7.11)
where
R =
1
2
〈ψ|(A +A†)|ψ〉 (7.12)
and the probability distribution PCook is normalized. Indicating by dB
′
i the random
variable whose distribution is PCook, one has
〈〈dB′i〉〉 = 2 γ Ri dt, 〈〈dB′i dB′j〉〉 = γ δij dt, (7.13)
so that
dB′ = dB+ 2γRdt (7.14)
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and B′i is a diffusion process having the same diffusion as Bi and drift 2Riγ. The
meaning of the process B′i and of its differential dB
′
i follows from the one of the
probability distribution PCook which defines them. The set of all realizations B
′
i(t)
coincides with that of all realizations Bi(t) (in fact both sets coincide with the set
of all functions satisfying a given initial condition), but their probabilities, according
to the definition (7.6) of PCook, are those of the physical ensemble instead of those of
the raw ensemble. The stochastic differential equation for the physical process can
now easily be written. We first write down the equation for the process generating
the normalized vectors |χ〉. From equation (7.9) and (7.10), by direct evaluation, one
gets:
d |χ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt +
(
− 1
2
γA† ·A − γA ·R + 3
2
γR ·R
)
dt +
(A−R) · dB] |χ(t)〉, (7.15)
R =
1
2
〈χ|(A† +A)|χ〉.
It is easily checked that equation (7.15) conserves the norm and that this feature does
not depend on Bi having drift zero. The physical process is obtained by replacing each
realization Bi(t) of the random function Bi(t) by an equivalent realization having the
appropriate different probability, i.e. an equivalent realization B′i(t) of the random
function B′i(t). This amounts to replace dBi by dB
′
i in equation (7.15), so that we
get
d |φ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt +
(
− 1
2
γA† ·A − γA ·R + 3
2
γR ·R
)
dt +
(A−R) · dB′] |φ(t)〉, (7.16)
R =
1
2
〈φ|(A† +A)|φ〉.
It is convenient to rewrite the above equation in terms of the original Wiener processes
Bi(t). One gets the final equation:
d |φ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt +
(
− 1
2
γ(A† − R) ·A + 1
2
γ(A − R) ·R
)
dt +
(A−R) · dB] |φ(t)〉, (7.17)
R =
1
2
〈φ|(A† +A)|φ〉.
We note that the equations for the norm conserving processes (7.15) and (7.16) or
(7.17), contrary to equations (7.1) or (7.9), are nonlinear.
The case in which Ai is a set of self–adjoint operators is of particular interest. In
this case equation (7.17) becomes27
d |φ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt − 1
2
γ(A−R)2dt + (A−R) · dB
]
|φ(t)〉
R = 〈φ|A|φ〉. (7.18)
27Stochastic equations having a formal structure of the type (7.17) have been considered in previous
works [96, 97], but there the random terms appearing at the right–hand side had a specific form
devised to describe a specific measurement that was supposed to be performed. The considered
equations, therefore, did not have the universal character of the CSL equations. Other investigations
[75, 98, 99] deal with dynamical reduction models similar to the one considered in reference [88]
and here. In reference [98] an equation very close to equation (7.17) is introduced (without deriving
it from a linear process), but it is not specialized to the use of densities around space points to
discriminate among different configurations. The idea of using densities is considered in reference
[99], where, however, the dynamical equation has a more complicated structure than CSL.
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The analysis of this and of the previous subsection have shown that one can take two
different attitudes to describe the diffusion process: either one solves equation (7.9),
taking as physical vectors the normalized ones and taking PCook as the physical prob-
ability distribution; or one considers equation (7.17), without the need to normalize
vectors and without the cooking prescription. At the non relativistic level, these two
attitudes are equivalent. However, relativistic considerations we will discuss in section
14.3 will indicate that the first attitude — based on the linear equation + the cooking
prescription — is more suited to describe the physics of the stochastic process.
7.3 Reduction of the statevector
We shall now show that, when {Ai} is a set of commuting self–adjoint operators, the
new terms in equation (7.18) induce, for large times, the reduction of the statevector
on the common eigenspaces of the operators Ai [66].
Since here we are interested in discussing the physical effects of the new terms,
we disregard for the moment the Schro¨dinger part of the dynamical equation. Then
equation (7.18) becomes simply
d |φ(t)〉 =
[
− 1
2
γ(A − R)2 dt + (A−R) · dB
]
|φ(t)〉 (7.19)
R = 〈φ|A|φ〉.
Let us write
A =
∑
σ
aσ Pσ, (7.20)
where the orthogonal projection operators Pσ sum up to the identity and it is under-
stood that σ 6= τ ⇒ aσ 6= aτ (i.e. aiσ 6= aiτ for at least one value of i). We consider
the real non–negative variables
〈φ|Pσ |φ〉 = zσ, (7.21)
having the property ∑
σ
zσ = 1. (7.22)
In terms of such variables, one finds:
R =
∑
σ
aσ zσ, (7.23)
(A−R)|φ〉 =
∑
σ
∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ )Pσ |φ〉, (7.24)
(A−R)2|φ〉 =
∑
σ
[∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ )
]2
Pσ |φ〉. (7.25)
It follows that the stochastic differential equation (7.19) can be written
dPσ|φ(t)〉 =

−γ
2
(∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ )
)2
dt+
∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ ) · dB
]
Pσ|φ(t)〉. (7.26)
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Using this equation in the relation:
d 〈φ|Pσ |φ〉 = [d 〈φ|Pσ ]Pσ|φ〉+
〈φ|Pσ [dPσ |φ〉] + 〈〈[〈φ|dPσ ] [dPσ|φ〉]〉〉,
gives for the variables zσ the set of stochastic differential equations
d zσ = 2 zσ
∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ ) · dB. (7.27)
Qualitatively, equations (7.27) shows that the diffusion of the {zσ} vanishes when
they approach the solution of the set of equations:
zσ
∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ ) = 0, (7.28)
so that the values of {zσ} eventually accumulate towards such solutions. A formal
proof of the fact that {zσ} asymptotically reduce to one of the solutions of equation
(7.28) is easily obtained. From equation (7.27) one finds:
d z2σ = 2 zσ dzσ +
[
2 zσ
∑
σ
zτ (aσ − aτ )
]2
γ dt (7.29)
and in turn
d 〈〈z2σ〉〉 = 〈〈d z2σ〉〉 = γ
[
2 zσ
∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ )
]2
dt. (7.30)
It follows that
d
dt
〈〈z2σ(t)〉〉 ≥ 0. (7.31)
This result, together with the boundedness property
〈〈z2σ(t)〉〉 ≤ 1, (7.32)
entails that for t→∞
d
dt
〈〈z2σ(t)〉〉 −→ 0. (7.33)
Using again equation (7.30), we get
zσ
∑
τ
zτ (aσ − aτ ) −→ 0. (7.34)
In reference [66] it is shown that the only solutions to the set of equations (7.28) are
of the form
z1 = 0 z2 = 0 . . . zσ = 1 . . . ,
corresponding to |φ〉 lying in one of the common eigenspaces of the operators Ai.
Since equations (7.26) do not change the Hilbert space ray to which each component
Pσ|φ(t)〉 belongs, we conclude that |φ(t)〉 asymptotically reduces to one of its initial
components Pσ|φ(0)〉 times a normalization factor.
The probabilities for the various possible issues are also easily calculated. In fact,
since d 〈〈zσ〉〉 = 〈〈d zσ〉〉 = 0, one has
〈〈zσ〉〉 = zσ(0). (7.35)
On the other hand,
〈〈zσ〉〉 −→ Prob[zσ(∞) = 1], (7.36)
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so that one finds
Prob[zσ(∞) = 1] = zσ(0), (7.37)
i.e.,
Prob[|φ(∞)〉 ∝ Pσ|φ(0)〉] = 〈φ(0)|Pσ |φ(0)〉. (7.38)
As one can see, this result is a direct consequence of the martingale property 〈〈d zσ〉〉 =
0 [100, 101, 88]. Physically, the above equation plays a fundamental role since it
guarantees that the dynamical reduction models reproduce the quantum predictions
about measurement outcomes.
7.4 Linear and non linear equations: the Stratonovich formal-
ism
The analysis of the previous subsections was based on the Itoˆ formalism for stochastic
differential equations. It is not difficult to re–write all the above equations, resorting
to the Stratonovich formalism [95], which is easier to handle. The linear equation,
corresponding to (7.9), is:
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H + A ·V(t) − γ
2
(
A† ·A + A2)] |ψ(t)〉, (7.39)
where Vi(t) are c–number stochastic processes with probability of occurrence given
by:
PCook[Vi(t)] = PRaw[Vi(t)] ‖|ψ(t)〉‖2. (7.40)
PRaw[Vi(t)] is the probability distribution of gaussian white noises satisfying:
〈〈Vi(t)〉〉 = 0, 〈〈Vi(t1)Vj(t2)〉〉 = γ δij δ(t1 − t2). (7.41)
In the particular but very important case in which the operators Ai are self–adjoint,
(7.39) reduces to:
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H + A ·V(t) − γA2
]
|ψ(t)〉. (7.42)
The physical meaning of equations (7.39) is the same of the corresponding Itoˆ equa-
tion: if a homogeneous ensemble (pure case) at the initial time t0 is associated with
the statevector |ψ(t0)〉, then the ensemble at a subsequent time t is the union of ho-
mogeneous ensembles associated with the normalized vectors |ψ(t)〉/‖|ψ(t)〉‖, where
|ψ(t)〉 is the solution of equation (7.39) with the assigned initial conditions and for
a specific stochastic process V (t) = {Vi(t)} which has occurred in the interval (0, t).
The probability associated to any such homogeneous ensemble is given by (7.40).
It is not difficult to write down the non linear equation for the physical vectors
|φ(t)〉 = |ψ(t)〉/‖|ψ(t)〉‖; here we limit ourselves only to the case in which Ai are
self–adjoint:
d
dt
|φ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H + (A−R) ·V(t) − γ (A−R)2
+ γ
(
Q2 −R2)] |φ(t)〉, (7.43)
R = 〈φ|A|φ〉 Q2 = 〈φ|A2|φ〉.
It is instructive to reconsider the reduction mechanism discussed in the previ-
ous subsection, using the Stratonovich equation (7.39); for simplicity we will limit
ourselves to study the case of a single self–adjoint operator A, so that only one
stochastic field V (t) appears. Suppose the initial statevector |ψ(0)〉 (for simplicity
61
we take t0 = 0) has non vanishing projections on two distinct eigenmanifolds of A,
corresponding to the eigenvalues α and β respectively:
|ψ(0)〉 = Pα |ψ(0)〉 + Pβ |ψ(0)〉. (7.44)
When the hamiltonian is disregarded, the solution of equation (7.39) is28:
|ψB(t)〉 = e αB(t)− α
2γ tPα |ψ(0)〉 + e βB(t)− β
2γ tPβ |ψ(0)〉. (7.45)
Here B(t) is the Brownian process:
B(t) =
∫ t
0
dτ V (τ). (7.46)
Taking into account equation (7.45) and the cooking prescription, one gets the
cooked probability density for the value B(t) of the Brownian process at time t:
PCook[w(t)] = ‖Pα |ψ(0)〉‖2 1√
2πγt
e
− 1
2γt
[B(t) − 2γαt]2
+
‖Pβ |ψ(0)〉‖2 1√
2πγt
e
− 1
2γt
[B(t)− 2γβt]2
. (7.47)
¿From the above equation it is clear that, for t → ∞, the stochastic process B(t)
can assume only values belonging to an interval of width
√
γt around29 either the
value 2γαt or the value 2γβt. The corresponding probabilities are ‖Pα |ψ(0)〉‖2 and
‖Pβ |ψ(0)〉‖2 respectively. The occurrence of a value “near” to 2αγt for the random
variable B(t) leads, according to (7.45), to a statevector which for t → ∞ is driven
into the eigenmanifold corresponding to the eigenvalue α of A. In fact, in such a case
one gets:
‖Pβ |ψB(t)〉‖2
‖Pα |ψB(t)〉‖2 ≃ e
−2γ(α− β)2t ‖Pβ |ψ(0)〉‖2
‖Pα |ψ(0)〉‖2
t→∞−→ 0. (7.48)
Analogously, when the random variable B(t) takes a value “near” 2βγt, for t → ∞
the statevector is driven into the eigenmanifold corresponding to the eigenvalue β of
A.
It is then clear that the model establishes a one–to–one correspondence between
the “outcome” (the final “preferred” eigenmanifold into which an individual stat-
evector is driven) and the specific value (among the only ones having an appreciable
probability) taken by B(t) for t → ∞, a correspondence irrespective of what |ψ(0)〉
is30. In the general case of several operators Ai, a similar conclusion holds for the
“outcomes” αi of Ai and the corresponding noises Bi(t).
7.5 The statistical operator
The statistical operator corresponding to the physical ensemble and its evolution
equation are easily obtained from the definition:
ρ =
∫
D[Bi(t)] |ψ〉‖|ψ〉‖
〈ψ|
‖〈ψ|‖ PRaw[Bi(t)]‖|ψ〉‖
2 = 〈〈|ψ〉〈ψ|〉〉PRaw (7.49)
28In equation (7.45) and following the statevector is labeled by the Brownian motion symbol B,
to stress the fact that, under our assumptions, the state at time t does not depend on the specific
sample function V (t) in the interval (0, t) but only on its integral given by equation (7.46).
29Note that even though the spread
√
γt tends to∞ for t→∞, its ratio to the distance 2(α−β)γt
between the two considered peaks of the distribution tends to zero.
30Obviously, |ψ(0)〉 enters in a crucial way in determining the probability of occurrence of the
Brownian processes B(t).
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and equation (7.9), or from
ρ =
∫
D[Bi(t)] |φ〉〈φ|PCook [Bi(t)] (7.50)
and equation (7.17).
∫ D[Bi(t)] is the functional integral with respect to all the
possible realizations of the stochastic processes Bi(t).
Using once more Itoˆ calculus in evaluating dρ, one gets31:
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] + γAρ(t) ·A† − γ
2
{
A† ·A, ρ(t)} . (7.51)
where { · , · } denotes the the anticommutator. This is the Lindblad form for the
generator of a quantum dynamical semigroup, as already discussed. It is remarkable
that the general Lindblad generator can be obtained from a stochastic process in
Hilbert space. Note that the way we have followed to get equation (7.51) describing
an ensemble associated to the statistical operator ρ(t) makes clear that each member
of the ensemble has a definite statevector at any time, a statevector which, eventually,
ends up in one of the eigenmanifolds of the preferred basis.
8 Continuous Spontaneous Localizations (CSL)
All the necessary mathematical tools to work with stochastic differential equations in
Hilbert space have been developed; we can now apply this formalism to work out a
model of dynamical reductions which has all the desired features of QMSL, but, at
the same time, overcomes the difficulties we have mentioned at the beginning of the
previous section.
It should be clear from the above analysis that what we have to do is to choose
the “preferred basis”, i.e. the operators Ai whose common eigenmanifolds are the
manifolds in which the statevector is driven by the diffusion process. These operators
have to be chosen is such a way that:
1. Macroscopic objects are always localized in space.
2. Microscopic dynamics is not altered in an appreciable way with respect to the
standard quantum evolution.
3. In particular, the energy increase of the system — due to space localizations —
must not be detectable.
4. The symmetry properties of systems containing identical particles must be pre-
served.
We now see how all these requirements are met by CSL. In the first subsection we set
out the preferred basis: the operators Ai will be chosen to be appropriate functions
of the creation and annihilation operators of particles in space. In subsection 8.2 we
discuss the implications of such a choice in the case of macroscopic systems, showing
how their classical properties stem from the quantum properties of their microscopic
constituents; this subsection parallels the analysis of subsection 6.4, which was per-
formed only at the statistical operator level, not at the wavefunction level like in the
present section.
In subsection 8.3 we determine the reduction rates induced by CSL, proving that,
with an appropriate choices of the parameters, they are compatible with those of
31Of course, the same equation is obtained starting from the Stratonovich equations (7.39) or
(7.43), which correspond to the Itoˆ equation (7.9) and (7.17), respectively.
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QMSL. In subsection 8.4 we discuss how the average value of physical observables
are affected by the new non–Hamiltonian terms, showing once more that there are
no appreciable differences with respect to QMSL. In subsection 8.5 we put forward
a simple, pedagogical, CSL model, which is illuminating in order to understand how
the reduction process amplifies when moving from the micro to the macro level.
In the last two subsections we discuss two new CSL models; in the first one
the collapse mechanism is related to the mass density distribution of the object,
rather than to the density–number operator, while in the second one the reduction
mechanism is related to gravity.
8.1 The choice of the “preferred basis”
Let us consider the creation and annihilation operators a†(y, s) and a(y, s) of a particle
at point x with spin component s satisfying canonical commutation or anticommuta-
tion relations. We define a locally averaged density operator
N(x) =
∑
s
∫
d3y g(y − x) a†(y, s)a(y, s), (8.1)
where g(x) is a spherically symmetric, positive real function peaked around x = 0,
normalized in such a way that: ∫
d3x g(x) = 1,
so that ∫
d3xN(x) = N,
N being the total number operator. The operatorsN(x) are self–adjoint and commute
with each other. In what follows we choose
g(x) =
( α
2π
)3/2
e
−α
2
(x)2
, (8.2)
where α is a parameter such that α−3/2 represents essentially the volume over which
the average is taken in the definition of N(x). The improper vectors
|q, s〉 = N a†(q1, s1)a†(q2, s2) . . . a†(qn, sn)|0〉 (8.3)
are the normalized common eigenstates of the operators N(x) belonging to the eigen-
values
n(x) =
n∑
i=1
g(qi − x).
We identify now, with reference to the previous section, the index i which labels the
operators Ai with the space point x and the operators Ai with the density operators
N(x). Itoˆ equation (7.9) then becomes:
d|ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt +
∫
d3xN(x)dB(x) − γ
2
∫
d3xN2(x)dt
]
|ψ(t)〉, (8.4)
where:
〈〈dB(x)〉〉 = 0 〈〈dB(x) dB(y)〉〉 = γ δ3(x− y)dt. (8.5)
This is, in a different notation, the process considered in references [88, 66] for iden-
tical particles. The generalization to several kinds of particles is immediate. For
completeness, we write down also the corresponding Stratonovich equation (7.39):
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H +
∫
d3xN(x)V (x, t) − γ
∫
d3xN2(x)dt
]
|ψ(t)〉; (8.6)
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the first two moments of the white noise V (x, t) are:
〈〈V (x, t)〉〉 = 0 〈〈V (x, t1)V (y, t2)〉〉 = γ δ3(x− y) δ(t1 − t2). (8.7)
Note that equation (8.6) can be rewritten in the following way:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
H +
∫
d 3x N (x)V ′(x, t)
− γ
∫
d 3xd 3y N (x)D(x − y)N (y)
]
|ψ(t)〉, (8.8)
where:
N (x) =
∑
s
a†(x, s) a(x, s) (8.9)
is the number–density operator, and V ′(x, t) is a new Gaussian stochastic process
defined as:
V ′(x, t) =
( α
2π
) 3
2
∫
d3y e
−α
2
(x− y)2
V (y, t). (8.10)
It is easy to check that its average value is zero, while the correlation function is:
〈〈V ′(x, t1)V ′(y, t2)〉〉 = γ D(x− y) δ(t1 − t2) =
= γ
( α
4π
) 3
2
e−α4 (x− y)2δ(t1 − t2). (8.11)
The equation for the statistical operator (7.51) reads:
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] + γ
∫
d3xN(x)ρ(t)N(x) − γ
2
∫
d3x {N2(x), ρ(t)}. (8.12)
In the representation given by the improper vectors (8.3), equation (8.12) becomes:
∂
∂t
〈q′, s′|ρ(t)|q′′, s′′〉 = − i
h¯
〈q′, s′| [H, ρ(t)] |q′′, s′′〉+ γ
2
∑
ij
[
2G(q′i − q′′j )−
G(q′i − q′j)−G(q′′i − q′′j )
] 〈q′, s′|ρ(t)|q′′, s′′〉, (8.13)
where
G(y′ − y′′) =
∫
d3x g(y′ − x) g(y′′ − x)
=
( α
4π
)3/2
e
−α
4
(y′ − y′′)2
. (8.14)
For a single particle, equation (8.13) reduces to:
∂
∂t
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉 = − i
h¯
〈q′|[H, ρ(t)]|q′′〉 −
γ
( α
4π
) 3
2
[
1− e−
α
4
(q′ − q′′)2
]
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉. (8.15)
We note that, taking
λ = γ
( α
4π
)3/2
, (8.16)
equation (8.15) coincides with the QMSL equation (6.12).
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8.2 Dynamical reductions for macroscopic rigid bodies
We now discuss the physical implications of the modified dynamical equation (8.4) for
a macroscopic system, under the assumption that the order of magnitude of the length
parameter 1/
√
α is such that it can reasonably be admitted that the wavefunction
of the internal variables of a macroscopic body is sharply localized with respect to
1/
√
α: the conclusions we will reach will be analogous to those derived in section 6.4,
when macroscopic objects where analyzed within QMSL.
Let Q be the center of mass coordinate of the system of identical particles which
constitutes the considered macroscopic body,
Q =
1
N
N∑
i=1
qi,
and write
qi = Q+ q˜i.
The coordinates q˜i with respect to the center of mass sum up to zero, so that they
are functions of 3N −3 independent internal variables32, which we indicate by r. The
internal variables r, together with the center of mass coordinates Q, are functions of
the coordinates qi. So, we consider the wavefunction
ψ(q, s) = Ψ(Q)χ(r, s), χ(r, s) =
[
S
A
]
∆(r, s), (8.17)
where “S” and “A” mean symmetrization or antisymmetrization with respect to in-
terchanges of the arguments (qi, si). The wavefunctions Ψ and χ are understood to
be separately normalized. The function ∆(r, s) is assumed to be sharply (with respect
to 1/
√
α) peaked around the value r0 of r.
The action of the operator N(x) on the wavefunction (8.17) is easily worked out.
One finds:
N(x)Ψ(Q)χ(r, s) = Ψ(Q)
[
S
A
]∑
i
( α
2π
)3/2
e
−α
2
[Q+ q˜i(r)− x]2
∆(r, s).
(8.18)
According to our assumptions, the factor in front of the function ∆ varies much more
slowly than ∆ itself, so that we can take r = r0 in the factor. In other words, we
treat the factor as if ∆(r, s) were of the form δ3n−3(r − r0)ξ(s). Then:
N(x)Ψ(Q)χ(r, s) = F (Q− x)Ψ(Q)χ(r, s), (8.19)
where:
F (Q− x) =
∑
i
( α
2π
)3/2
e
−α
2
[Q+ q˜i(r0)− x]2
. (8.20)
According to equation (8.19) the operator N(x) acts only on the factor Ψ of ψ.
As a consequence, under the assumption that:
H = HQ + Hr,
32The internal variables, as defined here, describe also rotations of the N–particle system. We
assume that the the wavefunction is such that the orientation of the system (and consequently of its
internal structure) is sharply defined. In the general case, one could consider 3 orientation variables,
to be treated along the same lines as the center of mass coordinate, and 3N − 6 truly internal
variables, to be assumed sharply localized in the wave function. However, in this case the problem
would be considerably more complicated without gaining very much as regards to physical insight.
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if Ψ and χ satisfy the equations
d|Ψ〉 =
[
− i
h¯
HQ dt +
∫
d3xF (Q− x) dB(x) − γ
2
∫
d3xF 2(Q− x) dt
]
|Ψ〉
(8.21)
d|χ〉 =
[
− i
h¯
Hr dt
]
|χ〉 (8.22)
respectively, the wavefunction (8.17) satisfies equation (8.4). We can conclude that,
under our assumptions, the center of mass and the internal motions decouple as in the
absence of the stochastic terms in equation (8.4). Furthermore, the stochastic terms
do not affect the internal structure, while the center of mass wavefunction obeys a
stochastic differential equation, again of the type (7.9), whose consequences will be
discussed below.
Note that equations (8.21) and (8.22) are exactly the counterpart of equations
(6.48) and (6.53) of QMSL, respectively. This proves that the separation of the
center of mass and internal motion takes place also at the wavefunction level, not
only at the statistical operator level, as seen in section 6.
8.3 Reduction rates
The operators F (Q− x) appearing in equation (8.21), which correspond to the oper-
ators Ai of equation (7.9), are real functions of the center of mass position operator
Q. They are a set of commuting self–adjoint operators, so that, as we know from
the results of section 7, the non–Schro¨dinger terms in equation (8.21) induce the re-
duction of the statevector on the eigenvectors of the position Q. Of course, such a
process requires an infinitely long time, while, in finite times, only the reduction on
approximate eigenstates of Q takes place33. We discuss here the time rate of the
localization process by studying the time dependence of the off–diagonal elements of
the statistical matrix 〈Q′|ρ|Q′′〉. Again, we disregard the effect of the Schro¨dinger
term, this approximation being justified by the fact that, for the values of |Q′ −Q′′|
in which we are interested, the reduction process will turn out to be very fast.
Equation (7.51) becomes in the present case:
∂
∂t
〈Q′|ρ|Q′′〉 = −Γ(Q′,Q′′) 〈Q′|ρ|Q′′〉, (8.23)
where:
Γ(Q′,Q′′) = γ
∫
d3x
[
1
2
F 2(Q′ − x) + 1
2
F 2(Q′′ − x)− F (Q′ − x)F (Q′′ − x)
]
.
(8.24)
Equation (8.23) gives:
〈Q′|ρ(t)|Q′′〉 = e−Γt 〈Q′|ρ(0)|Q′′〉. (8.25)
It is easily found that Γ is an even function of Q′ − Q′′. Since it is assumed that
very many constituents of the considered body are contained in a volume α−3/2, we
can use the macroscopic density approximation, consisting in replacing the sum by
an integral in equation (8.20). Then one writes:
F (Q− x) =
∫
d3y˜ D(y˜)
( α
2π
)3/2
e
−α
2
(Q+ y˜ − x)2
, (8.26)
33Of course, for very large times the Hamiltonian H cannot be any more ignored: a sort of balance
between the Hamiltonian spreading of the wavefunction and the reduction mechanism is established,
which keeps constant the spread of the wavefunction.
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where D(y˜) is the number of particles per unit volume in the neighborhood of the
point y = Q+ y˜.
A further approximation, which we call the sharp scanning approximation, can be
used, since we are not interested here in the details of the function Γ for Q′−Q′′ → 0.
The sharp scanning approximation consists in replacing the normalized Gaussian
function appearing in equation (8.26) by the corresponding delta function. Then one
has:
F (Q− x) = D(x−Q), (8.27)
so that one gets:
Γ(Q′ −Q′′) = γ
∫
d3x
[
D2(x)−D(x)D(x +Q′ −Q′′)] , (8.28)
where suitable changes of the integration variable have also been made. The physical
meaning of Γ is easily understood by making reference to a homogeneous macroscopic
body of density D0. Then:
Γ = γ D0 nout, (8.29)
nout being the number of particles of the body when the center of mass position is
Q′, which do not lie in the volume occupied by the body when the center of mass
position is Q′′. The ratio between the macroscopic rate (8.29) and the microscopic
rate (8.16) is nout D0(4π/α)
3/2.
The results (8.25) and (8.29) have to be compared with the result:
〈Q′|ρ(t)|Q′′〉 = e−λmacrot 〈Q′|ρ(0)|Q′′〉, (8.30)
λmacro = N λ, (8.31)
valid for |Q′ −Q′′| ≫ 1/√α, obtained in section 6.5 for the case of distinguishable
particles. We note that in the present case an additional factor D0(4π/α)
3/2 appears
in the macro–to–micro ratio, but such a factor is multiplied by the number of uncov-
ered particles nout rather than by the total number N . Clearly, this is a consequence
of the indistinguishability of particles and of the choice of the density as the dynam-
ical variable governing the process. In section 6.5, the length parameter 1/
√
α was
chosen to be of the order of 10−5 cm and the microscopic rate λ was suggested to be
of the order of 10−16 sec−1 with the aim of obtaining λmacro ≈ 107 sec−1 for a typical
macroscopic number N ≈ 1023. We repeat here the same choice,
1√
α
≈ 10−5 cm (8.32)
and look for a value of γ such that the macroscopic rate Γ is again of the order of 107
sec−1 for nout ≈ 1013. Since D0 ≈ 1024 cm−3, we get
γ ≈ 10−30 cm3 sec−1, (8.33)
corresponding (according to the relation (8.16) between λ, γ and α) to λ ≈ 10−17
sec−1. This value is such that nothing changes in the dynamics of a microscopic
particle even in the case in which it has an extended wavefunction34.
34Note that, in the case of a macroscopic object, QMSL requires a displacement of ≃ 1024 particles
for the reduction rate to be equal to 107 sec−1. CSL, on the other hand – in the case of normal
density – requires a displacement only of about 1013 particles in order to have the same localization
rate. This improvement of CSL with respect to QMSL is due to the indistinguishability of identical
particles, whose effects are explicitly taken into account in CSL.
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8.4 Position and momentum spreads
According to equation (8.28) or to the original expression (8.24), the diagonal elements
〈Q|ρ|Q〉 of the statistical operator in the position representation are not affected by
the reduction process, as a consequence of the process being a localization. Of course,
this does not mean that the time evolution of 〈Q|ρ|Q〉 is the same as the one given by
the pure Schro¨dinger dynamics: some changes are expected in the time dependence
of both position and momentum spreads, as a consequence of the presence of the
localization process. An explicit evaluation of these effects is necessary in order to
check that no unacceptable behaviour arises.
The equation for the statistical operator, in operator form, is written
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] + γ
∫
d3x
[
F (Q− x)ρ(t)F (Q − x)− 1
2
{
F 2(Q− x), ρ(t)}]
(8.34)
where we have retained also the Schro¨dinger term. We consider the case of a free
macroscopic body, so that, in our notation, H = P 2/(2M), M being the total mass.
For a dynamical variable S, we define the mean value
〈〈S〉〉 = Tr [Sρ] . (8.35)
The time derivative of 〈〈S〉〉, according to equation (8.34), is given by
d
dt
〈〈S〉〉 = − i
h¯
Tr ([S,H ]ρ) + (8.36)
γ
∫
d3x Tr
[(
F (Q− x)SF (Q− x)− 1
2
{
S, F 2(Q− x)}) ρ] .
¿From equation (8.36), through tedious but elementary calculations, one gets expres-
sions for the average values of position, momentum and their combinations which are
analogous to the QMSL equations (6.15)–(6.19). In particular we have:
{Qi} = {Qi}Sch + γδi h¯
2
6M2
t3, (8.37)
{Pi} = {Pi}Sch + γδi h¯
2
2
t, (8.38)
where
δi =
∫
d3y
[
∂F (y)
∂yi
]2
. (8.39)
To evaluate the quantities δi the sharp scanning approximation is no longer sufficient,
because here the derivative of the function F is required. We then use the macroscopic
density approximation (8.26). For definiteness and simplicity, we make reference to
a homogeneous macroscopic parallelepiped of density D0 having edges of lengths Li
parallel to the coordinate axes. Then, as shown in [66], one has with high accuracy
δi =
√
α
π
D20 Si, (8.40)
where Si = L1L2L3/Li is the transverse section of the macroscopic parallelepiped.
If the choice (8.32) and (8.33) is used for α and γ together with D0 ≈ 1024 cm−3,
one gets from equation (8.40) for the momentum diffusion coefficient,
1
2
γ δi h¯
2 ≈ 10−32(g cm sec−1)2 sec−1 Si cm−2. (8.41)
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For an ordinary macroscopic body, this value appears too small to give detectable
effects. For a very small macroscopic particle, due to the 1/M2 factor in the extra
term of equation (8.37), a non–negligible stochasticity could appear. For Lj ≈ 10−4
cm (this is the smallest order of magnitude for which the approximations leading
to equation (8.40) remain valid), a time of the order of 102 sec is required to make
the extra term of the order of 10−10 cm2. We do not know whether this kind of
effect could be used to provide a significant experimental bound on the product γ
√
α
contained in the momentum diffusion coefficient. We note, however, that the value
(8.40) could overestimate δi, because of the assumption of a rectangular profile for
the object under consideration.
8.5 Reduction mechanism: a simple model
After this long and detailed analysis of the reduction mechanism within CSL, we
propose here a second simpler way of looking at the localization process [68]; for
simplicity’s sake we restrict ourselves to a simplified version of CSL obtained by
disregarding the hamiltonian term and discretizing the space.
We divide the space into cells of volume (α/2π)−3/2 and we denote by N
(k)
i the
number operator counting the particles of type k in the i–th cell. As follows from the
discussion of the preceding subsections in the considered case, the dynamical evolution
drives the statevector into a manifold such that the number of particles present in
any cell is definite. The simplified equation for the statistical operator (8.12) reads:
d
dt
ρ(t) = γ
( α
4π
)3/2∑
k
[∑
i
N
(k)
i ρ(t)N
(k)
i −
1
2
∑
i
{N (k) 2i , ρ(t)}
]
. (8.42)
In accordance with relation (8.16), we will often use the QMSL rate parameter λ in
place of the expression γ(α/4π)3/2. If we denote by |n(k)1 , n(k)2 , . . . n(k)i , . . .〉 the state
with the indicated occupation numbers for the various types of particles and for the
various cells, the solution of equation (8.42) reads, in the considered basis:
〈n(k)1 , n(k)2 , . . . |ρ(t)|m(k)1 m(k)2 , . . .〉 =
= e
− λ
2
∑
k,i
(n
(k)
i −m(k)i )2t
〈n(k)1 , n(k)2 , . . . |ρ(0)|m(k)1 m(k)2 , . . .〉. (8.43)
Equation (8.43) is an indirect proof35 that linear superpositions of states containing
different number of particles in the various cells are dynamically reduced to one of
the superposed states with an exponential time rate depending on the expression
λ
2
∑
k
∑
i
(n
(k)
i −m(k)i )2.
The amplification process in going from the micro to the macroscopic case and
the preferred role assigned to position make it clear how such models overcome the
difficulties of quantum measurement theory. In fact in measurement processes one
usually assumes that different eigenstates of the measured micro-observable trigger
(through the system–apparatus interaction) different displacements of a macroscopic
pointer from its “ready” position. The unique dynamical principle of QMSL or CSL
leads then, in extremely short times, to the dynamical suppression, with the appropri-
ate probability, of all but one of the terms in the superposition, i.e., to the emergence
of an outcome.
35The direct proof, as repeatedly stated, comes from the study of the localization mechanism at
the wavefunction level.
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8.6 Relating reductions to the mass density
In this subsection we consider a CSL type dynamics in which, in place of the operators
N(x) previously considered, we introduce the mass density operators [68]:
M(x) =
∑
k
mkNk(x), (8.44)
where mk and Nk are the mass and the average mass density operator for a parti-
cle of type k, respectively. The Stratonovich stochastic evolution equation for the
statevector is:
d
dt
|ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H +
∫
d3xM(x)V (x, t) − γ
m20
∫
d3xM2(x)
]
|ψ(t)〉, (8.45)
where m0 is a reference mass and γ is the parameter appearing in standard CSL
of section 8.1. We identify the mass m0 with the nucleon mass; in this way the
reduction rates for macroscopic objects are practically equal to those of the standard
CSL model. With this choice the decoherence is governed by the mass of the nucleons
in ordinary matter, the contribution due to electrons being negligible.
As usual the corresponding equation for the statistical operator is easily obtained:
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] +
γ
m20
∫
d3xM(x)ρ(t)M(x) − γ
2m20
∫
d3x {M2(x), ρ(t)}.
(8.46)
One of main motivations to replace the number density operators N (k)(x) in the
CSL dynamics with the mass density operatorsM(x) derives from the desire to relate
reductions to gravity as suggested by various authors [102, 103, 104, 105, 99, 106] (a
model with analogous characteristics will be presented in the next section). Another
important feature of the above choice has been pointed out by P. Pearle and E. Squires
[107]: while the reduction rates for macro–objects are practically the same as those of
the standard CSL model, the probabilities of excitation or dissociation of microscopic
bound systems turn out to be depressed by large factors [107, 108], thus leading to a
smaller disagreement with the predictions of quantum mechanics for such systems. In
particular, a simple computation within the quark model for nucleons (disregarding
all relativistic effects which however could turn out to be very important at this level)
gives a dissociation rate for the proton well below the experimental bounds, while
the standard CSL model would lead to the violation of such bounds for the proton
life-time. The advantages of taking the above position have also been discussed by A.
Rimini [109].
8.7 A reduction model involving gravity
In 1989 L. Dio`si [99] proposed a modification of QMSL, different from CSL, with the
explicit aim of eliminating the new constants of nature α and γ and of relating the
process to gravity. Such model has been called quantum mechanics with universal
density localization (QMUDL) by the author.
Dio`si considers an extended macroscopic object, such as e.g. a homogeneous
sphere, and introduces a mass density operator f(x) at point x. For the case of a
homogeneous sphere of mass M and radius R:
f(x) =
M
V
θ(R− |q− x|), (8.47)
where V is the volume of the sphere and q is the center of mass position operator.
The stochastic dynamical equation is assumed to be:
d |ψ(t)〉 =
[
− i
h¯
H dt − G
2h¯
∫ ∫
d3x1 d
3x2
1
x12
[f(x1)− fψ(x1)]×
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× [f(x2)− fψ(x2)]dt+
∫
d3x[f(x)− fψ(x)]dξ(x)
]
|ψ(t)〉, (8.48)
where fψ(x) = 〈ψ|f(x)|ψ〉; ξ(x) is a real Wiener process satisfying:
〈〈dξ(x)〉〉 = 0 〈〈dξ(x1)dξ(x2)〉〉 = G
h¯
1
x12
dt. (8.49)
In the above equation x12 = |x1 − x2| and G is Newton’s gravitational constant.
Equation (8.48) can be put in the form (7.18), as shown in [110], the corresponding
operators Ai being functions of the center of mass position operator q: the non
Hamiltonian terms then induce the reduction onto states in which the position of the
center of mass is more and more definite.
It is easy to prove by Itoˆ stochastic calculus that equation (8.48) implies, for the
statistical operator, the dynamical equation
d
dt
ρ(t) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)] − G
2h¯
∫ ∫
d3x1 d
3x2
1
x12
[f(x1), [f(x2), ρ(t)]]. (8.50)
¿From equation (8.50), disregarding the Hamiltonian term, in the considered case
of a homogeneous sphere, one gets
〈q′|ρ(t)|q′′〉 = e Γ(∆) t 〈q′|ρ(0)|q′′〉, (8.51)
where
Γ(∆) = − 1
h¯
[U(0)− U(∆)], ∆ = |q′ − q′′|. (8.52)
In equation (8.52) U(∆) is the gravitational interaction energy of two homogeneous
spheres of the considered mass and radius, with the centers at distance ∆. For
instance, for R = 1 cm, M = 1 g and ∆ = 10−5 cm, Γ(∆) ≃ 109 sec−1, so that a
linear superposition of two such states evolves into one of them in about 10−9 sec.
This is comparable to the reduction rate implied by QMSL in such a case.
This model has many appealing features, e.g. the reduction mechanism is related
to the gravitational potential without resorting to any physical constant, besides New-
ton’s constant G. However, QMUDL, when taken literally, meets some serious diffi-
culties: in fact, it has been proven [110] that the localization mechanism of QMUDL
induces, in the case of macroscopic systems (with a number of constituents of the
order of Avogadro’s number), a total energy increase of about 103 erg sec−1, which
clearly is unacceptable.
Ghirardi, Grassi and Rimini [110] have shown that it is possible to remove such
a difficulty by making the following choice for the operators f(x) (which replaces
(8.47)):
f(x) = mN(x), (8.53)
where N(x) is given by equation (8.1) and m is the mass of the particles created by
a†(y, s). Obviously if the system contains different types of particles, in (8.53) a sum
over all types is understood. They chose for the parameter α again the value given
by CSL.
It is not difficult to show that the model possesses all the appealing features of
CSL, in particular it induces a fast suppression of the linear superpositions of states
containing a macroscopic number of particles which are differently located, it does
not alter in any appreciable way the dynamics of microsystems, and, in the case of a
body with the internal coordinate sharply localized with respect to 1/
√
α, it allows
the decoupling of the internal and center of mass motions, the internal motion being
governed with high accuracy by the standard quantum dynamics. The price which
has been paid is, with respect to Dio´si’s proposal which aimed to get rid of any new
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constant, the introduction of a new physical constant, namely the localization width
1/
√
α. In our opinion, however, this is not a serious drawback. Actually, as we
have stressed many times, in order to have a precise theory one needs to identify the
borderline between quantum and classical, to get rid of the shifty character of the
standard theory and of any proposed interpretation of it. The new parameter plays
such a role in the just discussed model.
9 Dynamical reduction models with general gaus-
sian noises
The dynamical reduction models analyzed in the previous sections have proven to
yield (at the non relativistic level) a perfectly consistent solution to the macro–
objectification problem of Quantum Mechanics. They are based on a stochastic mod-
ification of Schro¨dinger equation: besides the standard Hamiltonian, new terms are
added, which contain Gaussian white noises.
It is an interesting question to analyze whether the most important features of
CSL (and consequently of QMSL), in particular the localization mechanism, depend
in any essential way on the white noise character of the stochastic processes considered
[111, 112, 113, 114]. This is the subject of the present section.
There is a second, more important, reason to consider dynamical reduction models
governed by more general noises. As we shall see in the fourth part of the report,
relativistic CSL meets serious difficulties, since the reduction process yields an infinite
increase of the energy (per unit time and unit volume). This divergent increase is
due to the local coupling between quantum fields and the white noise stochastic filed:
it is still an open problem to understand whether a non–white stochastic field can
remove these divergences, and lead to a fully consistent relativistic model of dynamical
reductions.
The content of the present section is the following. In subsection 9.1 we derive a
modified Schro¨dinger equation, in which the new stochastic terms contain a general
Gaussian noise. In subsection 9.2 we analyze two important cases in which the mod-
ified Schro¨dinger equation can be studied in detail. In subsection 9.3 we analyze the
reduction properties of such an equation, while in subsection 9.4 we study the time
evolution of the average value of physical quantities. In this way we prove that the
considered model shares all the essential features of standard CSL.
The section ends with an explicit application of the above results to a specific
model of dynamical reductions in space, like we did in section 8 for white noise models.
9.1 The modified Schro¨dinger equation
In this subsection we begin the analysis of dynamical reduction models in which the
reduction mechanism is controlled by general Gaussian noises. The first task is to
derive a modified Schro¨dinger equation generalizing equation (7.42), and preserving
the average value of the square norm of vectors, so that the cooking prescription can
be applied to it.
Let us then consider the following equation:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
H0 +
∑
i
Aiwi(t)
]
|ψ(t)〉, (9.1)
where, as before, H0 is the Hamiltonian of the system, {Ai} is a set of commuting
self–adjoint operators, and wi(t) are c–number gaussian stochastic processes whose
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first two moments are36:
〈〈wi(t)〉〉 = 0, 〈〈wi(t1)wj(t2)〉〉 = γ Dij(t1, t2). (9.2)
We already know that the evolution described by equation (9.1) is not unitary and it
does not preserve the norm of the statevector; we then follow the same prescription
outlined in section 7. We consider as physical vectors the normalized ones:
|φ(t)〉 = |ψ(t)〉‖|ψ(t)〉‖ , (9.3)
and we assume that any particular realization of the stochastic processes wi(t) has a
probability of occurrence PCook[w(t)] equal to:
PCook[w(t)] = PRaw[w(t)] ‖|ψ(t)〉‖2, (9.4)
where PRaw[w(t)] is now the gaussian probability distribution defined by (9.2). The
above assumptions guarantee that the reduction probabilities reproduce the standard
quantum mechanical probabilities.
Of course, we have to check that equation (9.4) correctly defines a probability
distribution, i.e. that it sums to 1. Following the discussion of section 7, we know
that this is equivalent to requiring that the time derivative of 〈〈〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉〉〉 is zero.
Let us evaluate it:
d
dt
〈〈〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉〉〉 =
〈〈[
d〈ψ(t)|
dt
]
|ψ(t)〉
〉〉
+
〈〈
〈ψ(t)|
[
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
]〉〉
=
=
〈〈
〈ψ(t)|
[
+
i
h¯
H0 +
∑
i
Aiwi(t)
]
|ψ(t)〉
〉〉
+
〈〈
〈ψ(t)|
[
− i
h¯
H0 +
∑
i
Aiwi(t)
]
|ψ(t)〉
〉〉
.
The two terms involving the Hamiltonian H0 cancel out (in fact they describe the
unitary part of the evolution); the noises wi(t), being c–numbers, can be taken out of
the scalar product, so that:
d
dt
〈〈〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉〉〉 = 2
∑
i
〈〈〈ψ(t)|Ai|ψ(t)〉wi(t)〉〉. (9.5)
The right hand side of (9.5) can be rewritten with the help of the Furutsu–Novikov
formula [115, 114]:
〈〈F [w(t)]wi(t)〉〉 = γ
∑
j
∫ +∞
0
Dij(t, s)
〈〈
δF [w(t)]
δwj(s)
〉〉
ds (9.6)
(for simplicity, throughout this subsection we take t0 = 0 as the initial time). F [w(t)]
is any functional of the stochastic fields wi(t); in the present case case, F [w(t)] =
〈ψ(t)|Ai|ψ(t)〉.
The formal solution of equation (9.1) is:
|ψ(t)〉 = T e
− i
h¯
H0t +
∑
i
Ai
∫ t
0
wi(s) ds
|ψ(0)〉. (9.7)
36There is no loss of generality in considering gaussian processes with zero mean. In fact, if
〈〈wi(t)〉〉 = mi(t) 6= 0, we can always define new processes zi(t) = wi(t) − mi(t), which have zero
mean, and rewrite the modified Schro¨dinger equation (9.1) in terms of the processes zi(t).
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Note that, since |ψ(t)〉 depends on the stochastic processes wi(s) only within the
time–interval [0, t], the functional derivative of |ψ(t)〉 with respect to wj(s) is zero if
s 6∈ [0, t]. We then have:
d
dt
〈〈〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉〉〉 = 2γ
∑
i,j
∫ t
0
Dij(t, s)
〈〈[
δ〈ψ(t)|
δwj(s)
]
Ai|ψ(t)〉
〉〉
ds
(9.8)
+ 2γ
∑
i,j
∫ t
0
Dij(t, s)
〈〈
〈ψ(t)|Ai
[
δ|ψ(t)〉
δwj(s)
]〉
ds 6= 0.
Since the time derivative of the average value of the square norm of the statevector
is not zero, we have to add an extra term to equation (9.1), as expected and as it
happens also in the case of white noise. Relation (9.8) tells us which kind of term
must be added. The conclusion follows: with reference to our procedure, the request
that PCook[w(t)] correctly defines a probability distribution, i.e. that the average
value of the square norm of the statevector |ψ(t)〉 is conserved, leads to the stochastic
Schro¨dinger equation:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=

− i
h¯
H0 +
∑
i
Aiwi(t)− 2γ
∑
i,j
Ai
∫ t
0
dsDij(t, s)
δ
δwj(s)

 |ψ(t)〉. (9.9)
This is the main result of this subsection. Note that an equation like (9.9) has been
derived also in [113, 116] by following a different line of thought.
Some comments are appropriate:
• Equation (9.9) no longer describes a Markovian evolution for the statevector un-
less the correlation functions Dij(t, s) are Dirac–δ’s in the time variable — i.e.
the stochastic processes wi(t) are white in time. As a consequence, the corre-
sponding equation for the statistical operator is not of the quantum–dynamical–
semigroup type37, contrary to what happen for the case of CSL (see equation
(7.51)).
• In general, the explicit form of the functional derivatives of |ψ(t)〉 with respect
to the noise wi(t) cannot be evaluated exactly, except for few special cases, two
of which will be considered in the next subsection. Therefore, in the general case
it is difficult to analyze the time evolution of the statevector and the statistical
properties of the ensemble of states generated by the stochastic processes. In
particular, one cannot write a closed equation for the evolution of the statistical
operator.
9.2 Two special cases
In order to understand the kind of difficulties one encounters when working with
non–white stochastic processes, and in particular the reasons for which the functional
derivative of the statevector |ψ(t)〉 in general cannot be computed exactly, let us
reconsider equation (9.7), writing explicitly its perturbative expansion:
T e
− i
h¯
H0t +
∑
i
Ai
∫ t
0
wi(s) ds
=
=
∞∑
n=0
[
− i
h¯
]n
1
n!
∫ t
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ t
0
dtn T {H(t1) . . . H(tn)} , (9.10)
37See section 6.6.
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where we have defined the operator:
H(t) = H0 + ih¯
∑
i
Aiwi(t). (9.11)
The functional derivative of |ψ(t)〉 with respect to wj(s) can be obtained deriving
term by term the series38 (9.10). The derivative of the term n = 0 is zero; the
derivative of the term n = 1 is:
δ
δwj(s)
[
− i
h¯
∫ t
0
dt1H(t1)
]
= − i
h¯
∫ t
0
dt1 [ih¯ δ(s− t1)Aj ] = Aj . (9.12)
The next (n = 2) term is:
[
− i
h¯
]2
1
2
∫ t
0
dt1
∫ t
0
dt2 T {H(t1)H(t2)} . (9.13)
The functional derivative of the time–ordered product T {H(t1)H(t2)} = θ(t1 −
t2)H(t1)H(t2) + θ(t2 − t1)H(t2)H(t1) is:
δ
δwj(s)
T {H(t1)H(t2)} =
= ih¯ θ(t1 − t2) [δ(t1 − s)Aj H(t2) + δ(t2 − s)H(t1)Aj ]
+ ih¯ θ(t2 − t1) [δ(t2 − s)Aj H(t1) + δ(t1 − s)H(t2)Aj ] . (9.14)
We note that the first and third terms at the right hand side of (9.14) differ only for
the exchange of the dummy variables t1 ↔ t2; the same is true for the second and the
fourth term. The derivative of the n = 2 term (i.e. of Eq. (9.13)) is then:
Aj
[
− i
h¯
∫ s
0
dt1H(t1)
]
+
[
− i
h¯
∫ t
s
dt1H(t1)
]
Aj . (9.15)
Equation (9.15) does not have a simple form, contrary to (9.12), and derivatives of
higher terms are more and more complicated, due to the fact that the operators Aj
in general do not commute with the Hamiltonian H0. In fact, would they commute,
equation (9.15) would simplify to:
Aj
[
− i
h¯
∫ t
0
dt1H(t1)
]
, (9.16)
i.e. the derivative of the second term would give Aj times the first term. Moreover,
if [Aj , H0] = 0, the functional derivative of the term n + 1 gives Aj times the n–th
term so that :
δ
δwj(s)
|ψ(t)〉 = Aj |ψ(t)〉, (9.17)
as we are going to prove. In fact, the hypothesis that the operators Ai commute
with the Hamiltonian H0 is equivalent to the (more elegant) requirement that the
operators H(t) defined in (9.11) commute at different times. In this case, the time–
ordered product in the exponential series (9.10) can be omitted, and the functional
derivative of the n–th term is:
δ
δ wj(s)
[
− i
h¯
]n
1
n!
∫ t
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ t
0
dtn {H(t1) . . . H(tn)} =
38We assume that the initial state |ψ(0)〉 does not depend on the stochastic processes wi(t).
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=[
− i
h¯
]n
1
n!
n∑
i=1
∫ t
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ t
0
dtn
{
H(t1) . . .
δ H(ti)
δ wj(s)
. . .H(tn)
}
=
=
[
− i
h¯
]n
1
(n− 1)!
∫ t
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ t
0
dtn
{
δ H(t1)
δ wj(s)
. . . H(tn)
}
=
= Aj
[
− i
h¯
]n−1
1
(n− 1)!
∫ t
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ t
0
dtn−1 {H(t1) . . .H(tn−1)} . (9.18)
This completes the proof. Note also that, when s = t, an extra factor 1/2 appears
in (9.17), because in this case the Dirac delta function arising from the functional
derivative of H(t) is centered in one of the two extreme points of the interval of
integration.
Recently, L. Hughston [117], S. Adler and P. Horwitz [118, 119] have proposed a
white–noise model of dynamical reductions in which the operators Ai are taken to be
functions of the Hamiltonian H0; this implies that the stochastic terms of equation
(7.42) drive the statevector into the energy eigenmanifolds of the physical system.
Making such a choice in the non–white equation (9.9), the operators H(t) at different
times commute among themselves, the functional derivatives of the statevector |ψ(t)〉
can be computed, and equation (9.9) becomes:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=

− i
h¯
H0 +
∑
i
Aiwi(t)− 2γ
∑
i,j
AiAj
∫ t
0
Dij(t, s) ds

 |ψ(t)〉, (9.19)
with Ai = Ai(H0). Equation (9.19) is exact and, correspondingly, one can easily
derive a closed equation for the time evolution of the statistical operator. All the
statistical properties concerning the physical system can be evaluated exactly.
We conclude the subsection showing that the functional derivatives of |ψ(t)〉 can
be explicitly evaluated also in the case of general white noise stochastic processes,
without having to require that H0 commutes with Ai. Moreover, we will prove that
in this case equation (9.9) reduces to (7.42), as expected.
Under the assumption of white–noise stochastic processes (Dij(t1, t2) = δij δ(t1−
t2)), the Furutsu–Novikov relation
〈〈F [w(t)]wi(t)〉〉 = γ
〈〈
δF [w(t)]
δwi(t)
〉〉
(9.20)
leads to the following expression for the time derivative of the average value of the
square norm of the statevector |ψ(t)〉 satisfying equation (9.1):
d
dt
〈〈〈ψ(t)|ψ(t)〉〉〉 = 2γ
∑
i
〈〈[
δ〈ψ(t)|
δwi(t)
]
Ai|ψ(t)〉
〉〉
+
2γ
∑
i
〈〈
〈ψ(t)|Ai
[
δ|ψ(t)〉
δwi(t)
]〉〉
. (9.21)
We now have to evaluate the functional derivatives of the statevector, taking into
account that the noises wi (appearing in the derivatives) are taken at time t.
The derivative of the term n = 1 is equal to (1/2)Aj (see equation (9.12)), the
factor (1/2) deriving from the Dirac delta function δ(t−t1) which is integrated between
0 and t. For the derivative of the n = 2 term, let us look at expression (9.15). If we
take s = t, the second term goes to zero, while the first one gives39:
1
2
Aj
[
− i
h¯
∫ t
0
dt1H(t1)
]
. (9.22)
39The factor (1/2) appears for the same reason as before.
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In general, the functional derivative of any term of the exponential series (9.10) gives
(1/2)Aj times the previous term, so that, in general:
δ
δwj(t)
|ψ(t)〉 = 1
2
Aj |ψ(t)〉. (9.23)
This means that the square–norm–preserving Schro¨dinger equation is:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
H0 +
∑
i
Aiwi(t)− γ
∑
i
AiAj
]
|ψ(t)〉, (9.24)
which coincides with the original CSL equation (7.42). An alternative and quicker
way to derive the white–noise limit is to replace Dij(t, s) with δijδ(t− s) in equation
(9.9) and to show that (9.23) is a consistent solution.
9.3 The reduction mechanism
Here, we will analyze under which conditions the new terms in the modified Schro¨dinger
equation (9.9) induce, for large times, the reduction of the statevector to one of the
common eigenstates of the commuting operators Ai.
For this purpose, let us disregard the Hamiltonian H0; under this assumption
the operators H(t) commute at different times and (as discussed in the previous
subsection) the functional derivatives of the statevector |ψ(t)〉 give the operators Ai
times |ψ(t)〉. Equation (9.9) becomes then40:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=

∑
i
Aiwi(t)− 2γ
∑
i,j
AiAj
∫ t
t0
Dij(t, s) ds

 |ψ(t)〉. (9.25)
The equation for the statistical operator can now be easily derived; using the definition
(7.49), we get:
dρ(t)
dt
= −γ
∑
i,j
[Ai, [Aj , ρ(t)]]
∫ t
t0
Dij(t, s) ds, (9.26)
which is a consistent generalization of the CSL equation (7.51) when the Hamiltonian
H0 is omitted: in fact, if the stochastic processes wi(t) are independent and white
(Dij(t1, t2) = δij δ(t1 − t2)), then (9.26) reduces exactly to (7.51).
In order to test the reduction properties, we will show first of all how the reduction
mechanism works for the statistical operator. As in section 7, let us suppose that the
common eigenmanifolds of the operatorsAi, which we assume to have a purely discrete
spectrum, are one–dimensional; let |α〉 be the vector spanning the α–eigenmanifold.
The equation for the matrix elements 〈α|ρ(t)|β〉 is:
d〈α|ρ(t)|β〉
dt
= − γ
∑
i,j
(aiα − aiβ)(ajα − ajβ)
∫ t
t0
Dij(t, s) ds 〈α|ρ(t)|β〉. (9.27)
Making use of the symmetry property of the correlation functions:
Dij(t1, t2) = Dji(t2, t1), (9.28)
we can write the solution of equation (9.27) in the following form:
〈α|ρ(t)|β〉 = e
− γ
2
∑
i,j
(aiα − aiβ)(ajα − ajβ)
∫ t
t0
dt1
∫ t
t0
dt2Dij(t1, t2)
〈α|ρ(t0)|β〉.
(9.29)
40Here and in what follows, we consider a generic initial time t0.
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¿From equation (9.29), we sees that if |α〉 = |β〉, the exponent is zero: as in CSL,
the diagonal elements of the density matrix do not change in time. If, on other other
hand |α〉 6= |β〉, the evolution of the matrix element depends on the time behavior of
the correlation functions Dij(t1, t2).
If we want the off–diagonal elements to be damped at large times, two conditions
must be satisfied. The first one is that the exponent in (9.29) must be negative:
this is always true, since the correlation function of a Gaussian process is positive
definite41.
The second condition is that the double integral of the correlation function must
diverge for large times:∫ t
t0
dt1
∫ t
t0
dt2Dij(t1, t2) −→ +∞ for t→ +∞, (9.30)
so that the off–diagonal elements of the density matrix go to zero. This condition
is not a priori satisfied by a generic Gaussian stochastic field. At any rate, physi-
cally reasonable stochastic fields always satisfy it: here we present just a couple of
meaningful examples.
Suppose the stochastic fields wi(t) are equal and independent, with a (normalized)
Gaussian correlation function:
Dij(t1, t2) = δij
1√
2πτ
e
− (t1 − t2)
2
2τ2 . (9.31)
Let us also take t0 = −∞. Equation (9.27) then becomes:
d〈α|ρ(t)|β〉
dt
= − γ
2
∑
i
(aiα − aiβ)2 〈α|ρ(t)|β〉, (9.32)
which is independent from the correlation time τ , and moreover it corresponds exactly
to the CSL evolution. Note that if we take the limit τ → 0, the gaussian process
becomes a white noise process with a Dirac–δ correlation function and we recover,
again, the CSL theory.
As a second example, suppose the correlation function is:
Dij(t1, t2) = δij
1
2τ
e
−|t1 − t2|
τ . (9.33)
Equation (9.27) becomes:
d〈α|ρ(t)|β〉
dt
= − γ
2

1− e− (t− t0)τ

∑
i
(aiα − aiβ)2 〈α|ρ(t)|β〉. (9.34)
As before, the off–diagonal elements are exponentially damped and, in the limit t→
+∞ we recover the behaviour of CSL. Note that the effect of a non–white correlation
function is that of decreasing the reduction rate of the localization mechanism.
We now analyze how the reduction mechanism works at the wavefunction level.
As in section 7.4, we consider a simplified dynamics in which only one operator A
appears in equation (9.25). This operator is coupled to a single stochastic process
w(t), whose correlation function is D(t1, t2). Finally, we assume that at the initial
time t0 the statevector is:
|ψ(t0)〉 = Pα|ψ(t0)〉 + Pβ |ψ(t0)〉, (9.35)
41We assume that the correlation function is non degenerate.
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where Pα and Pβ are projection operators onto the eigenmanifolds of A corresponding
to two different eigenvalues α and β, respectively. The solution of equation (9.25) is:
|ψ(t)〉 = eαx(t) − α2γf(t)Pα|ψ(t0)〉 + eβx(t)− β
2γf(t)Pα|ψ(t0)〉, (9.36)
where
x(t) =
∫ t
t0
w(s) ds, f(t) =
∫ t
t0
ds1
∫ t
t0
ds2D(s1, s2). (9.37)
Note that γf(t) = 〈〈x2(t)〉〉, i.e. such a quantity is the variance of the stochastic
process x(t).
Since the “raw” probability distribution of the process x(t) is:
PRaw[x(t)] =
1√
2πγf(t)
e
− 1
2γf(t)
x2(t)
, (9.38)
taking into account the cooking prescription (9.4) we obtain:
PCook[x(t)] = ‖Pα|ψ(t0)〉‖2 1√
2πγf(t)
e
− 1
2γf(t)
[x(t)− 2αγf(t)]2
+ ‖Pβ |ψ(t0)〉‖2 1√
2πγf(t)
e
− 1
2γf(t)
[x(t) − 2βγf(t)]2
.
(9.39)
Equation (9.39) implies that, if f(t) → +∞ when t → +∞, the stochastic process
x(t) will take either a value close to 2αγf(t) — within an interval of width
√
γf(t)
— or a value close to 2βγf(t), within the same interval42. Of course, the requirement
that f(t) → +∞ as time increases is exactly the same as requirement (9.30) which
guarantees the damping of the off–diagonal elements of the density matrix.
Suppose now that the actual realization of the stochastic process x(t) occurs
around 2αγf(t); the corresponding probability is ‖Pα|ψ(0)〉‖2. We then have:
‖Pβ |ψ(t)〉‖2
‖Pα|ψ(t)〉‖2 ≃ e
−2γ(α− β)2f(t) ‖Pβ|ψ(0)〉‖2
‖Pα|ψ(0)〉‖2 → 0 as t→∞, (9.40)
which means that the statevector |ψ(t)〉 is driven into the eigenmanifold of the oper-
ator A corresponding to the eigenvalue α. By the same reasoning, it is immediate to
see that, with a probability equal to ‖Pβ |ψ(0)〉‖2, the statevector is driven into the
eigenmanifold associated to the eigenvalue β. We have thus proved that the statevec-
tor |ψ(t)〉 undergoes a random spontaneous reduction to one of the two eigenmanifolds
of the operator A, with a probability which coincides with the one assigned by stan-
dard Quantum Mechanics to the outcomes of an experiment aimed to measure the
observable A.
9.4 The average value of observables
When one disregards the Hamiltonian term H0, it is not difficult to see how the
stochastic terms affect the average value of physical quantities. Its time derivative
42As noted in section 7.4, even though the interval
√
γf(t) tends to infinity as time increases, the
ratio
√
γf(t)/2(α − β)γf(t) goes to zero.
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can be calculated following almost the same steps which, in the previous subsection,
have led to equation (9.26) for the statistical operator; the final equation is:
d〈O〉
dt
= −γ
∑
i,j
〈〈〈ψ(t)| [Ai, [Aj , O]] |ψ(t)〉〉〉
∫ t
t0
Dij(t, s) ds, (9.41)
to be compared with the corresponding CSL–white noise equation:
d〈O〉
dt
= − γ
2
∑
i
〈〈〈ψ(t)| [Ai, [Ai, O]] |ψ(t)〉〉〉. (9.42)
The analysis of the previous subsection should have made clear how (9.41) differs
from (9.42), so we will not repeat it here.
9.5 Connection with CSL
We now apply the formalism introduced in the previous subsections to derive an
equation with the property of localizing macroscopic systems in space, as it happens
for CSL. In other words, we specify the choice of the “preferred basis” {Ai} in such
a way to have a physically meaningful theory for our purposes.
The most natural choice for the operators Ai is the number density operator for
a system of identical particles:
Ai −→ N (x) =
∑
s
a†(x, s) a(x, s). (9.43)
Correspondingly, the noises wi(t) are replaced by a stochastic field w(x, t), whose
correlation function is D(x, t1;y, t2).
In section 13, the transformation and invariance properties of dynamical reduction
models will be discussed in detail. In particular, it will be proved that, in order for
the physics of the model to be invariant under Galilean transformations (we speak of
stochastic Galilean invariance), the correlation function D(x, t1;y, t2) itself must be
invariant under the considered group of transformations, i.e.
D(x, t1;y, t2) = D(|x− y|, t1 − t2); (9.44)
the easiest way to construct a function like (9.44) is to take the product of two
functions of the space and time variables, respectively:
D(x, t1;y, t2) = g(|x− y|)h(t1 − t2). (9.45)
As regards g(|x− y|), a reasonable choice is a gaussian function, like in CSL:
g(|x− y|) = γ
( α
4π
) 3
2
e
−α
4
(x − y)2
, (9.46)
with 1/
√
α ≃ 10−5 cm.
It is natural to choose a gaussian function also for h(t1 − t2):
h(t1 − t2) =
(
β
4π
) 1
2
e
−β
4
(t1 − t2)2
. (9.47)
In making the above choice, we have introduced a new parameter (β); this can be
considered as a drawback of the model. However, we note that it always is possible
to define β in terms of α, γ and fundamental constants of nature, so that, essentially,
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no new arbitrary parameter is introduced into the model. As an example, we can
choose β = c2α ≃ 1030 sec−2, where c is the speed of light. This choice is particularly
appropriate from the point of view of a possible relativistic generalization of the
theory, which we will discuss in the fourth part of this report. Moreover, such a
choice corresponds to an extremely small correlation time, so that for ordinary systems
(moving slower than the speed of light) the behaviour of the model is similar to the
one arising from the white–noise CSL.
The modified equation (9.9) for the statevector evolution becomes now:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
H0 +
∫
d3xN (x)w(x, t) − (9.48)
− 2γ
∫
d3xd3yN (x)g(|x − y|)
∫ t
t0
ds h(t− s) δ
δw(y, s)
]
|ψ(t)〉.
If we ignore the free Hamiltonian H0, i.e. if we confine our considerations to the
reduction mechanism43, equation (9.48) becomes:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[∫
d3xN (x)w(x, t) − γ(t)
∫
d3xd3yN (x)g(|x − y|)N (y)
]
|ψ(t)〉
(9.49)
with:
γ(t) = 2γ
∫ t
t0
ds h(t− s). (9.50)
The corresponding equation for the statistical operator is:
d
dt
ρ(t) = −γ(t)
2
∫
d3x d3y [N (x), [N (y), ρ(t)]] g(|x− y|). (9.51)
Equation (9.48) can be rewritten in a form closer to equation (8.6), a fact which
will be useful for the subsequent discussion. Let us define a new Gaussian stochastic
process w(x, t), which is connected to w(x, t) by the relation:
w(x, t) =
( α
2π
) 3
2
∫
d3x e
−α
2
(x− y)2
w(y, t). (9.52)
The process w(x, t) has zero mean and correlation function
〈〈w(x, t1)w(y, t2)〉〉 = γ δ(3)(x− y)h(t1 − t2). (9.53)
Using the following relation:
δ
δw(x, s)
|ψ(t)〉 =
∫
d3y
δw(y, s)
δw(x, s)
δ
δw(y, s)
|ψ(t)〉 =
=
( α
2π
) 3
2
∫
d3y e
−α
2
(x− y)2 δ
δw(y, s)
|ψ(t)〉, (9.54)
it can be easily seen that (9.48) is equivalent to the equation:
d|ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
H0 +
∫
d3xN(x)w(x, t) − (9.55)
− 2γ
∫
d3xN(x)
∫ t
t0
ds h(t− s) δ
δw(x, s)
]
|ψ(t)〉,
with N(x) defined by (8.1).
43For the physically interesting cases, e.g. for the dynamical evolution of macrosystems, such an
assumption is justified by the fact that the effect of the reduction is much faster than the typical
times in which the Hamiltonian can induce appreciable dynamical changes of the statevector.
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9.5.1 Dynamics for macroscopic rigid bodies
As for CSL, it is not difficult to discuss the physical implications of equation (9.48)
— or equation (9.55) — for the case of an almost rigid macroscopic body, i.e. a body
such that the wavefunctions of its constituents can be considered very well localized
with respect to the localization length 1/
√
α. Under the same assumptions of section
8.2, we obtain that if |Ψ〉 and |χ〉 satisfy the equations
d|Ψ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
HQ +
∫
d3xN (x)w(x, t) − (9.56)
− 2γ
∫
d3xN (x)
∫ t
t0
ds h(t− s) δ
δw(x, s)
]
|Ψ(t)〉,
d|χ(t)〉
dt
=
[
− i
h¯
Hr
]
|χ(t)〉, (9.57)
then |ψ(t)〉 = |Ψ(t)〉 |χ(t)〉 satisfies equation (9.55) or, equivalently, equation (9.48).
Equations (9.56) and (9.57) imply that the center of mass and internal motion
decouple, and that the stochastic terms affect only the center of mass and not the
internal structure, as it happens for CSL.
Following the same arguments of section 8.3, it can also be proven that the lo-
calization rate of the center of mass wavefunction grows linearly with the number
of particles of the rigid body. In fact, by disregarding the Hamiltonian H0, one de-
rives an evolution equation for the matrix elements 〈Q′|ρQ(t)|Q′′〉 of the statistical
operator of the centre of mass, which is similar to (8.23), with γ(t) replacing γ:
∂〈Q′|ρQ(t)|Q′′〉
∂t
= −Γ˜(Q′,Q′′, t) 〈Q′|ρQ(t)|Q′′〉 (9.58)
with
Γ˜(Q′,Q′′, t) = γ(t)
∫
d3x
[
1
2
F 2(Q′ − x) + 1
2
F 2(Q′′ − x)−
F (Q′ − x)F (Q′′ − x)
]
. (9.59)
This proves that also in the present model the reduction rate of the center of mass
of the system grows linearly with the number of its constituents. Moreover, taking a
large value for β, as it has been suggested previously, γ(t) → γ in very short times,
so that the reducing dynamics is practically the same as the one of CSL.
Part III
The Interpretation of GRW and
CSL Models
10 The mass density function
In the second part of this report we have made plausibe that the Dynamical Reduction
Models allow to overcome the macro-objectification problem. However, in accordance
with the appropriate and strict requests by J.S. Bell (see below) about the fact that a
theory must first of all make perfectly clear what it is actually about, it is necessary to
supplement the formal apparatus with a precise interpretation which specifies how the
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mathematical entities entering into play are related to the physical aspects of natural
processes we experience. Accordingly, in this section we tackle the subtle problem of
working out a consistent and unambiguous interpretation of the theoretical models
under study, in the non relativistic case. We will show how, by taking advantage of
their specific features, one can give a description of the world in terms of the mean
valuesM(r, t), at different places and at different times, of appropriately defined mass
density operators. The presentation is organized as follows.
We start with a historical account of J.S. Bell’s contribution to the elaboration of
a sensible interpretation of QMSL (subsection 10.1). Next, we introduce the mass–
density function M(r, t) and we show that, within standard Quantum Mechanics,
i.e. in the absence of a mechanism restricting the possible states of the Hilbert space
of “our universe”, one unavoidably meets situations which cannot be consistently
described in terms of M(r, t) (subsection 10.2).
Fortunately, since the universal dynamics of the reduction models does not permit
the persistence for [32] more than a split second of the just mentioned unacceptable
states, it allows to identify the functionM(r, t) as the basic element for the description
of the world (subsection 10.3). In terms of it one can define an appropriate “topology”
(subsection 10.4) which is the natural candidate for establishing a satisfactory psycho–
physical correspondence. We conclude the section with a general discussion of how a
theory should describe the physical world, and how this is accomplished by dynamical
reduction models (subsection 10.5).
10.1 The position of J. Bell about dynamical reduction models
J. S. Bell has always been in the forefront of the struggle for clarifying the conceptual
status of quantum theory. He has repeatedly stressed the points he considered as
essential to have “an exact theory” i.e., in his words [87], one which neither needs
nor is embarrassed by an observer. We may appropriately recall some of his more
passionate statements [120]:
A good word is ‘beable’ from the verb ‘to be’, ‘to exist’. In your theory
you should identify some things as being really there, as distinct from the
many mathematical concepts you can easily devise — like the projection
of the side of a triangle to infinity and so on. We must decide that some
things are really there and that you are going to take them seriously.
These are the beables, and if you are going eventually to have ‘observers’,
for example, they must be made out of beables. ... Another good word
is ‘kinematics’. Many accounts of quantum mechanics start by telling
you how to calculate probabilities; and I consider them to be dynamics.
The kinematics should list the possibilities that you are envisaging, then
afterwords you can attach probabilities to the different possibilities. I
won’t accept as a list of possibilities the ‘possible results of experiments’,
because that is to try again to begin with these vague concepts. I would
want the kinematics of your theory tell me what it is you are talking about
before you tell me what about it.
And it is just in the spirit of the above sentences that he has analyzed the GRW
theory, a theory that [120]:
looks like a rather neat resolution of the problem of quantum mechan-
ics. It is very close to what one does in practice, but instead of having
this funny jump at an arbitrarily defined act of ‘measurement’, it has it
as something which happens all the time and more often in systems which
are big — big in a way which is controlled by the parameters of the theory
... .
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Since his first writing on this theory [32], Bell has proposed an interesting inter-
pretation for it in terms of beables:
There is nothing in this theory but the wavefunction. It is in the wave-
function that we must find an image of the physical world, and in particu-
lar of the arrangement of things in ordinary 3–dimensional space. But the
wavefunction as a whole lives in a much bigger space, of 3N−dimensions.
It makes no sense to ask for the amplitude or phase or whatever of the
wavefunction at a point in ordinary space. It has neither amplitude nor
phase nor anything else until a multitude of points in ordinary 3–space are
specified. However, the GRW jumps (which are part of the wavefunction,
not something else) are well localized in ordinary space. Indeed each is
centered on a particular spacetime point (x, t). So we can propose these
events as the basis of the ‘local beables’ of the theory. These are the math-
ematical counterparts in the theory to real events at definite places and
times in the real world (as distinct from the many purely mathematical
constructions that occur in the working out of physical theories, as distinct
from things which may be real but not localized, and as distinct from the
‘observables’ of other formulations of quantum mechanics, for which we
have no use here). A piece of matter then is a galaxy of such events. As
a schematic psychophysical parallelism we can suppose that our personal
experience is more or less directly of events in particular pieces of matter,
our brains, which events are in turn correlated with events in our bodies
as a whole, and they in turn with events in the outer world.
The suggestion about the possibility of establishing an appropriate psycho–physical
parallelism has been subsequently proved [121] to be perfectly appropriate (see also
the discussion of section 12): a perception process requires the displacement of a
certain number of particles within our brain. The definite perception corresponds
therefore unambiguously to a mini–galaxy of localizations in the axons or the cere-
bral cortex, such mini–galaxies referring to different ‘brain regions’ according to the
precise situation which triggers the perception44. This is the precise sense in which
the GRW theory allows to ‘close the circle’, i.e., it yields a picture of natural processes
which agrees with quantum predictions at the micro–level but also with our definite
perceptions and conceptualizations at the macroscopic one. We do not see what more,
on an ontological basis, can be required from a theory of natural processes.
Starting from these remarks we can now pass to discuss what we have denoted
as the mass density interpretation and raise the question: why can’t one take the
mass density function seriously as the “local beable” of the theory and, in particular,
replace the ‘galaxy’ of definite localizations occurring in definite space regions with
the existence of precise regions in which the mass density is “accessible” (the exact
meaning of this expression will be discussed later) and the ‘mini–galaxies’ of localiza-
tions in our bodies and our brains with the locations of the macroscopic number of
ions which are involved in the transmission of a nervous signal and in triggering the
conscious perception?
Before coming to deepen this point we have to mention that subsequently J. Bell
himself has slightly changed his mind. In reference [2] he wrote:
The GRW type theories have nothing in their kinematics but the wave-
function. It gives the density (in a multidimensional configuration space!)
44Actually, even triggering processes involving superpositions of states of microsystems which are
such to induce precise perceptions (due to the extreme sensitivity, e.g. of the visual process) lead to
definite perceptions and not to a confused state of mind, just because they imply different modalities
of the localization processes in the brain (see reference [121]).
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of stuff. To account for the narrowness of that stuff in macroscopic di-
mensions, the linear Schro¨dinger equation has to be modified, in the GRW
picture by a mathematically prescribed spontaneous collapse mechanism.
One of us (G.C.G.) has exchanged with him various letters devoted to deepening this
point. In a letter of October 3, 1989, J.S. Bell wrote:
As regards Ψ and the density of stuff, I think it is important that
this density is in the 3N−dimensional configuration space. So I have not
thought of relating it to ordinary matter or charge density in 3−space.
Even for one particle I think one would have problems with the latter. So
I am inclined to the view you mention ‘as it is sufficient for an objective
interpretation’ ... And it has to be stressed that the ‘stuff’ is in 3N−space
— or whatever corresponds in field theory.
This concludes our analysis of the stimulating suggestions of J.S. Bell about the
interpretation of dynamical reduction theories.
As already anticipated, in the next subsection we will analyze a different and
more precise proposal, based on the consideration of an appropriately averaged mass
density distribution in ordinary space, which has been put forward in ref. [68]. Such
a proposal, among other interesting features, will make perfectly clear the links, at
the macroscopic level, between the formal elements which characterize the states of
macroscopic systems according to the theory, the properties which can be considered
as objectively possessed by them and the practical way of testing such properties. In
fact one could remark that J.S. Bell has been not wholly explicit about the problem
of establishing precise relations between the specific formal features characterizing
macro–systems (the narrowness of the stuff ) and the experiments aimed to ascertain
the associated properties, and has simply suggested (as it is sufficient for an objective
interpretation) that it could be easily settled within the GRW theory.
10.2 Mass density function
In order to prepare the grounds for the analysis we are going to perform it is useful
to recall that the universal dynamics of dynamical reduction models strives to make
some precise properties as objectively possessed by individual physical systems. The
very fact that no analogous mechanism is at work within the standard theory forbids
to adopt, within such a theory, the natural interpretation we are going to propose as
the basic ontology for CSL. As we have discussed in great details, the Dynamical Re-
duction Theories make almost definite the positions of massive particles. Accordingly,
the natural quantity which will end up having an objective (i.e. independent of any
measurement process) value is the locally averaged (over the characteristic volume of
the theory, i.e., 10−15cm3) mass distribution of the universe.
In this subsection we characterize in a mathematically precise way the c-number
function representing the just mentioned averagemass density in ordinary 3-dimensional
space, the quantity to which we will attach an absolutely prominent role for the in-
terpretation of the theory. We will also make clear that, as already mentioned, within
standard quantum mechanics such a quantity exhibits problematic features (which
parallel the ones connected with the macro-objectification problem) implying that an
ontology based on the mass density function cannot be consistently adopted within
such a theory. The clarification of this important point will pave the road for the
proof that, on the contrary, such an ontology leads, within the dynamical reduction
formalism, to a clear, precise and fully consistent worldview which fits perfectly our
experience with the reality around us.
To begin with, let us then consider a physical system S which will constitute “our
universe” and let us denote by H(S) the associated Hilbert space. Let |ψ(t)〉 be the
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normalized statevector describing our individual system at time t; in terms of it we
define an average mass density c–number function M(r, t) in ordinary space as
M(r, t) = 〈ψ(t)|M(r)|ψ(t)〉, (10.1)
where M(r, t) is the mass density operator defined in section 8.6. Equation (10.1)
establishes, for a given t, a mapping of H(S) into the space of positive and bounded
functions of r.
Obviously this map is many to one; in particular, to better focus on this point as
well as for making clear the difficulties of the standard theory with such a function, it
turns out to be useful to compare two statevectors |ψ⊕〉 and |ψ⊗〉 defined as follows.
Let us consider a very large number N of particles and two space regions A and
B with spherical shape and radius R. The state |ψ⊕〉 is the linear superposition,
with equal amplitudes, of two states |ψAN 〉 and |ψBN 〉 in which the N particles are
well localized with respect to the characteristic length (10−5 cm) of the model and
uniformly distributed in regions A and B, respectively, in such a way that the density
turns out to be of the order of 1 gr/cm3. On the other hand, |ψ⊗〉 is the tensor product
of two states |φAN/2〉 and |φBN/2〉 corresponding to N/2 particles being distributed in
region A and N/2 in region B, respectively:
|ψ⊕〉 = 1√
2
[|ψAN 〉+ |ψBN 〉] |ψ⊗〉 = |φAN/2〉 ⊗ |φBN/2〉 (10.2)
It is trivial to see that the two considered states give rise to the same function M(r)
and it is clear that if one attempts to attach some meaning to it one has to be very
careful in keeping in mind from which state M(r) originates.
In particular, it is quite obvious that in the case of |ψ⊕〉,M(r) cannot be consid-
ered as describing an “actual” mass density distribution. To see this, let us suppose
that one can use standard quantum mechanics to describe the gravitational interac-
tion between massive bodies and let us consider the following gedanken experiment:
a test mass is sent through the middle point of the line joining the centers of regions
A and B with its momentum orthogonal to it (see figures 2a and 2b).
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Figure 2: Accessible and non–accessible mass density distribution M(r). In case 7a, corre-
sponding to the factorized state |ψ⊗〉, the mass density in regions A and B is accessible and
the test particle, interacting with |ψ⊗〉, behaves in such a way as to give rise to the appropri-
ate density along its natural trajectory. In case 7b, corresponding to the superposition |ψ⊕〉,
the densities in A and B are non–accessible and the same holds for the density distribution
generated by the interaction of the test particle with |ψ⊕〉.
In the case of the state |ψ⊗〉 for the system of the N particles standard quantum
mechanics predicts that the test particle will not be deflected. On the other hand, if
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the same test is performed when the state is |ψAN 〉 (|ψBN 〉), quantum mechanics predicts
an upward (downward) deviation of the test particle. Due to the linear nature of the
theory this implies that if one would be able to prepare the state |ψ⊕〉 the final state
would be
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|ψAN 〉 ⊗ |ψUP〉 + |ψBN 〉 ⊗ |ψDOWN〉] (10.3)
with obvious meaning of the symbols. If one includes the test particle into the
“universe” and considers the mass density operator in regions corresponding to the
wavepackets |ψUP〉 and |ψDOWN〉, one discovers once more that nowhere in the universe
one can “detect” or “perceive” a density corresponding to the density of the test par-
ticle. In a sense, if one would insist in giving a meaning to the density function he
would be led to conclude that the particle has been split by the interaction into two
pieces of half its density. This analysis shows that great attention should be paid in
assuming that the function M(r) describes the actual state of affairs.
Before going on we consider also another quantity which will be useful in what
follows. It is the mass density variance at r at time t defined by the following map
from H(S) into R3:
V(r, t) = 〈ψ(t)|[M(r) − 〈ψ(t)|M(r)|ψ(t)〉]2 |ψ(t)〉 (10.4)
|ψ(t)〉 being a normalized statevector.
With these premises we have all the elements which are necessary to discuss the
problems one meets when dealing withM(r) and the way to overcome them. We will
do this in the next subsection. Before doing that, we consider it appropriate to simply
mention the obvious fact that the states giving rise to puzzling, non objective, density
functions are those corresponding to superpositions of differently located macroscopic
bodies, i.e. the infamous states which are at the centre of the long debated problems
about the meaning of quantum mechanics at the macro–level.
For future purposes it is useful to introduce a mathematical criterion which per-
mits to clarify the different status of the mass densities in the two above considered
cases (corresponding to the states |ψ⊕〉 and |ψ⊗〉, respectively). This is more easily
expressed by resorting to a discretization of space in analogy with what has been done
in section 8.5. Obviously, in place of the space functions M(r, t) and V(r, t) we will
consider the mean value Mi(t) and the variance Vi(t) of the mass operator in the
i–th cell. For any cell i we define the ratio:
R2i = Vi/M2i (10.5)
We then state that the mass Mi is “accessible” if Ri turns out to be much smaller
than one, that is:
Ri ≪ 1 (10.6)
This criterion is clearly reminiscent of the probabilistic interpretation of the statevec-
tor in standard quantum mechanics. Actually, within such a theory equation (10.6)
corresponds to the fact that the spread of the mass operatorMi is much smaller than
its mean value. Even though in this paper we take a completely different attitude with
respect to the mean value Mi, it turns out to be useful to adopt the above criterion
also within the new context. In fact, as we will discuss in what follows, when one
has a space region such that for all cells contained in it (10.6) holds, it behaves as if
it would have the “classical” mass corresponding to Mi. This remark should clarify
the reason for having characterized as “accessible” the mass (or equivalently the mass
density) when the above conditions are satisfied.
With reference to the previous example we stress that in the case of |ψ⊗〉 all cells
within regions A and B are such that criterion (10.6) is very well satisfied. In the
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case of |ψ⊕〉 one has for the same cells:
Mi ≃ n
2
M0, Vi ≃ n
2
4
M20 (10.7)
where n is the number of particles per cell. It follows that
Ri ≃ 1. (10.8)
10.3 The mass density function within dynamical reduction
models
In the previous subsection we have presented a meaningful example of the difficul-
ties one meets when one keeps the standard quantum dynamics and tries to base a
description of the world and an acceptable psycho–physical correspondence on the
mass density function M(r). The unacceptable features find their origin in the fact
that, when the macrostate is |ψ⊕〉, while the density function takes the value of about
1/2 gr/cm3 within regions A and B, if one performs a measurement of the density
in the considered regions, or if a measurement like process (such as the passage of
the test particle in between A and B) occurs, things proceed in such a way that is
incompatible with the above density value. Actually one could state that no outcome
emerges in the measurement. To understand fully the meaning of this statement one
could identify, e.g., the final position of the test particle with a pointer reading; the
pointer would then not point to the middle position (corresponding to equal densities
in A and B) but would be split into “two pointers of half density” pointing upward
and downward, respectively (compare with figure 7b).
If one takes an analogous attitude with reference to dynamical reduction theories
one does not meet the same difficulties because they imply that linear superpositions
of states corresponding to far–apart macroscopic systems are dynamically suppressed
in extremely short times and measurements have outcomes. Therefore, we can guess
that, within the context of the dynamical reduction program, the description of the
world in terms of the mass density function M(r) is a good description precisely
because it becomes dynamically accessible at the macroscopic level; moreover it is
such as to allow one to base on it a sensible psycho–physical correspondence.
Obviously, if one naively looks at the dynamical reduction models by sticking
to some sort of “classical” ontology, one can be tempted to claim that some fuzzy
situations can occur also in this context, when the mass density, as it may very well
happen for a microsystem, is not “accessible”, i.e. when (in the simplified discretized
version) criterion (10.6) is not satisfied. However, as we are going to show, this does
not give rise to any difficulty whatsoever for the program we are furthering.
In order to show this we will examine, along the above lines, the status of the mass
density function M(r) for the various possible states which are not forbidden by the
reducing dynamics. We will discuss the cases of microsystems and macro–systems,
and, with reference to the latter, we will identify two physically relevant classes of
states which can occur. As we have done previously we will deal with a discretized
space.
10.3.1 Microscopic systems
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a single nucleon. As it is well known, the
reducing dynamics does not forbid the persistence, for extremely long times, of linear
superpositions of far–away states of the particle, typically states like:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|0, 0, . . . , 1i, . . . , 0j , . . .〉 + |0, 0, . . . , 0i, . . . , 1j, . . .〉] (10.9)
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where i and j are two distinct and far apart cells. Such microscopic states which
are not eigenvectors of the operatorsMi will be called “microscopically non definite”,
the term “non definite” making reference to the characteristic preferred basis of the
model. As is evident from (10.9) the mean values of Mi and Mj are (1/2)m0 and
criterion (10.6) is not satisfied at the space regions of both cells. As it is (inconsis-
tently) assumed within standard quantum mechanics and as it is (rigorously) implied
by CSL, a measurement of the mass in one of these two cells would give the definite
outcome 0 or m0 with equal probability (corresponding to the fact that wavepackets
of microsystems diffuse, but however the reaction of a detector devised to reveal them
remains spotty) and not (1/2)m0, the value taken by the density function within the
considered cells. Accordingly, in the considered case the mass in the cells is not acces-
sible. This discrepancy, this non classical character of Mi and Mj , cannot however
be considered a difficulty for the theory with the proposed interpretation, in particu-
lar, it does not forbid to take seriously, i.e. to attach an objective status to the mass
density function; it simply amounts to the recognition that we cannot legitimately
apply our classical pictures to the microworld. On the contrary we must allow [122]
microsystems to enjoy the cloudiness of waves. The crucial point is that within the
theory we are discussing, in spite of the mass density having the value (1/2)m0 in both
regions, any attempt to detect its value in one of them by an amplification process,
implies, as a rigorous consequence of the dynamical equation governing all physical
processes, that the outcome will be either 0 or m0, in perfect agreement with our
experience.
10.3.2 Macroscopic systems
The theory allows the persistence of two general classes of states for macroscopic sys-
tems, i.e. those describing almost rigid bodies with sharply defined (with respect to
the characteristic length of the model) center of mass position, and those correspond-
ing to a macroscopic number of microsystems in microscopically non definite states.
Due to the fact that the center of mass of the wavefunction has, in general, non com-
pact support, the first class obviously includes also states which, being brought in by
the reducing dynamics, have “tails”. The so called “tail problem” will be discussed
in the following section.
States of the first class have been extensively analyzed in sections 6, 7 and 8; we
have seen that superpositions of different macroscopic states are reduced — in a very
short time — to one of their terms; correspondingly, the classical properties of macro-
scopic systems are restored. Thus, for example, a state like |ψ⊕〉 is spontaneously
transformed, by the reducing dynamics, either into the state |ψNA 〉 or |ψNB 〉, i.e. into
states which have an accessible mass–density distribution.
Concerning states of the second class, it is of extreme relevance to make clear
that they have a conceptual status which is very different45 from the one of the
superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states like |ψ⊕〉; moreover, they
represent rather peculiar situations which mainly have an “academic” character, since
states of this kind certainly do not appear often in practice. However, it is worthwhile
to discuss them in some detail.
Let us consider a system of N nucleons and a discretization of space in small cubes
of linear dimensions 10−8 cm. We consider again two macroscopic regions A and B,
and we label by the indices kA and kB pairs of cubes within A and B respectively.
For kA 6= k˜A the two cubes are disjoint and the union of all cubes kA (kB) covers the
region A (B). The index k runs from 1 to N , a very large number; typically if A and
45This important difference has already been appropriately stressed by A. Leggett [123], who, even
though in a different context, has introduced the mathematically precise concept of disconnectivity
to distinguish states of this type from states like |ψ⊕〉.
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B have volumes of the order of 1 dm3, N will be of the order of 1027.
Let us denote by |ψkA〉 and |ψkB 〉 the states of a particle whose coordinate repre-
sentation are well localized within kA and kB, respectively. As an example we could
choose
〈r|ψkA 〉 = χ(kA) (10.10)
χ(kA) being the characteristic function of the cube kA. We now consider the following
microscopically non definite state for the k–th particle:
|ψk〉 = 1√
2
[|ψkA〉 + |ψkB 〉] (10.11)
and the factorized state of the N particles
|ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψk〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψN 〉. (10.12)
In spite of the fact that the state |ψ〉 is a direct product of microscopically non definite
states it is nevertheless “almost” an eigenstate of the operators Mi (remember that
the linear dimensions of the cell to which the index i refers are of the order of 10−5
cm so that one such cell contains about 109 cubes of the kind of kA (kB)). In fact,
denoting by n ≃ 109 the number of kA (kB) small cubes contained in the i–th cell,
one can easily see that |ψ〉 gives rise to “accessible” mass Mi in regions A and B
respectively46:
〈Mi(A,B)〉 ≃ 1
2
nm0, 〈M2i(A,B)〉 ≃
1
4
(n2 + n)m20 (10.13)
hence
V2i(A,B) ≃
1
4
nm20, Ri(A,B) ≃
1√
n
≪ 1 (10.14)
To clarify the physical implications of the state |ψ〉, from the point of view which
interests us here, we can imagine performing once more the gedanken experiment
with a test particle we have already considered in the previous subsection, assuming,
for simplicity, that the interactions between the test particle and the considered N
particles do not change the state47 of the latter. By substituting equation (10.11) into
equation (10.12), we see that |ψ〉 is a superposition of 2N states in which each particle
is well localized. In such a superposition all states have an equal amplitude 1/
√
2N
and almost all states correspond to about N/2 particles being in regions A and B re-
spectively. Therefore, in the language of dynamical reduction models, the probability
of occurrence of a realization of the stochastic potential leading to the “actualization”
of an almost completely undeflected trajectory for the test particle is extremely close
to one48. This shows that the mass density functionM(r) corresponding to the state
behaves in a “classical way”, so that no trouble arises in this case.
It has to be noted that, obviously, the massMi corresponding to the state (10.12)
coincides with the one corresponding to the state |ψ⊗〉 of the previous subsection, in
spite of the fact that both states are dynamically allowed and are quite different as
46In making the computations we have identified the operators Mi with the sum of the projectors
(multiplied by the nucleon mass m0) of the various particles in the i–th cell.
47At any rate, possible changes in such a state would be symmetrical with respect to the middle
plane, so that the subequent considerations would still hold true.
48It could be useful to remark that if one would analyze the same experiment in terms of the linear
quantum dynamics, the test particle would end up in the linear superposition of an extremely large
number of states. However, since such states correspond to trajectories which are very near and
almost undeflected, the evaluation of the mass density associated to the final statevector would show
that in the “middle” region there would practically be the total mass of the test particle. Therefore,
this represents a case in which even without any reduction process the mass density referring to the
test particle would correspond to a precise outcome of the measurement.
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physical states. However, as we have shown, the masses Mi in the two cases behave
practically in the same way and are fully unproblematic, contrary to what happens
in the case of |ψ⊕〉.
Concluding, we have made plausible that in the context of the dynamical reduction
program one can consistently describe the world, at a given time, in terms of the
mass density function M(r) and that, due to the fact that such a function becomes
accessible at the macrolevel, such a description matches our experience with the reality
around us. Obviously, since with the elapsing of time the state of the world changes,
a complete description requires the consideration of the motion picture of the density,
i.e. ofM(r, t) defined in equation (10.1). We will discuss in greater detail this crucial
point in the next section.
10.4 Defining an appropriate topology for the CSL model
Let us consider a system S of finite mass which will constitute our “universe” and its
associated Hilbert space H(S). We denote by U(S) the unit sphere in H(S) and we
consider the nonlinear map49 M associating to the element |ϕ〉 of U(S) the element
m = {Mi(|ϕ〉)} of l2, Mi(|ϕ〉) being the quantity 〈ϕ|Mi|ϕ〉.
On U(S) we define a topology by introducing a mapping ∆ : U(S)⊗U(S)→ R+
according to:
∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) = d(m,n) =
√∑
i
(mi − ni)2 (10.15)
where m = {Mi(|ϕ〉)}, n = {Mi(|ψ〉)}. Such a mapping is not a distance since, as
it emerges clearly from the analysis of the previous subsection, it may happen that
∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) = 0 even though |ϕ〉 6= |ψ〉. However ∆ meets all other properties of a
distance:
∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) = ∆(|ψ〉, |ϕ〉) ≥ 0 (10.16)
and
∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) ≤ ∆(|ϕ〉, |χ〉) + ∆(|χ〉, |ψ〉) (10.17)
as one easily proves by taking into account the fact that d is a distance in l2.
¿From now on we will limit our considerations to the proper subset A(S) of U(S)
of those states which are allowed by the CSL dynamics. In the previous subsection
we have already identified, even though in a rough way, the set A(S). One could
obviously be very precise about such a set by adopting e.g. the following criterion:
let |ϕ〉 ∈ U(S), and let us consider the ensemble A(S)(|ϕ〉) of states which have a non
negligible (this obviously requires the definition of a threshold) probability of being
brought in by the reducing dynamics after a time interval of the order of 10−2 sec,
which is the characteristic perception time of a human being50, for the given initial
condition |ϕ〉. The union of all subsets A(S)(|ϕ〉) for |ϕ〉 running over U(S) is then
A(S). For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to go through the cumbersome
management of a very precise definition of the set A(S); the consideration of the cases
we have discussed in the previous subsection is sufficient to lead to the interesting
conclusions.
For any element |ϕ〉 of A(S) we consider the set of states of A(S) for which
∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) ≤ ǫ. Here the quantity ǫ has the dimensions of a mass and is chosen of
the order of 1018m0, with m0 the nucleon mass. From the properties of the map ∆ it
follows that:
49To be rigorous, one should consider the map M from the unit sphere of H(S) into the space L2
of the square integrable functions of r. However, we can deal, without any loss of generality, with
the discretized version of the model.
50See the discussion of section 12.
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1. {∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) ≤ ǫ and ∆(|ϕ〉, |χ〉) ≤ ǫ} implies ∆(|χ〉, |ψ〉) ≤ 2ǫ.
2. {∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉)≫ ǫ and ∆(|ϕ〉, |χ〉) ≤ ǫ} implies ∆(|χ〉, |ψ〉)≫ ǫ.
We have introduced the parameter ǫ in such a way that it turns out to be sensible
to consider similar to each other states whose “distance” ∆ is smaller than (or of the
order of) ǫ. More specifically, when
∆(|ϕ〉, |ψ〉) ≤ ǫ (10.18)
we will say that |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉 are “physically equivalent”. More about this choice in
what follows.
To understand the meaning of this choice it is useful to compare it with the natural
topology ofH(S). We begin by pointing out the inappropriateness of the Hilbert space
topology to describe the concept of similarity or difference of two macroscopic states.
In fact suppose our system S is an almost rigid body and let us consider the following
three states: |ϕA〉, |ϕB〉 and |ϕ˜A〉. The state |ϕA〉 corresponds to a definite internal
state of S and to its center of mass being well localized around A, the state |ϕB〉 is
simply the translated of |ϕA〉 so that it is well localized in a distant region B, the
state |ϕ˜A〉 differs from |ϕA〉 simply by the fact that one or a microscopic number of its
“constituents” are in states which are orthogonal to the corresponding ones in |ϕA〉.
It is obvious that, on any reasonable assumption about similarity or difference of
the states of the universe, |ϕ˜A〉 must be considered very similar (identical) to |ϕA〉
while |ϕB〉 must be considered very different from |ϕA〉. On the other hand, according
to the Hilbert space topology
‖|ϕA〉 − |ϕ˜A〉‖ = ‖|ϕA〉 − |ϕB〉‖ = √2 (10.19)
This shows with striking evidence that the Hilbert space topology is totally inadequate
for the description of the macroscopic world. As a consequence such topology is also
quite inadequate to base on it any reasonable psycho-physical correspondence.
We now discuss the “distorted” (with respect to the Hilbert space one) topology
associated to the “distance” ∆. First of all we stress that the two states |ϕA〉 and |ϕ˜A〉
which are maximally distant in the Hilbert space topology, turn out to be equivalent,
i.e. to satisfy condition (10.18) in the new topology. This represents an example
showing how such a topology takes more appropriately into account the fact that,
under any sensible assumption, the “universes” associated to the considered states
are very similar.
Obviously, one problem arises. Criterion (10.18) leads us to consider as equivalent
states which are quite different from a physical point of view, even at the macro-
scopic level. To clarify this statement we take into account two states |ϕ〉 and |ψ〉
corresponding to an almost rigid body located, at t = 0, in the same position but
with macroscopically different momenta, let us say P = 0 and P , respectively. Even
though the two states are physically quite different, their distance at t = 0 is equal
to zero. However, if one waits up to the time in which the state |ψ〉 has moved away
from |ϕ〉, the “distance” ∆(|ϕ(t)〉, |ψ(t)〉) becomes large and the two states are no
longer equivalent. We will discuss the now outlined problem in great details in the
next section.
Before concluding this part it is important to analyze the case of two states |ψ〉
and |ψT 〉 such that |ψ〉 corresponds to an almost rigid body with a center of mass
wavefunction which is almost perfectly localized while |ψT 〉 corresponds to the same
body with a “tail” in a distant region. As we have already discussed, the CSL dy-
namics allows the existence of this latter type of states; however it tends to depress
more and more the tail in such a way as to make the mass in the distant region
extremely close to zero (much less than one nucleon mass) in very short times. As a
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consequence, according to the topology that we propose the two states |ψ〉 and |ψT 〉
turn out to be identical. This is quite natural. In fact, in the same way in which
taking away a single particle from a macroscopic system would be accepted as being
totally irrelevant from a macroscopic point of view, when one chooses, as we do, to
describe reality in terms of mass density, one must consider as equivalent situations
in which their difference derives entirely from the location of a small fraction of the
mass of a nucleon in the whole universe. We remark that |ψ〉 and |ψT 〉 are extremely
close to each other also in the standard Hilbert space topology.
10.5 Deepening the proposed interpretation
We consider it appropriate to devote this subsection to discuss in great generality
the problem of giving an acceptable description of the world within a given theory.
Usually one tries to do so by resorting to the notion of observable. As repeatedly
remarked, such an approach meets, within standard quantum mechanics, serious dif-
ficulties since the formal structure of the theory allows only probabilistic statements
about measurement outcomes conditional under the measurement being performed.
In brief, the theory deals with what we find not with what is. This is why J.S. Bell has
suggested [124] replacing the notion of observable with the one of “beable”, from the
verb to be, to exist. Obviously, the identification of the beables, of what is real, re-
quires the identification of appropriate formal ingredients of the theory we are dealing
with.
10.5.1 The case of the Pilot–Wave theory
To clarify our point, it turns out to be useful to analyze the de Broglie–Bohm Pilot–
Wave theory. It describes the world in terms of the wavefunction and of the actual
positions of the particles of our “universe”, each of which follows a definite trajec-
tory. Therefore, in such a theory it is quite natural to consider as the beables the
positions (which are the local elements accounting for reality at a given instant) and
the wavefunction (which is nonlocal and determines uniquely the evolution of the
positions). It is important to remember that, within the theory under discussion, all
other “observables” (in particular, e.g. the spin variables) turn out, in general, to be
contextual. This simply means that the truth value of a statement about the outcome
of the measurement of one such observable (which in turn is simply a statement about
the future positions of some particles) may in general depend (even nonlocally) on
the overall context. This obviously implies that the attribution of a value to the con-
sidered observable cannot be thought as corresponding, in general, to an “objective
property” of the system.
Before coming to discuss the problem of the beables within CSL we would like to
call attention to the fact that [87] within the Pilot–Wave theory, one can construct,
from the microscopic variables r, macroscopic variablesR including pointer positions,
images on photographic plates etc. Obviously this requires some fuzziness, but such
a limitation is not relevant for a consistent account of reality. Thus, in this theory
we are led to suppose that it is from the r, rather than from the wavefunction, that
the observables we use to describe reality are constructed. The positions are also the
natural candidates to be used in defining a psycho–physical parallelism, if we want
to go so far. An appropriate way to express the now discussed features of the theory
derives from denoting, as J.S. Bell proposed, as “exposed variables” the positions of
particles and as a “hidden variable” the wavefunction ψ.
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10.5.2 The case of CSL
Let us now perform a corresponding analysis for the dynamical reduction models.
Since, as should be clear from the discussion given in the previous subsection, the most
relevant feature of the modified dynamics is that of suppressing linear superpositions
corresponding to different mass distributions, one is actually led to identify as the local
beables of the theory the mass density function M(r, t) at a given time. Obviously,
also within CSL just as for the Pilot–Wave the wavefunction plays a fundamental role
for the evolution so that it too acquires the status of a nonlocal beable.
It has to be remarked that in the interpretation we are proposing, even though the
wavefunction is considered as one of the beables of the theory, the “exposed variables”
are the values of the mass density function at different points. It is then natural to
relate to them, as we have done in the previous section, the concept of similarity or
difference between universes.
In doing so one is led to consider equivalent, at a fixed time t, two “universes”
which are almost identical in the exposed beables (i.e. they satisfy the condition
(10.18)). Obviously the fact that the above condition holds at t does by no means im-
ply that the two universes will remain equivalent as time elapses. It has to be stressed
that the just mentioned feature is not specific of the model and the interpretation we
are proposing, but is quite general and occurs whenever one tries to make precise
the idea of “similarity” of physical situations. In fact within all theories we know,
and independently of the variables we choose to use to define nearness, situations can
occur for which nearby states at a given time can evolve in extremely short times in
distant states.
To focus on this important fact we can consider even classical mechanics with
the assumption that both positions and momenta are the beables of the theory51.
As it is obvious, even if such an attitude is taken there are at least two reasons for
which nearby points in phase space can rapidly evolve into distant ones. First of
all one must take into account that many systems exhibit dynamical instability so
that the distance between “trajectories” grows exponentially with time. Secondly,
even for a “dynamically standard” situation one can consider cases in which just the
present conditions can give rise to completely different evolutions depending on some
extremely small difference in the whole universe. Suppose in fact you consider two
universes A, A˜ differing only in the direction of propagation of a single particle (such
universes have to be considered as very close in any sensible objective interpretation).
If the trajectory of the considered particle in A˜ is such that in a very small time it
triggers e.g. the discharge of a Geiger counter, which in turn gives rise to some relevant
macroscopic effect, while in A it does not, the evolved universes soon become quite
different. An analogous argument obviously holds for standard quantum mechanics,
the Pilot–Wave theory and, as previously remarked, for CSL too.
It is appropriate to stress that, in a sense, the above considerations favor taking a
position about reality which can be described in the following terms. One considers
the sensible “beables” for its theory at a fixed time and one distinguishes similar or
different universes on the basis of such a snapshot. Obviously, one must then also
pay attention to the way in which the beables evolve, i.e. to compare snapshots at
different times52.
51Obviously, within classical mechanics any function of these variables can be considered as a be-
able, but since all information about the system can be derived from the positions and the momenta,
consideration of such variables is sufficient.
52From this point of view, one could state that also the classical world would be most appropriately
described in terms of positions at fixed time.
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10.5.3 The role of mass density
The previous analysis has shown that the proposed interpretation (mass density =
exposed beable) can be consistently taken within CSL. Obviously it gives an absolutely
prominent role to the mass in accordance with the fact that mass is the handle by
which the reduction mechanism induces macro–objectification.
Other features of natural phenomena, such as the effects related to the charge are,
in a sense, less fundamental since to become objective they need mass as a support.
To clarify this point we remark that one could consider, e.g., a condenser with two
plates of about 1 cm2, at a distance of 1 cm. The plates are supposed to be perfectly
rigid and in perfectly defined positions53. Let us also consider the following gedanken
situation: the condenser can be prepared in the superposition of two states, |C0〉
and |Cc〉, the first corresponding to its plates being neutral, the second to its plates
having being charged by displacing 1012 electrons from one plate to the other. We
remark that for the two states the decoupling rate (recall that electrons, which are
very light, are quite ineffective in suppressing superpositions) is about 10−8 sec−1, i.e.
that the superposition can persist for more than ten years. The electric field within
the plates is zero or about 108 V/m in the two states, respectively. Suppose now we
consider a small sphere of radius 10−5 cm and density 10−2 gr/cm3 carrying a charge
corresponding to 104 electrons. We send such a test particle through the plates of the
condenser. What happens? The final state is the entangled state
|ψ(t)〉 = 1√
2
[|C0〉 |undeflected〉 + |Cc〉 |deflected〉] (10.20)
the location of the particle in the state |undeflected〉 and |deflected〉 differing by macro-
scopic amounts. According to the CSL model of section 8.6, one can easily evaluate
the rate of suppression of the superposition. As already remarked the contribution
of the electrons on the plates is totally negligible so that the decoherence is governed
mainly by the mass of the particle. Then, with the above choices for the radius and the
density of the test particle, the superposition will persist for more than one minute.
In spite of the fact that macroscopically relevant forces enter into play no reduction
takes place for such a time interval. On the contrary, if we put the same charge on a
particle of normal density and of radius 10−3 cm, we see that the macroscopic force
acting on it when the condenser is in the state |Cc〉 leads to a displacement of the
order of its radius in about 10−5 sec and that within the same time the reducing effect
of the dynamics suppresses one of the two terms of the superposition.
This example is quite enlightening since it shows that superpositions of charge
distributions generating different forces which are relevant at the macroscopic level,
are not suppressed unless they induce displacements of masses. It goes without say-
ing that any attempt to relate reduction to charge is doomed to fail since it will
not suppress superpositions of macroscopically different but electrically neutral mass
distributions.
We hope to have made clear, with this perhaps tedious analysis, the real signifi-
cance of treating the mass function as the “exposed beables” allowing one to describe
reality.
53This assumption must be made because we are just discussing the role of the charge with respect
to the one of the mass within the model. If one would allow deformations and/or displacements of
the plates, once more the ensuing reduction would be due to the mass and not directly to the charge
density difference in states |C0〉 and |Cc〉.
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11 The “tail problem” in dynamical reduction mod-
els
Dynamical reduction models have been repeatedly criticized because the reducing
dynamics does not lead, in the case of macroscopic systems, to perfectly localized
wavefunctions, i.e. to wavefunctions having a compact support corresponding to a
small (with respect to the characteristic length 1/
√
α) volume of space. On the
contrary, wavefunctions describing macroscopic systems always have (very small, as
we shall see) “tails” spreading out to infinity.
Due to this feature, many authors [125, 45, 126, 127, 128] have suggested that
dynamical reduction models do not guarantee the emergence of a objective (and
classical) world at the macroscopic level, a world in which macroscopic systems occupy
a precise position in space.
In the present section we will show why the “tail problem” is not a problem within
QMSL and CSL. After a brief introduction (subsection 11.1), in subsection 11.2 we
list the criticisms which have been put forward by the above quoted authors. In
subsection 11.3 we give a quantitative estimate of the order of magnitude of the tails,
in the case of a macroscopic system, showing that they represent an extremely small
portion of the wavefunction.
In subsections 11.4 and 11.5 we reply to the criticisms, by means of the mass
interpretation introduced in the previous section: the tails of the wavefunction do
not forbid the (classical) description of macroscopic systems. However, this does not
mean that the tails do not have any physical relevance, as we will prove in subsection
11.6. We conclude the section with a classical analog of the tail problem (subsection
11.7).
11.1 Historical remarks
J. Bell vividly described Schro¨dinger’s trials to give a consistent interpretation of the
wavefunction [2]:
In the beginning Schro¨dinger tried to interpret his wavefunction as
giving somehow the density of stuff of which the world is made. He tried
to think of an electron as represented by a wavepacket ... a wavefunction
appreciably different from zero only over a small region in space. The
extension of that region he thought of as the actual size of the electron ...
his electron was a bit fuzzy. At first he thought that small wavepackets,
evolving according to the Schro¨dinger equation, would remain small. But
that was wrong. Wavepackets diffuse, and with the passage of time be-
come indefinitely extended, according to the Schro¨dinger equation. But
however far the wavefunction has extended, the reaction of a detector to
an electron remains spotty. So Schro¨dinger’s “realistic” interpretation of
his wavefunction did not survive.
Then came the Born interpretation. The wavefunction gives not the
density of stuff, but gives rather (on squaring its modulus) the density of
probability. Probability of what, exactly? Not of the electron being there,
but of the electron being found there, if its position is “measured”.
Why this aversion to “being” and insistence on “finding”? The found-
ing fathers were unable to form a clear picture of things on the remote
atomic scale. They became very aware of the intervening apparatus, and
of the need for a “classical” base from which to intervene on the quantum
system. And so the shifty split.
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Some remarks having a direct connection with the central problem of the present
section emerge quite naturally. Schro¨dinger too, just as von Neumann, was certainly
aware of the fact that the electron wavefunction cannot have compact support, ac-
cording to his equation. In spite of that he was quite keen to interpret a well localized
wavefunction as describing a “bit fuzzy” electron, or better the “stuff” of which the
electron is made (its mass and charge density). The compelling reasons for abandon-
ing such a position did not come, as we all know, from the fact that even extremely
well localized wavefunctions have tails, but, as appropriately stressed by Bell, from the
fact that well concentrated wavepackets become appreciably different from zero over
macroscopic regions in extremely short times. Thus, Schro¨dinger’s realistic position
had to be abandoned, to be replaced by the probabilistic Born interpretation.
There is no doubt that Schro¨dinger too was perfectly aware of the fact that the
integral over the whole space of the squared modulus of the wavefunction does not
change with time, as a very consequence of Schro¨dinger’s equation. Consequently he
certainly had perfectly clear that by adopting the “density of stuff” interpretation
he had to accept also that, in spite of the fact that his electron was there (in the
small region in space in which its wavefunction was concentrated), a negligible part
of its mass (or charge) would not be confined to that region. The extremely relevant
difference of the model theories we are analyzing here with the case of Schro¨dinger,
however, derives from the fact that superpositions of functions of macro–systems,
appreciably different from zero over macroscopic distances, are dynamically forbidden
within QMSL, contrary to Schro¨dinger’s case.
11.2 Criticisms about the “tail problem”
As the reader has certainly grasped, the localization of the wavefunction does not
lead to an infinitely precise localization of the pointer. Actually, after a localization
the wavefunction (like all conceivable wavefunctions, both within standard Quantum
Mechanics and CSL) unavoidably exhibits tails extending over the whole space. In
fact, since |ψ〉 has a noncompact support in the position representation, multiplying
it times a Gaussian leaves it different from zero everywhere54 (recall the example at
the end of section 6.1). This fact is at the basis of the uneasiness of various people
who naively transfer the ontology of standard quantum mechanics to the new theory.
The first criticism of this kind has been formulated by A. Shimony [125] who has put
forward many desiderata for a modified quantum dynamics, one of them being that:
If a stochastic dynamical theory is used to account for the outcome of a
measurement, it should not permit excessive indefiniteness of the outcome,
where “excessive” is defined by consideration of sensory discrimination.
This desideratum tolerates outcomes in which the apparatus variable does
not have a sharp value, but it does not tolerate “tails” which are so broad
that different parts of the range of the variable can be discriminated by
the senses, even if very low probability amplitude is assigned to the tail.
It goes without saying that the perspective chosen by Shimony with respect to the
dynamical reduction models is entirely based on the standard probabilistic interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics (even if very low probability amplitude is assigned to the
tail) about the possible ‘outcomes’ of a measurement process.
A quite similar criticism has been raised by Albert and Loewer [45]:
Our worry is that GRW collapses almost never produce definite out-
comes even when outcomes are recorded in distinct positions of macro-
54We stress that it would have been totally useless to make the localization function of compact
support, since the kinetic energy part of the hamiltonian would immediately make the wavefunction
different from zero everywhere.
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scopically many particles. The reason is that a GRW jump does not
literally produce a collapse into an eigenstate of position. A GRW col-
lapse yields one of the states with tails in which almost all the amplitude
is concentrated in the region around one of the two components but there
is nonzero, though very small, amplitude associated with other regions.
... This means that the post collapse state is not an eigenstate of position
and so does not actually assign a definite position to the pointer.
Once more we stress the adherence of the authors to the standard formalism: the only
variables which have values are those of which the statevector is an eigenstate. One
should also note that the request that the statevector be an eigenstate of position is
very peculiar: the localization mechanism should map a state of the Hilbert space
onto a non–normalizable state and, at any rate, such a state would immediately
spread everywhere, loosing what is considered its fundamental feature of assigning a
definite position to the pointer. Subsequently, the same authors [45] have suggested
that the GRW proposal could be saved provided one would be keen to release the
eigenvector–eigenvalue link. More about this in what follows.
The tail problem leads in a straightforward way to the enumeration anomaly which
is the subject of the papers of Lewis [126] and Clifton and Monton [127, 128] (who
use the term ‘conjunction introduction’ instead of ‘enumeration’). The idea is quite
simple. Lewis considers a macroscopic marble and a very large box, he denotes the
normalized eigenstates of the marble being inside and outside the box as |in〉 and
|out〉, respectively, and he remarks that starting from a state:
1√
2
(|in〉 + |out〉) (11.1)
the GRW dynamics will transform it, almost immediately, into a state like
a|in〉 + b|out〉 (11.2)
or into a state like
b|in〉 + a|out〉 (11.3)
where 1 > |a|2 ≫ |b|2 > 0 (|a|2 + |b|2 = 1). Lewis recalls that the GRW theory
requires us to interpret each one of these states as one in which the marble is inside
(in case (11.2)) or outside (in case (11.3)) the box55. Then he considers a system of
n non interacting marbles, each in a state like (11.2):
|Ψ〉all = (a|in〉1 + b|out〉1)⊗ (a|in〉2 + b|out〉2)⊗ ...⊗ (a|in〉n + b|out〉n) . (11.4)
The counting anomaly is then easily derived: for a state like (11.4) the GRW theory
allows us to claim that: ‘particle 1 is in the box’, ‘particle 2 is in the box’, ..., ‘particle
n is in the box’ but for the same state the probability that all marbles be found in
the box is |a|2n, which, for n sufficiently large, can be made arbitrarily small.
Clifton and Monton [127] agree, in principle, with Lewis, and they also prove that
the suggestion of releasing the eigenvalue–eigenvector link put forward by Albert and
Loewer [45] does not allow one to overcome the difficulty. In fact, what Albert and
Loewer propose is to weaken the eigenvalue–eigenvector link for position according to
a rule they call PosR:
‘Particle x is in region R’ if and only if the proportion of the total
squared amplitude of x’s wavefunction which is associated with points in
region R is greater or equal to 1− p,
55We point out that, with reference to the above states, it would have been much more appropriate
to assert that they represent a marble which is located in the precise region where its wavefunction is
sharply peaked. Obviously that region is inside the box for state (11.2) and outside for state (11.3).
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with an appropriately chosen (and small) p. Clifton and Monton suggest, first of all,
to generalize PosR for a multi–particle system resorting to what they call the fuzzy
link criterion:
‘Particle x lies in region Rx and y lies in Ry and z lies in Rz ...’ if
and only if the proportion of the total squared amplitude of ψ(t, r1, ..., rN )
that is associated with points in Rx ×Ry ×Rz ... is greater than or equal
to 1− p.
It should be clear that, while according to the fuzzy link criterion for a state like
(11.4) the propositions Ai ≡ ‘particle i is in the box’ are true for any i, the conjuction
A1 ∧A2 ∧ ...∧An is false. In other words, the proposal entails a failure of conjunction
introduction. Having remarked this, the above authors feel the necessity of pointing
out that the tail problem, even though present, can never become manifest within the
GRW theory. This is proved by operationalizing the procedure of counting marbles, i.e.
by considering apparata aimed to detect whether particle 1 is in the box, particle 2 is
in the box and so on, and another apparatus aimed to detect how many particles there
are in the box and comparing their outcomes. Then, by some assumptions (which
seem to us useless and inappropriate) one shows that a situation resembling the one
of the von Neumann chain emerges: in spite of the different possible final outcomes
there is always consistency between the individual and global detections.
To be more precise we recall the reasoning of reference [127]. It goes as follows:
An ideal measurement of whether marble 1 is in the box would correlate
orthogonal states of a macroscopic measuring apparatus to the |in〉 and
|out〉 states of the marble.
Obviously one has to resort to n such apparatuses. The evolution leads to the state:
(a|in〉1|‘in’〉M1 + b|out〉1|‘out’〉M1)⊗ ...⊗ (a|in〉n|‘in’〉Mn + b|out〉n|‘out’〉Mn) (11.5)
where the states |‘in’〉Mk ( |‘out’〉Mk) are eigenstates of the observable: ‘the k–th
apparatus has recorded that the marble is inside (outside) the box’. At this stage
the authors need a further apparatus M (again working ideally) to see how many
marbles are in the box. A new step in the chain is necessary and one ends up with
an entangled state of the kind:
|ψ〉count =
n∑
k=0
an−kbk |φ(n − k, in; k, out)〉 |‘O = n− k’〉 (11.6)
where the last factor refers to the eigenstate of M corresponding to the eigenvalue
‘n−k particles are inside the box’, and the states |φ(n−k, in; k, out)〉 are (in general)
linear superpositions of states in which there are n−k factors of the type |in〉j |‘in’〉Mj
and k factors |out〉s|‘out’〉Ms. And here comes the conclusion:
The state |ψ〉count is highly unstable given the GRW dynamics, ... since
its various terms differ as to the location of the pointer on M ’s dial that
registers the value of O.
Moreover, even if the state collapses to a term |φ(n−k, in; k, out)〉|‘O = n− k’〉, since
the terms of the first factor differ as to the location of at least one marble and since
the marbles and the apparata Mr are macroscopic, then one would end up, e.g., with
the state:
(|out〉1|‘out’〉M1|in〉2|‘in’〉M2 . . . |in〉n|in〉Mn)|‘O = n− 1’〉 (11.7)
in which the records of the various individual apparata Ms agree with the one of O.
Thus, the counting anomaly cannot become manifest.
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In what follows we will put forward precise motivations showing that this opera-
tionalization process is useless. But we want to call immediately the attention of the
reader to an important fact. Suppose we consider, for simplicity, only two terms of
one of the states |φ(n− k, in; k, out)〉, e.g.:
|in〉1|‘in’〉M1|out〉2|‘out’〉M2 . . .+ |out〉1|‘out’〉M1|in〉2|‘in’〉M2 (11.8)
and recall that these authors denote as |in〉1 the part of the GRW Gaussian–like wave-
function lying inside the box and as |out〉1 the tail outside the box. Suppose particle
1 suffers a localization within the box. In configuration space one sees immediately
that multiplying the wavefunction corresponding to (11.8) times a Gaussian centered
within the box near the point at which the wavefunction is peaked and normalizing
the resulting statevector makes the second of the two above terms of much smaller
norm than the first, but in no way suppresses it. Obviously the same argument applies
for any localization of the pointers of the individual apparataMi andM . So the state
will never take precisely to form (11.7). The authors have implicitly assumed that
at some level the standard quantum mechanical reduction (and not the spontaneous
localization characterizing the GRW theory) takes place56.
11.3 A quantitative analysis
Let us consider a macroscopic object which is in an “almost” eigenstate of the mass
operators Mi (we consider once more the discretized version of CSL) but which how-
ever have tails. Let |ψ〉 be the normalized state
|ψ〉 = α|ψAN 〉 + β|ψBN 〉 (11.9)
where |ψAN 〉 and |ψBN 〉 are the states appearing in (10.3) and |β|2 is extremely close to
zero. In region A we have
Mi(A) ≃ |α|2nm0, Vi(A) ≃ |α|2|β|2n2m20, and Ri(A) ≃ |β|2 ≪ 1 (11.10)
so that the massesMi(A) are accessible and practically equal to those corresponding
to the state |ψAN 〉. In region B we have
Mi(B) ≃ |β|2nm0, Vi(B) ≃ |α|2|β|2n2m20, and Ri(A) ≃ |β|−2 ≫ 1 (11.11)
hence the massesMi(B) are not accessible.
Our aim is to make a quantitative estimate of Ri(A) and of the total mass in
region B. To this purpose (as it is evident from equations (11.10) and (11.11)) one
has to explicitly evaluate the order of magnitude of the parameter |β|2 implied by the
reducing dynamics. In order to do this, to cover also the case of non homogeneous
bodies, we consider again two far apart regions A and B, each containing K cells and
a system of nucleons which at time t = 0 is in a (normalized) state of the type (the
overall phase factor being irrelevant)
|ψ〉 = α(0)|n1(A), . . . , nK(A), . . . , 0, . . . , 0〉 +
β(0)eiγ(0)|0, . . . , 0, . . . , n1(B), . . . , nK(B)〉 (11.12)
56In [128], Clifton and Monton have tried to de–emphasize their previous assertions by stating:
In our exposition we were simply dividing the collapse process into different stages for ease of
exposition. Certainly we were aware that the marbles themselves will be almost continually subject
to GRW collapses. Our answer is quite simple: first, why not confine the analysis to the marbles?
What is the purpose of introducing the apparata? Secondly, we invite the reader to introduce in the
game the appropriate description of the whole process by assuming that, in turn, the registration of
the outcome is given by the location of a pointer whose wavefunction unavoidably has tails. He will
easily realize that there is no advantage in operationalising the process of counting marbles: he will
find himself back to square one.
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where α(0) and β(0) are comparable positive numbers and ni(A,B) represents the
occupation number in the i–th cell in regions A and B respectively57. We then study
the ensemble of systems brought in by the reducing dynamics after a time interval
of the order of, e.g., 10−2 sec (the reason for this choice will become clear in what
follows).
According to the CSL model of section 8.6, after such a time interval the normal-
ized state corresponding to a definite realization of the stochastic potential would be
of the type
|ψB(t)〉 = αB(t)|n1(A), . . . , nK(A), . . . , 0, . . . , 0〉 +
βB(t)e
iγ(0)|0, . . . , 0, . . . , n1(B), . . . , nK(B)〉 (11.13)
with αB(t) and βB(t) as positive numbers. The ensemble of systems corresponding to
all possible realizations of the stochastic potential would be described by the statistical
operator
ρ(t) =
∫
dB1 . . . dB2K Pcook[B(t)] |ψB(t)〉〈ψB(t)| (11.14)
satisfying58
〈n1(A), . . . , nK(A), . . . , 0, . . . , 0|ρ(t)|0, . . . , 0, . . . , n1(B), . . . , nK(B)〉 =
e
−λ t
K∑
i
n2i
〈n1(A), . . . , nK(A), . . . , 0, . . . , 0|ρ(0)|0, . . . , 0, . . . , n1(B), . . . , nK(B)〉
(11.15)
with λt ≃ 10−18. From (11.15) we see that the matrix elements of ρ(t) between
the considered states are exponentially damped by a factor which is proportional to∑K
i n
2
i .
In the following we consider only situations in which
∑K
i n
2
i turns out to be
much greater than 1018, so that in the considered time interval of 10−2 sec the linear
superposition (11.12) is actually suppressed, i.e. either αB(t) or βB(t) of equation
(11.13) become very small. The states at time t are then typical states with “tails”,
i.e. states whose existence is considered as a drawback of the theory by the authors
of references [125, 45, 126, 127, 128]. Equation (11.15) implies (taking into account
equations (11.13) and (11.14)) that
∫
dB1 . . . dB2K Pcook[B(t)]αB(t)βB(t) = α(0)β(0) e
−λ t
K∑
i
n2i
(11.16)
¿From (11.16), since αB(t) and βB(t) are positive, one can easily deduce that the
probability of occurrence of realizations of the stochastic potential which would lead to
a value for the product αB(t)βB(t) much greater than e
−λ t
∑
K
i
n2i must be extremely
small. Therefore, one can state that in practically all cases
αB(t)βB(t) ≃ e
−λ t
K∑
i
n2i
(11.17)
57We disregard the cells which are not contained in regions A and B since they are irrelevant for
the following discussion.
58Even though we are using the CSL model relating decoherence to the mass, the formulas of this
subsection coincide with the analogous ones of standard CSL. This is due to the fact that we deal
only with nucleons and that we have chosen the coupling to the noise to be governed by the ratio
γ/m2
0
, taking the standard CSL value.
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If we assume that αB(t) ≃ 1, so that we consider an individual case for which the
reduction leads to the state corresponding to the nucleons being in region A, |βB(t)|2
must be of the order of e−λ t
∑K
i
n2i . On the basis of this fact we can then estimate the
value of |β|2, e.g., for a homogeneous marble of normal density (so that ni = n ≃ 109
is the number of particles per cell) and of size 1 dm3 (so that K ≃ 1018 is the number
of cells in regions A and B) getting a figure of the order of e−10
18
. Correspondingly,
we have
Ri(A) ≃ e−10
18
(11.18)
while for the total mass in region B we get the value
MB ≃ e−10
18
1027m0 (11.19)
Equation (11.18) shows that the mass in region A is “accessible” to an extremely
high degree of accuracy and equation (11.19) shows that the total mass in region B
is incredibly much smaller than the mass of a nucleon. If we consider a situation in
which K or n are greater than those of the example we have discussed now, we find
values for Ri(A) and MB which are even smaller59 than those of equations (11.18)
and (11.19). This fact by itself (see also the analysis of the following subsection)
shows that the states with “tails” allowed by CSL cannot give rise to difficulties for
the proposed interpretation of the theory. For example, if we would perform the usual
gedanken experiment with the test particle it would be deflected just as if in region
A there would be the “classical” mass Knm0.
11.4 Mass density interpretation and marbles
Before replying to the criticisms previously mentioned [125, 45, 126, 127, 128], and in
the light of the analysis of the previous section, we call the reader’s attention to the
following properties of the mass density interpretation within dynamical reduction
models which are relevant for the discussion about the “tail problem”:
1. In the case of a marble the mass density is accessible just where the marble is
located. Any test devised to ‘reveal’ the mass density distribution will agree with
the statements which make reference to the accessible mass density. One can
easily evaluate the contribution of the tails60 to any possible gravitational test
and conclude that there would be no physically testable difference whatsoever
between the case of a marble whose wavefunction is a Gaussian of width 10−11
cm, and one for which its wavefunction has compact support.
2. This should make clear why we claim that there is no need to operationalize
the process of counting marbles. We already know that the regime condition
induced by the GRW dynamics corresponds precisely to the statement that the
particles are where they are, i.e., in those regions in which there is an accessible
mass density, and that any test will confirm such statements.
3. It is important to stress a point which seems to have been underestimated in
[127] and [128], i.e. the crucial role played by the fact that the GRW theory
leads to precise regions in which the mass is accessible. For this reason it does
not seem a good choice to have schematized the ‘tail problem’ by resorting
to the states |in〉 and |out〉 (even though they are those which matter for the
counting anomaly). If the dynamics would allow a marble in the box to be
59Note that this holds also for objects like a galaxy or a neutron star.
60In the previous subsection it has been proved that the integral of the mass density extended to
all space exception made for the region in which the Gaussian is centered amounts to an incredibly
small fraction of the mass of a nucleon.
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in the superposition of two states corresponding to two Gaussians, or even (at
a certain instant) to two wavefunctions of comparable norm with disjoint and
far apart (let us say 1 meter) compact supports, the associated mass density
function would not be accessible anywhere in ordinary space, and any talk about
the location of the marble would be devoid of any meaning. We can speak of
the position of a marble just because there is a region coinciding (practically)
with its location in which there is an accessible mass density. If there is no
such region, to be allowed to say something about where the marble is one
should resort to ‘a measurement’ and to some recipe leading to an accessible
mass density of the pointer of the measuring device. But fortunately, within
the GRW theory, when one reaches the macroscopic level, there is no need to
invoke observables or measurement processes. This argument shows also how
inappropriate it is to make reference, as is repeatedly done in references [127]
and [128], to microscopic systems replacing the marbles: for such systems there
is no mechanism forbidding the spread of the wavefunction and consequently no
talk about their location has any meaning61.
As already mentioned, Clifton and Monton have pointed out that the mass density
interpretation requires a divorce of mass talk from position talk. We believe that what
they want to stress is that since the integral over the whole space of the operator
M(r) gives the the total mass operator of all particles in the universe, and since the
GRW theory does not contemplate creation and/or annihilation processes, the mass
associated to the region in which it is accessible (i.e. in which, according to our
views, the marble is located) cannot coincide with the total mass of the marble. This
is true, but, as we have already remarked this divorce amounts to an extremely small
fraction of the mass of a nucleon and fits perfectly the ontology of a theory which
allows microsystems [122]:
to enjoy the cloudiness of waves, while allowing tables and chairs, and
ourselves, and black marks on photographs, to be rather definitely in one
place rather than another, and to be described in classical terms.
We do not want to be misunderstood. We are not playing once more with the
possibility of locating the split between micro and macro, reversible and irreversible,
quantum and classical, where we consider it appropriate for our purposes. To clarify
this point we can consider a state of (the particles of) the marble in which, for
some physical interaction, a portion of 10−15 cm3 of the marble has been separated
from the marble itself. We stress that, within the GRW theory with the proposed
interpretation this situation is ‘objectively’ different from that of an unsplit marble
and can be perfectly described in classical terms. In particular, the superposition of
a state of an ‘unbroken marble’ and the one of the marble which ‘has lost a piece’
will not last for the perception times, and, if reduction takes place to the second
state, the mass density will turn out to be accessible just where the marble and
where its fragment are located. But if, instead of a fragment, the marble has been
deprived of some elementary particles, then, while the mass is still accessible where
the marble is, it is no more so for the region over which the wavefunctions of the
lost particles extends, and this precisely for the reason that their wavefunction spread
almost instantaneously. We think that one has to keep clearly in mind this situation
61Obviously, also the mass density of an elementary particle can be accessible, if its wavefunction
is extremely well peaked in a region of, let us say, less tan 10−6 cm. But as we all know, the
hamiltonian evolution will make it unacessible almost immediately due (not to the tails) but to the
extremely rapid increase of its spread without any localization balancing the hamiltonian spread. In
our opinion this is the appropriate way to read the statement of J.S. Bell: even for one particle I
think one would have problems with the mass density and makes clear while, at any rate, one cannot
apply it to the macroscopic case.
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to understand why the remarks of Clifton and Monton about the location of the
marble and the mass density are not cogent (more about this later).
11.5 Proof of the internal consistency of the mass density in-
terpretation: reply to criticisms
¿From the previous analysis it should be clear why we consider not cogent the criti-
cisms raised by Shimony, Albert and Loewer and Lewis, and why we consider super-
fluous and inappropriate the suggestion by Clifton and Monton to operazionalize the
counting process (see also [129, 130, 131]). Let us be more specific.
1. The tail problem is not a problem, it simply requires us to abandon the idea
that the presence of the tail implies that there is a certain probability that a
measurement gives the outcome: ‘the marble has been found in the region of
the tail’. In the GRW theory there are no measurements. If we are interested
in testing the ‘properties’ of a microsystem then we have to invent a device
correlating its different microstates to different regions in which the mass density
of the pointer becomes accessible. From the knowledge of such an accessible
mass density we can infer ‘the outcome of the measurement’. If the object
we are interested in is already macroscopic then there is nothing to measure
about its position: the object is where the associated mass density is accessible.
Measuring where the object is becomes then, in a sense, tautological and has
only a practical interest if, e.g., we have no access to the object. In such a
case the so called ‘measurement procedure’ consists simply in establishing a
correlation between the region where the mass density of the measured object is
accessible and the region in which the mass density of the pointer is accessible,
period.
2. According to the remarks under 1), in the state (11.4) considered by Lewis the
mass density is accessible only inside the box, since one can easily check that
the only points in space where the mass is accessible lie inside it, while outside
the box there are no points where this occurs. This, in turn, implies that in
such a state any test aimed to ascertain where the marble is will almost always
give as a result ‘the marble is inside the box’. We stress that we have added
the specification ‘almost’, not because the regions in which the mass density is
accessible are (due to the tails) to some extent imprecise in a state like (11.4),
but to take into consideration that any physical test requires a certain time
and that, when the number of marbles increases beyond any limit, the peculiar
rapid variations of the centers of the Gaussians which define the accessibility
regions could lead us to detect a particle outside the box, just because it can
make a sudden enormous jump during the test process. But this is a story
which has nothing to do with the enumeration principle and with the problem
of the tails: it originates entirely from the dynamical structure of the theory. At
any rate, as we have already argued, even when the number of marbles which
one takes into account becomes enormous, at any given time one will always
be dealing with precisely n Gaussians peaked around n precise positions. In
brief: there is no probability of finding marbles in different places than those
where their mass density is accessible and so there is no counting anomaly. The
statement that the probability of finding all the particles within the box is |a|2n
derives entirely from adopting the standard probabilistic interpretation and
the standard position about measurements.
3. For the above reasons, there is also no need to operationalize the counting
process: such a procedure, if developed rigorously, will simply lead to more
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and more macro–systems in states which are characterized by an accessible
mass density in the regions in which the theory allows us to say they actually
are, plus more and more tails spread out over the whole universe. These tails
require a divorce of position talk from mass talk, but contrary to what the
remarks of reference [128] seem to suggest, this divorce is absolutely negligible
and experimentally undetectable. In fact even though one could naively argue
that when the marbles become more and more numerous the mass density in
the tails becomes more and more relevant (and might amount to the mass of
even 1000 marbles) one cannot forget that increasing the number of marbles
increases correspondingly their gravitational effects (masking more and more
the gravitational contribution of the tails) and that the mass density of the tails
is never accessible. Stated in rather brute terms: the tails cannot in any way
conspire to produce an accessible mass density which can be identified with ‘a
marble’. Thus, asserting that in a state like (11.4) one could legitimately claim
that n− 1000 marbles are in the box is completely nonsensical62. The analogy
with a classical situation we will present in the last subsection will allow us to
deepen this point.
4. Clifton and Monton claim that the same arguments which “serve to motivate
the mass density criterion, also serve to motivate speaking of a particle (or
particles) as being located in a region whenever its wavefunction assigns high
probability to its being detected in that region; that is they also motivate the
fuzzy link. Unfortunately, [Bassi and Ghirardi] never say why the fuzzy link is
‘inappropriate’ and not a ‘valid’ way to understand reduction theories”.
It is easy to find in this very sentence the reasons for the inappropriateness of
the Clifton and Monton analysis: the authors use the terms probability and being
detected which shows that they are still bound to the orthodox interpretation.
But the whole sentence reveals that they have not grasped the real meaning
of the idea of accessibility: if a superposition of two states of a marble with
comparable weights and both with compact support entirely within the box but
separated by an appreciable distance would be possible, then the mass would
not be accessible. It is just because of a lack of understanding of this point
that these authors feel comfortable in replacing a marble with a particle, as
the above sentence shows. But this is totally inappropriate and this is why the
fuzzy link is inappropriate. In brief: the main reasons to reject the fuzzy–link
are that it puts exactly on the same ground micro and macro–systems and it
does not take at all into account the most relevant feature of the GRW theory,
62With reference to this point we would like to point out that the same problem of the relations
between position and mass occurs even in Classical Mechanics and, in general, in field theories. In
fact the equivalence between mass and energy implies that the mass of a classical object is not given
only by the masses of its constituents, but also by the energy of the fields which keep the constituents
together. And such fields, of course, are spread out in space. Thus, if one wants to be very pedantic,
he could say that not all of the mass–energy of the object is where we see the object to be, since
a very small portion of it is spread in outer space. From this point of view the situation is quite
similar to the one of the GRW theory: if one considers an incredibly large number n of macroscopic
classical objects inside a box and calculates the total mass inside it, he could very well find as a result
m (n − 1000). Do we have to conclude that not only the GRW theory but also Classical Mechanics
and Field Theory violate the enumeration principle? We think that this is not the case; we believe
that it is Lewis’ and Clifton and Monton’s points of view which are too strict and inadequate to the
interpretation of such theories. A field (quantum or classical), in general is never well localized in
space and thus concepts like ‘being located’ are not well suited to describe its properties. This is
why when we want to speak of a field as located in a certain region of space, we have to accept a
certain amount of fuzziness. Thus, for a field, being confined to a certain region means that almost
all the field is confined in such region, and if particles and matter have to be described in terms of
fields (and this is the trend in modern physics), we have to accept some fuzziness, otherwise nothing
would be located anywhere in space.
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i.e., that what the dynamical evolution makes accessible is precisely and solely
the mass density at the appropriate macro level.
11.6 The stochastic nature of the evolution
So far we have discussed the description of the world allowed by the CSL theory
in terms of the values taken by the mass density function M(r) which have been
recognized to constitute the exposed beables of the theory. According to equation
(10.1) it is the wavefunction associated to the system which determines M(r). It is
useful to analyze the evolution of the beables. Let us consider, for convenience, the
linear formulation of CSL: as we have discussed in sections 7 and 8, the dynamical
evolution equation for the wave function is fundamentally stochastic, being governed
by the stochastic processes w(r, t). The “cooked” probability of occurrence of such
processes, based on the analog of equation (7.40), depends on the wavefunction which
describes the system and this fact is of crucial importance for getting the “right” (i.e.
the quantum) probabilities of measurement outcomes. Therefore, in the CSL theory,
the wavefunction has both a descriptive (since it determinesM(r)) and a probabilistic
(since it enters in the prescription for the cooking of the probability of occurrence of
the stochastic processes) role.
Also the “tails” of the wavefunction have a precise role. In fact, suppose our
“universe” is described at t = 0 by a normalized state
|ψ(0)〉 = α(0) |a〉 + β(0) |b〉 (11.20)
with |β(0)|2 being extremely small. The “reality” of the universe at t = 0 is “de-
termined” by the state |a〉, as we have explicitly shown in the previous subsection.
However, one cannot ignore the (extremely small) probability |β(0)|2 that a realiza-
tion of the stochastic potential occurs which, after a sufficiently long time, leads to a
normalized state
|ψ(t)〉 = α(t) |a˜〉 + β(t) |b˜〉 (11.21)
with |α(t)|2 being extremely small and with |a˜〉 and |b˜〉 two of the most probable states
at time t for the initial conditions |a〉 and |b〉, respectively. Then, the “reality” at time
t is that associated to the state |b˜〉 which has its origin in the negligible component
|b〉 at time t = 0. Thus, some “memory” of a situation which at time zero did not
correspond to the “reality” of the world remains at time t. Obviously, if such an
extremely improbable case would occur one would be tempted (wrongly) to retrodict
that “reality” at t = 0 was the one associated to |b〉 and not the one associated
to |a〉. However, we stress that such peculiar events, which we could denote as the
“reversal of the status of the universe”, have absolutely negligible probabilities. As
made plausible by the estimate for the values of β(t) given in the previous section, the
“risk to be wrong” in retrodicting from the present to the past “status of the world”
is comparable with the probability of being wrong when, having observed now a table
standing on the floor, and knowing that it has been kept isolated, we claim that it was
standing there even one hour ago, in spite of the fact that thermodynamically a very
peculiar situation corresponding to its “levitation” at that time could in principle
have occurred.
11.7 A classical analogue of the tail problem
The criticisms which have been put forward concerning the tail problem and which
we have discussed in the previous subsections, claim that the GRW theory, just due
to the tail problem, is fundamentally unsatisfactory from an ontological point of view.
To answer such criticisms we consider it appropriate to consider a quite simple clas-
sical situation which shares many of the aspects of the dynamical reduction models.
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Suppose we have a collection of macroscopic objects of a precise shape and with pre-
cise mass density: to be specific let us consider an assembly of identical tables. Let us
suppose that they are at rest and that the dynamics allows processes in which each
of the tables has an extremely small probability (let us say of the order of e−[10
34]) of
emitting just one nucleon or one electron in a certain time. The specification just one
is intended to be strict: a table can emit one such particle but if the emission takes
place, no more particles can be emitted. To go on, we postulate (this is the analog of
adopting the accessibility criterion within the GRW theory) that a table which has
lost just one nucleon or one electron can still be called a table63. We now consider a
universe made by an unphysically large number n (of the order of some 1024e[10
34])
of tables. After a while, a certain number of nucleons and protons (proportional to
n) will be emitted. Thus the physical situation will be: we have n− k tables in their
original status (with k << n), k tables which have lost a particle, and k particles
propagating in space. We think that everybody would agree with the statement that
there are still n tables in our universe. And we also believe that nobody would suggest
that the emitted particles could, in principle, be used to ‘build up a new table’64. At
any rate, if one would take seriously such a possibility one would be lead to conclude
that he started with n tables and he ended up with n+1 tables without changing the
total mass. How is this possible? Is there something terribly wrong in the classical
model we are envisaging? Do we have to declare that the ontology of the model leads
to inconsistencies? Or does not this simply mean that the links between objects, their
masses and their locations is not so strict as Shimony, Albert, Loewer, Clifton and
Monton believe and that, in particular, in the unrealistic and purely speculative case
in which the number of tables which enter into play is made unphysically large one
cannot avoid facing quite peculiar but logically prefectly consistent situations?
12 The psycho–physical parallelism within CSL
The most characteristic and appealing feature of CSL and of its interpretation consists
in the fact that it allows one to give a satisfactory account of reality, to take a realistic
view about the world, to talk about it as if it is really there even when it is not
observed. However, one cannot avoid raising the problem of including also conscious
observers in the picture, for [87] what is interesting if not experienced? Thus one
is led to consider the problem of the psycho–physical parallelism within dynamical
reduction models: this is the subject of the present section.
The section begins with a challenge for dynamical reduction models, put forward
by D. Albert and L. Vaidman [132, 133]: do they always guarantee definite outcomes
to measurement processes (subsection 12.1)? In order to answer this question, in
63Obviously, the reader should have grasped why we allow the tables to loose just one elementary
constituent and we forbid the emission processes to continue indefinitely. If one would have taken such
an attitude one would be compelled to define precisely up to which point one is keen to consider the
system to be still ‘a table’, i.e. to specify that a loss of, e.g., 105 particles is acceptable but that after
that limit it is no longer legitimate to call the system ‘a table’. Since within GRW the accessibility
derives from the fact that the center–of–mass of a macro–system gets localized with an extremely
precise accuracy (of about 10−11 cm) and for ordinary objects like marbles or tables this defines
quite precisely the ‘mass in the tail’ (which turns out to be an extremely small fraction of a nucleon
mass) the above assumption is quite appropriate to develop the analogy we are interested in.
64Taking the risk of being pedantic we stress once more that both in the considered example as well
as within the GRW theory with the mass density interpretation, our ‘disregarding’, in some sense,
the emitted particles (the tails) for what concerns the consideration of the tables which are in our
universe does not mean we wish to deny to them a real status and to ignore the physically relevant
effects they can trigger. One can think, e.g., of having in the universe also many Geiger counters;
there is no doubt that one of the emitted particles could trigger a counter inducing relevant dynamical
changes. The same is true within the GRW theory: the tails can trigger further appreciable effects,
as we have already stressed with particular emphasis.
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subsection 12.2 we analyze what we expect a “measurement process” and a “mea-
surement outcome” to be. This leads us (subsection 12.3) to consider how the process
of perception unfolds in time and how the reduction mechanism works within the
nervous system, thus proving that an observer always has definite perceptions about
measurement outcomes.
We conclude the section (subsections 12.4 and 12.5) with some further comments
about the relation between measurement outcomes and human perceptions.
12.1 Introduction
Some years ago, two quite interesting papers, one by D. Albert and L. Vaidman [132]
and the other by D. Albert [133] (see also [62]), challenging QMSL, have appeared.
In them some critical remarks have been put forward which, in the authors’ intention,
should prove that dynamical reduction models suffers from some serious limitations,
in particular that they do not satisfy fundamental requirements that conventional
wisdom imposes on a workable theory of collapse. The papers offer the opportunity
of a clarification about the model and its aims and deserve various comments.
In reference [132] the authors start by listing the features that any theory pre-
tending to describe the collapse should exhibit. Let us summarize them:
1. It ought to guarantee that measurements always have outcomes after they are
over, i.e., after a recording of the outcomes exists in the measuring device.
2. It ought to imply that, for any given eigenvalue of the measured observable,
the probability that the statevector ends up in the associated eigenmanifold
coincides with the probability that standard quantum mechanics attributes to
such an outcome.
3. It should not contradict any experimentally established quantum mechanical
predictions about physical systems, in particular the fact that isolated micro-
scopic systems have never yet been observed to undergo collapses.
As regards QMSL, Albert and Vaidman agree that, due to the extremely low
probability of occurrence of a localization and the fact that the localization distance
is large on the atomic scale, the theory satisfies requirement 3). They also seem
to agree on the fact that, when consideration is given to a system containing many
particles which is in a superposition of two states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, such that in |ψ1〉 a
large number N of particles have spatial positions which differ more than 1/
√
α from
those they have in |ψ2〉, then such a state is transformed dynamically into either |ψ1〉
or |ψ2〉 in a time of the order of 1016N−1 sec, which, for N of the order of Avogadro’s
number, means in less than a microsecond. So, when consideration is given to cases in
which the measurement outcomes are indicated by some sort of a macroscopic pointer
taking macroscopically different spatial positions, QMSL does satisfy also 1) and 2)
besides 3).
Then, why do Albert and Vaidman assert that the theory runs into difficulties
with the first two requirements? The reason for this is that they consider it incorrect
to assume that all measuring instruments work in the above indicated way. They
illustrate this point with an example, which we briefly report here.
A spin–1/2 system is prepared in an eigenstate of σx and then it is passed in
a Stern–Gerlach arrangement with non–uniform magnetic field in the z direction.
The two spin states |z+〉 and |z−〉 are then correlated to upward and downward
“trajectories,” respectively. These trajectories hit a fluorescent screen at two different
points A and B which are separated by a macroscopic distance. The screen is such
that the particle impinging on it causes some of the electrons of the atoms around
the point of impact to jump into excited orbitals. De–excitations of these electrons
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give then rise to a luminous dot, which can be directly seen by an experimenter. The
situation, before any observer enters into play, can then be described by the following
statevector
|ψ(1, 2)〉 = 1√
2
[|z+, x = A〉MP |1ex, . . . , nex; (n+ 1)gr, . . . , 2ngr〉
+ |z−, x = B〉MP |1gr, . . . , ngr; (n+ 1)ex, . . . , 2nex〉] , (12.1)
where MP refers to the measured particle and the electrons from 1 to n are near
point A, the remaining ones are near B. The indices ex and gr refer to excited and
ground states for the indicated electrons, which subsequently decay, emitting photons
from the indicated points, respectively.
With reference to this example, the authors argue then as follows: since in the
whole process few particles are involved and, in any case, the displacements of the
particles which are involved are totally negligible with respect to 1/
√
α, the reduc-
tion mechanism of QMSL cannot be effective in suppressing one of the two states
in equation (12.1). The consideration of the subsequent emission of photons does
not change the situation since, on one hand, the spontaneous localizations of QMSL
do not affect photons and, on the other hand, the photon wavefunctions originating
from A and B immediately overlap almost completely. So, in spite of the fact that,
corresponding to the impinging of the particle on the screen having occurred at A
or at B, there is a luminous record in different places which can be perceived by a
naked human eye, QMSL does not imply that the suppression of one of the two states
has occurred. Therefore QMSL does not satisfy the basic requirement 1). To put
it in different words: while everybody would agree that the measurement has been
completed after the emission of the photons from the fluorescent screen and before
any observer actually looks at the light spot, QMSL is not able to attribute a definite
outcome to the measurement.
The argument of the authors reduced to its essence consists in stressing that not
all conceivable processes which everybody would agree to call measurement processes
involve macroscopic displacements of a macroscopic number of particles, and that,
under such conditions, dynamical reduction models cannot yield an actual dynamical
reduction of the wavepacket. With reference to this pertinent remark and to the
above example, we consider it important to distinguish, for conceptual clarity, two
mechanisms which could make QMSL ineffective in inducing the reduction:
1. That the number of particles involved in the process (e.g., in the set–up consid-
ered, the electrons which have to be excited in order that the emitted photons
be perceivable by the unaided eye of a human experimenter) be very small.
2. That, even if many particles are involved, the changes in their states which occur
as a consequence of their interactions with the measured microsystem (in the
example considered the transitions from the ground to an excited state) involve
position changes which are much smaller than the localization distance 1/
√
α
of the spontaneous process. The above two alternatives will be discussed in the
next subsection.
12.2 Measurements and outcomes
Let us begin by stating that we agree perfectly with the conclusions drawn in [132]
about the specific situation discussed in it. Due to the extremely low rate of the
spontaneous localizations and the large value (on the atomic scale) of the localization
distance of QMSL, any superposition of states in which only few particles are in
appreciably different spatial positions or in which many particles are only slightly
displaced is not dynamically suppressed by the theory.
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We then agree that in the considered example the linear superposition will persist
for long times. Is this a feature which shows the failure of the model in accounting
for measurement processes? We think that one should be careful in drawing such a
conclusion.
As a starting point it is useful to recall the lucid position of J. Bell about such
kind of problems. In [124] he stated:
The usual approach, centered on the notion of “observable”, divides
the world somehow into parts: “system” and “apparatus”. The “appa-
ratus” interacts from time to time with the “system”, “measuring” “ob-
servables”... There is nothing in the mathematics to tell what is “system”
and what is “apparatus”, nothing to tell, which natural processes have the
special status of “measurements”.
Furthermore, in [122], he stressed:
Surely the big and the small should merge smoothly with one another.
And surely in fundamental physical theory this merging should be de-
scribed not just by vague words but by precise mathematics.
These quotations appropriately point out that, in what the author would have
considered a serious theory, the very mathematics of the theory and not “vague words”
should define what is a measurement. In this respect it seems to us that in [132] what
has to be considered a measurement, what plays the role of an apparatus, is still
defined by terms that are to some extent vague. For instance, in footnote 1, the
authors, trying to make precise what is a recording by an instrument, require that it
consists in a change of the measuring device which is macroscopic, irreversible, and
visible to the unaided eye of a human experimenter.
It is just to try to be very precise about the meaning of such terms that we have
chosen to make at the end of the previous subsection a clear distinction between the
two crucial points which are at the basis of the arguments of Albert and Vaidman.
Let us consider point 1. If the number of particles which are involved in the
process under consideration is really very small (as it is legitimate to assume due to
the sensitivity of the human eye to light quanta — the threshold for visual perception
being of about 6 photons), then the changes of the measuring device are surely not
macroscopic, even though they can be irreversible and visible to the human unaided
eye. Is it correct to pretend that also in such a case the process has to be considered as
a genuine measurement which should have an outcome before anything else happens?
We can raise some doubts about the correctness of taking this attitude by con-
sidering the following gedanken experiment. Suppose we have an atom which can be
prepared in an excited state |Ex〉 of spin 1/2 and with the following characteristics:
the excited state decays with a quite long lifetime, of the order of several seconds or
longer, in a state |SLC〉 which is the ancestor of a short lived sequential decay chain
with various steps, all lifetimes in the sequence being extremely short (of the order of
nanoseconds). We prepare the state |Ex〉 in a spin state that is an eigenstate of σx,
and we perform a Stern–Gerlach experiment devised to measure the z component of
the spin. The long lifetime of the initial state then allows us to correlate the two σz
components to two different positions of the atom, which we will denote by A and
B, respectively, just as in the example considered by Albert and Vaidman. After a
time of the order of the lifetime for the first transition, the atom decays; and, going
through the cascade process, it emits several photons, let us say a number larger than
the perception threshold. There is no doubt that the situation is very similar to the
one considered in [132]: the sequential decay is an irreversible process in the same
sense in which the excitation and decay of few fluorescent electrons is. Moreover, the
emission from two macroscopically distant regions of a number of photons which is
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sufficient to be perceived by the naked eye of a human experimenter allows a direct
detection of whether the atom has been found with spin up or with spin down. Could
anybody pretend that a spin measurement has been performed on the atom before
any observer would look at it? We think that this would be a wrong request and
that actually nobody would feel embarrassed in considering the system to be in the
linear superposition of the two final states. So, there is no reason to require that an
acceptable theory of collapse should guarantee that this specific “measurement” has
an outcome at this stage.
Let us now consider possibility 2. We think that it is perfectly plausible to imagine
interaction mechanisms between a microscopic and a macroscopic system such that, on
one hand, many constituents of the macroscopic one can change their quantum state
in a way which depends on the state of the triggering system, and, on the other hand,
that such changes do not involve displacements of the particles considered of amounts
larger than 10−5 cm. The simplest example which one can think of is just the one in
which many particles change their energy by amounts summing up to a macroscopic
energy change without appreciably changing their position (on the relevant scale).
However, the important question is: can this change be really macroscopic and have
no other effect? In particular, would it not induce, at least indirectly, macroscopic
changes in the positions of a macroscopic number of particles? It is not easy to
exclude this, since one cannot ignore, e.g., the interactions of the system with its
environment65. In such a case, at least for reasons of thermal equilibrium, changes
of this sort must be recognized to occur. Obviously one could object that the body
could very well be kept almost perfectly isolated. But how would then one check
that it has changed its state? The final answer would be: by direct detection with
an appropriate apparatus or by direct observation (if this is possible, since, e.g., the
body radiates) by a conscious observer.
We can now raise our basic question: what would make it unacceptable to consider
that such a body remains in a superposition of the two macroscopically different states
under consideration before it is detected and the result is recorded?
The above statement can obviously be meaningful only if one makes precise the
meaning of the expressions “detected” and “recorded”. We completely agree on this,
but we stress once more that it is just the theory itself which must give a precise
meaning and make absolutely definite the significance of these expressions. QMSL
does this: the body is detected and the result is recorded at the moment into which
it evolves into, or, via its interactions with other systems, it induces the occurrence
of a linear superposition of states containing a macroscopic number of particles which
are differently located in space by an amount of the order of 10−5 cm or larger. At
that moment it has to choose one of its possible ways! And it is the dynamics of the
theory that guarantees that this will happen.
One may like or dislike this picture, but one has to recognize that it is consistent
and represents a step towards a possible clarification of some of the puzzles of the
quantum world. Obviously the above position is tenable only provided one can guar-
antee a fundamental fact: since our perceptions are definite, at least in connection
with any act of perception, a situation must occur such that the reduction mecha-
nism, whose taking place is precisely defined by the theory, becomes effective. The
65It has to be stressed that here our resorting to the environment is conceptually radically different
from the procedure followed in approaches like the one considered by Joos and Zeh [30] to solve
the measurement problems (see section 4.3). There the environment plays the role of a system
whose correlations with the measured system and measuring apparatus cannot be detected, so that,
to make physical predictions, one must take the partial trace on the environment variables. As
already discussed, the reduction does not then occur at the individual level. Here the changes of the
environment we are interested in are those in which a macroscopic number of particles are displaced.
When they occur the universal dynamical mechanism of QMSL actually induces reductions at the
individual level.
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next subsection is devoted to making plausible that this is the case by a discussion of
visual perception.
12.3 Reduction within the nervous system
As stressed in the previous subsection, the very possibility of considering QMSL as
yielding a unified description of all physical phenomena rests on the fact that one
can show that the physical processes occurring in sentient beings, leading to definite
perceptions, involve a displacement of a sufficient number of particles over appropriate
distances to allow the reduction to take place within the perception time.
We will describe now, in its essential aspects, the visual perception process, to
make plausible that the above situation actually occurs. The reason to choose to
discuss explicitly the case of the visual perception should be obvious. First, vision is
directly involved in the example discussed in the previous subsection. Secondly, the
visual channel is presently the most studied of all sensory channels and therefore the
best understood. Finally, other sensory modalities show similar characteristics, both
in the distal refined transduction mechanisms and in the excitation pattern reaching
the central nervous system.
We will divide our description into the three main cascades of events that take
place following the absorption of one photon in a photoreceptor cell of the retina:
1. multiplicative chain in the photoreceptor cell,
2. transmission of the electrical signals along the fibers of the optic nerve,
3. excitation of neurons in the cortical visual area.
All these events are necessary for seeing. We will make rough estimates of the number
of particles moving in these processes.
An observation is relevant: In general, sensory cells have no threshold in respond-
ing to external stimuli. In the case of photoreceptors, the absorption of a photon by
a pigment molecule (retinene) determines a isomeric transition (cis–trans). But the
same transition can be also determined for example by thermal excitation. The de-
tection of external stimuli is therefore based on statistical decision about the signal to
noise ratio [134]. For this reason, the psycho–physical threshold is set at the average
level of six absorbed photons.
We now analyze the multiplicative chain in the photoreceptor cell. The excited
state R of the retinene, inside the rhodopsin (a protein molecule with molecular weight
Mw = 39, 000) has a lifetime sufficiently long on the disks of the rod to activate
about 100 transducin molecules T , present in the interdisk space (about of the same
Mw). This is used to release the inhibition of the enzyme PDE (phosphodiesterase,
Mw = 180, 000), able to hydrolyze very rapidly about 1, 000 cyclic nucleotide c–GMP
(guanosinmonophosphate). All together we obtain a multiplication in molecule num-
ber of about 100, 000 for each absorbed photon. The c–GMP molecules (cooperatively
3 of them) normally keep open the channels of the plasma membrane, enclosing the
vertebrate rod outer segment. Their hydrolysis determines the closure of the channels
and the consequent hyperpolarization of the cell and starts the electrical signal that
will be transmitted to a chain of neurons of the retina [135]. The electric current
change through the membrane is of the order of a pA: one can estimate that the ions
(mostly Na) affected in their movement are about 108.
But we are interested in following the chain of events further on. The hyperpo-
larization of the inner segment of the rod is followed by the release of a chemical
transmitter, kept in vesicles near the membrane in such a way to diffuse rapidly
(about 1 msec) in the synaptic gap towards other neurons present in the retina: the
horizontal cells, the amacrine and bipolar cells. We will not try to estimate how much
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these interactions will increase the number of particles involved and their movement,
keeping in mind that those interactions develop not only in the forward direction but
also laterally and in the backward direction. To be very conservative, we can indicate
a factor 10 in the number of molecules. The signals transmitted, both electrical or
chemical, in these stages are graded, modulated in linear and nonlinear fashion. The
last step is acted on the final output cells of the retina, the ganglion cells. These cells,
whose long axons (about one million) form the optic nerve, send the electric impulses
(spikes) towards the CNS (central nervous system). The propagation is regenerative
and saltatory, going along a series of Ranvier nodes, where the membrane of the nerve
fiber is free of the insulating sheets of the Schwann cells.
The above figures about the displaced particles are not sufficient to guarantee
by themselves that the reduction has already occurred. However, we stress that all
estimates we have made are very conservative and correspond to having chosen for the
numbers of particles their minimal values. The high complexity of the system and
its connectivity would justify the introduction of various amplifying factors which
would remarkably raise the above values. These considerations should have made
plausible that the number of particles and their displacements have reached the level
which is sufficient to make effective the reduction mechanism. This makes correct
the conviction of everybody working and analyzing what is going on in the nervous
system that, at this stage, the quantum aspects of the phenomenology have already
come down to the level for which the classical description is adequate.
To be more specific and remove any possible doubt about the definiteness of con-
scious perception, we show now, examining in more details the signal propagation,
that even if one limits his considerations to this last step of the visual perception
process, the estimates of the number and of the displacements of the particles which
are involved would lead to the same conclusion. For this purpose, we simply analyze
what happens to a neuron involved in the transmission of such a signal. The neuron
has a main cell body with a nucleus and a long tube, the axon, extending from the
cell body and having at its end a variety of hair–like structures connecting it to other
nerve cells. As already remarked, in the case of the optic nerve, the axon is wrapped
in a series of small sheaths of myelin, an insulating substance, separated at intervals
of the order of one millimeter by nodes referred to as Ranvier’s nodes (see figure 3).
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Figure 3: Drawing of a nerve cell.
To make the following discussion clearer, it is useful to mention that axon’s diameter
is of the order of 10−4 cm, the myelin sheath thickness is greater than 10−5 cm,
and the membrane thickness at Ranvier’s node is of the order of 10−6 cm. The
transmission mechanism goes as follows: when an impulse is generated, at Ranvier’s
nodes, ions channels open in the membrane of the axon, through which Na+ and
K+ ions flow. Thus, in the course of the depolarization of the membrane, circular
currents, connecting two nearby Ranvier’s nodes and closing through the external
conducting medium, arise (see figure 4).
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Figure 4: The scheme of impulse transmission. R = Ranvier
node. m = myelin. a = axoplasm.
Important facts to be taken into account are the following: during one impulse ≃ 6·106
sodium ions pass a Ranvier’s node; the time necessary to restore the resting potential
in the considered region of the axon is of the order of 10−3 sec; finally the internal ion
current flows near the axon membrane. With these premises, we can try to evaluate
the efficiency of the reduction mechanism. To do this, in place of QMSL, we will make
use of CSL: in such a theory, as we have seen, the decoupling rate for superpositions
of states involving differently located particles is approximately given by:
e
−λ t
∑
i
(ni − n′i)2
, (12.2)
where λ = 10−16 sec−1, and ni, n
′
i are the numbers of particles present in the cell
(of volume 10−15 cm3) labeled by the index i, in the two states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 whose
superposition we are considering, respectively. Obviously |ψ〉 is associated with the
occurrence of the impulse transmission, while |ψ′〉 corresponds to no transmission.
In our case, we consider all cells surrounding the internal membrane of the axon
between two Ranvier’s nodes. There are 105 such cells. Taking into account that the
atomic number of Na+ is 11, so that one ion contains more than 30 particles and
that we have disregarded the K+ ions, we have to fit about 109 particles in the 105
cells. We then have that, when the signal is transmitted, for about 105 cells |ni−n′i|
turns out to be ∼ 104. These values, when substituted in equation (12.2), taking into
account that the impulse lasts at least for 10−3 sec, give an exponent 10−6.
To complete the description, we have to consider two further steps, each involving
a multiplicative factor. The optic fibers arrive at lateral geniculate bodies (LGB),
where they branch out making contacts with many cells. The neurons in these bodies
send their axons again to the visual striate cortex, an essential step for seeing. In
both these stations a conservative estimate of the multiplicative effect [136] can be a
minimum of 102, therefore we can obtain at least a factor of 104.
In our calculation we have completely disregarded further displacements of parti-
cles induced by the macroscopic current around the axon. In one of his books [137],
R. Penrose has considered an analogous problem, to reach the Planck mass level,
which in his approach would mark the setting up of the reduction. To get the desired
result, he needs to assume that such further displacements imply a further amplifi-
cation of a factor 108, a figure that he considers reasonable. We obviously need a
much smaller factor, e.g., one of the order of 104 would be largely sufficient. So,
we have made perfectly plausible that the number of displaced particles and the dis-
placements which are involved imply the dynamical reduction mechanism of QMSL
(or better of CSL) becomes fully effective in suppressing the superposition of the two
states (nervous signal)–(no signal) before any act of conscious perception occurs. The
fundamental requirement which has to be imposed on the model to account for our
definite perceptions is therefore certainly satisfied.
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12.4 Does reduction require observers?
It has to be firmly stressed that the fact that we have felt the necessity of performing
an analysis of the visual perception mechanism is not intended as the acceptance, on
our part, of the point of view that consciousness has a specific role in the reduction
process. QMSL states that reduction will take place whenever the above indicated
precise conditions for the reduction mechanism to be effective occur. So, if in place of
a human being we put a spark chamber or a macroscopic pointer which is displaced,
or a device producing ink spots on a computer output, reduction will take place. In
the context of the previous subsection, the human nervous system is simply something
which has the same function as one of these devices, if no such device interacts with
the system before the human observer does.
With respect to Albert and Vaidman’s example, our attitude should then be quite
clear: the state is not reduced up to the moment in which the dynamical evolution
leads to the occurrence of a superposition of states differing in the positions of a
macroscopic number of particles. Whether this happens because one puts in front of
the fluorescent screen a spark chamber or the nervous system of a human observer is
totally irrelevant.
With reference to the argument we have just developed, we think it is appropriate
to point out that some sentences of reference [133] could turn out to be misleading.
For instance, at the beginning of section IV, the author, after having recalled the
situation of [132], makes the following general statement: “If we want to stick with
QMSL, then we would have to insist ... that no measurement is absolutely over, no
measurement absolutely requires an outcome, until there is a sentient observer who
is actually aware of that outcome”. As we have proven, this is not true in general
but only in very peculiar cases. Actually, according to QMSL, not only practically
all measuring experiments of our laboratories but also all those measurement–like
processes which, as J. Bell [2] has stressed, “we are obliged to admit ... are going on
more or less all the time, more or less everywhere”, have definite “outcomes” even in
absence of any sentient being.
12.5 Some general comments about an alleged general impos-
sibility proof of dynamical reduction models
We come now to examine further criticisms to QMSL, which have been put forward
in sections IV and V of [133] (see also [62]). The whole argument can be briefly
summarized as follows: the author contemplates the possibility of the existence of
unusual sentient beings whose peculiar features consist in the fact that their conscious
beliefs are assumed to be 100% correlated with the position of a single particle. To
be more precise, the author considers a science–fiction character, John, who, due
to a peculiar surgical implant in his brain, can perform a measurement of a spin
component, e.g. of an electron, by making it cross a tunnel in his brain and interact
with a microscopic particle P in the implanted device. John is such that his “ready–
to–perceive state” |P0〉 corresponds to the particle P being in a certain position,
while the perceptions “spin up” and “spin down” are uniquely correlated to P being
up (|P+〉) or down (|P−〉) with respect to the initial position.
It is stipulated:
1. that no other change in John’s body occurs as a consequence of the process (i.e.,
no other of John’s atoms or electrons beside P is involved in this process);
2. that, nevertheless, John is consciously aware as vividly and as completely as he
is ... or has ever been aware of anything in his life of what the value of the spin
component is.
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Given these premises, provided one takes the attitude to believe what John says,
the argument is quite straightforward: if one wants to account for the definite per-
ceptions of John by a dynamical reduction mechanism, one must consider a process
which suppresses the linear superpositions of position states of a single particle, and
this would surely imply an easily detectable violation of the predictions of quan-
tum mechanics for microsystems. So, no physically acceptable reduction mechanism
whatsoever could do the desired job of making definite John’s perceptions.
The first obvious remark is that the very consideration of such a being would upset
any neurophysiologist. In fact, all we know about consciousness points undoubtedly
towards the necessity of very complex systems like the human brain to support it. The
features of such systems which are commonly considered essential for consciousness
are, on the one hand, the fact that they contain a gigantic number of transmitting
units (like neurons) and, on the other hand, that these units are wired up in an
extremely complicated network. For these reasons, one could disregard objections
which require as an essential ingredient the consideration of sentient beings whose
different beliefs are correlated to states that are only microscopically different.
However, we can raise the question: even if one would accept that “in principle”
the possibility of the existence of “microscopic” sentient beings (whatever precise
meaning one could attribute to the word sentient) cannot be excluded, should one
consider as cogent the criticism put forward in the two last sections of reference [133]?
Answering the above question requires a detailed analysis. First of all, it turns out
to be appropriate to recall the precise and relevant terms of the debate about the
foundations of quantum mechanics and the reasons which make programs like the
dynamical reduction one interesting. The situation can be summarized as follows.
The conceptual structure of the quantum scheme does not allow, as it stands, the
elaboration of an articulate, systematic and coherent picture of natural phenomena,
i.e., what A. Shimony [1] calls a “philosophical world view”. It is the desire to build
such a coherent picture which has led to the consideration of various “alternative the-
ories”, which give for all practical purposes (FAPP) the same predictions as quantum
mechanics plus the wavepacket reduction postulate. Each of them implies a certain
world view, and each of them is based on different specific assumptions.
Let us start by considering two of the more appealing “alternative theories” that
have been proposed:
1. The dynamical reduction models;
2. The de Broglie–Bohm pilot wave theory, or, more generally, the hidden–variable
theories.
It is useful to remark that both these theories aim at giving an account of physical
processes without having to make reference to observers. The other alternative which
deserves to be discussed, and which Albert seems to prefer, is the many–minds theory.
We will consider it below.
Due to the fact that present–day technology does not allow us to verify whether,
at the macroscopic level and under appropriate circumstances, wavepacket reduction
occurs, there is no experimental objective criterion to choose, e.g., between the two
above alternatives 1) and 2). Such a choice must then be based on the identification
of the assumptions which are essential for them as well as on the consideration of
possible difficulties they meet or unpleasant features they exhibit. As concerns the
assumptions, we remark that, as appropriately stressed by J. Bell [2], the characteristic
element distinguishing program 1) from 2) consists in the fact that 1) assumes that
the wavefunction gives a complete description of natural phenomena, while 2) accepts
from the very beginning that additional variables are necessary. Concerning what
one could consider the limitations of the corresponding programs, we mention that 1)
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requires the acceptance of the fact that Schro¨dinger’s equation is not exactly true and
the introduction of “ad hoc” parameters; 2) requires us to accept contextuality (i.e.,
that a complete specification of a state assigns definite truth values to a proposition
only relative to a specific context).
Albert [133], instead of following the above outlined procedure to choose among the
“alternative schemes,” seems to adopt as a crucial criterion for accepting or rejecting
one of them the fact that it can accommodate beings like John. Various comments
are appropriate: first, we do not view it as legitimate to adopt such a criterion to
judge a theory, particularly in view of the fact that, as already remarked, the very
idea that such beings exist seems to conflict with all we know to be needed to support
consciousness. Secondly, we want to stress that the author’s request amounts to
plainly postulating that program 1) has to be rejected. In fact, the very hypothesis
that John exists and is reliable leads to the denial of the fundamental assumption
lying at the basis of the dynamical reduction program, i.e., that the wavefunction
gives a complete description of natural phenomena, since the same overall statevector
1√
2
[|z+〉 |P+〉 + |z−〉 |P−〉] (12.3)
would be associated in some cases with a situation in which John believes that “the
spin is up” and in others to one in which John believes that “the spin is down66”. Fi-
nally, it is worth noticing that even scheme 2) cannot accommodate, without encoun-
tering serious conceptual difficulties concerning the “status” that can be attributed
to their perceptions, beings such as John. The reason for this lies just in the fact
that the particle P in John’s device is a microscopic system. As a consequence, the
linear superpositions of states corresponding to different positions of P are not, even
FAPP, equivalent to a statistical mixture of states corresponding to P having a def-
inite position. Then, the evolution leading the particle from its “ready state” to the
final state is, not only in principle but practically, reversible (so that one can “undo”
what has been done). Moreover, observables which do not commute with the position
of P must be admitted to be actually measurable, contrary to what would happen if
P would be a macroscopic system.
To illustrate the obvious fact that the process leading to John ’s definite percep-
tions about the spin value can be reversed, let us assume, for simplicity, that the
displacement of P induced by its interaction with the spin of the electron occurs as a
consequence of a σzpz coupling (pz being the z component of the linear momentum
of P ) lasting for the time interval δt taken by the electron to go through John’s im-
planted device. Then it follows that, if P is in the up (down) position, feeding into the
device another electron with spin down (up), will cause P to return to its ready state
position. We can then consider the following experiment. We have two electrons in
the singlet state, which travel towards John’s device with a certain common velocity
and which reach the device at times differing by an amount ∆t larger than δt. Then
when the first electron crosses John’s device, we have the statevector evolution:
1√
2
[|z2−〉 |z1+〉 − |z2+〉 |z1−〉] |P0〉 −→
−→ 1√
2
[|z2−〉 |z1+〉 |P+〉 − |z2+〉 |z1−〉 |P−〉] , (12.4)
where |P0〉, |P+〉, |P−〉 represent the ready, up, and down states of P , respectively,
and where we have disregarded the spatial variables of the electrons. When the state
66We do not want to be misunderstood: we are not assuming that it is possible to give a purely
physical explanation of mental events, but we are simply imposing the obvious condition that different
beliefs must be related to statevectors which somehow differ.
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on the right hand side of equation (12.4) obtains, due to the fact that within the
de Broglie–Bohm theory all particles at all times have definite positions, P is either
up or down and, as a consequence, John can “legimately” be said to have a definite
belief about the z component of the spin of the first electron. However, it has to be
remarked that in the de Broglie–Bohm theory the spin being a contextual variable is
not an observable quantity. As a consequence, in the case considered, the “outcome”
of John ’s measurement cannot be related to any objective property of the spin of
the electron before the measurement (note that this would hold also in the case in
which P would be a macroscopic measuring device). Subsequently the second electron
crosses John ’s device, bringing P back to its ready position P0. As a consequence,
due to the assumption that no other change but the displacement of P has occurred
in the first process, the state after the passage of the second electron turns out to be
again exactly the initial state, i.e., the one on the left hand side of equation (12.4).
It is important to stress that in such a state the spin variables are not correlated to
the position of any particle and that the process just described (i.e., the interaction
of the second electron with P ) does not involve in any way the first electron on which
the “measurement” of the spin had been previously performed.
Let us now suppose that another observer performs a measurement of the same
spin component of the first electron. It is obvious that also this second measurement
turns out to be contextual, and therefore its outcome is not related to the outcome
of the “measurement” performed by John. This puts into evidence that the previous
belief by John about the outcome of the spin “measurement” he has performed cannot
even be related to an objective property of the electron after the “measurement”; in
particular it cannot be used to foresee the outcomes of subsequent measurements,
i.e., in general it has no predictive value. Of course, the situation would have been
completely different if the particle P in John ’s device were a macroscopic “pointer”.
In that case, when the state on the right hand side of equation (12.4) obtains, also in
the de Broglie–Bohm theory one can assert that things go as if wavepacket reduction
had occurred, the reason for this being that it is practically impossible to completely
reverse the measuring process. In such a case, therefore, the belief of the observer
about the spin of the electron corresponds to an “effective determinateness” of the
spin of the electron after the measurement, and all observers performing subsequent
measurements of the same component of the spin find the same result which has been
found by the first (macroscopic) observer67. In our opinion, this analysis puts into
evidence that, even though in the de Broglie–Bohm scheme John can be considered
to have definite perceptions as he claims, no validity, in the spirit of the theory, can
be attributed to them.
We come now to the consideration of the many–minds approach. As already
discussed in section 4, what a many–minds theory takes physics to be ultimately
about is what sentient observers think. As a consequence, the adoption of a many–
minds position implies a dualistic attitude: there are a physical universe, described by
the statevector obeying an exact Schro¨dinger’s equation, and a mental universe made
up of the impressions of sentient observers (an expression which, in this context is
synonymous with observers with minds). In such a theory even the beliefs of human
observers are unavoidably not always “true” (i.e., reflecting objective properties of
the physical universe) but have a sort of “effective validity” (in the sense that the
future evolution of the mental states of such beings will proceed, in general, as if
their beliefs were true). Obviously, within such a theory, the possibility to attribute
effective validity to a belief requires a reliable memory recording the belief itself.
It seems to us that the fundamental criterion to judge whether the many–minds
theory can accommodate other kinds of sentient beings has to be related to its be-
67We want to stress that this holds independently of the fact that at the instants of the subsequent
measurements the brain of the first observer be still active and healthy or not.
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ing able to guarantee to their beliefs the “effective validity” which is required to
characterize the beliefs of human beings. Since, as already remarked, the “effective
validity” criterion requires some sort of memory, one is compelled to choose between
the following alternatives: either he attributes to John a macroscopic memory, but
in this case the whole criticism to the dynamical reduction program breaks down; or,
alternatively, he assumes that not only the formation of beliefs but also the memory
storing process involves only microscopic changes, e.g., the displacement of P , and
nothing else. In such a case, for obvious reasons (see the preceding discussion and/or
take into account that wavepackets unavoidably spread), John’s memory has not the
level of reliability which is necessary to allow the attribution of an effective validity
to his (ephemeral) beliefs.
Concluding, the above analysis has made plausible that even on the basis of quan-
tum mechanical considerations one is led to recognize that consciousness and memory
must be macroscopically supported in order to exhibit those features of reliability
and/or effective validity that are necessary to make them meaningful and which are
characteristic of human consciousness and memory; thus, both QMSL and CSL allow
us to “close the circle”.
Part IV
Relativistic Dynamical Reduction
Models
13 White noise models: general framework and ex-
amples
J. Bell [32], in explicating QMSL, immediately identified two aspects of it which
required further investigations:
1. The model does not respect the symmetry requirements for systems of identical
particles.
2. The introduction of the localizations assigns a special role to position and re-
quires a smearing on space, which makes it quite problematic to find a relativistic
generalization of it.
The first difficulty has been overcome by CSL, in which the sudden localizations of
QMSL have been replaced by a continuous stochastic evolution of the statevector.
Steps toward a solution of the second problem have been made with the introduction
of relativistic CSL models [67, 138, 89, 139, 140], which are the subject of this fourth
part of the report.
In the present section we consider the general problem of describing relativistic
dynamical reductions in terms of white–noise stochastic differential equations. In
subsection 13.1 we analyze the issue of stochastic Galileian invariance within non
relativistic QMSL and CSL, which guarantees that all the physical predictions of
the above models are invariant under the Galilei group of transformations. We will
see that stochastic invariance puts very severe limitations on the type of stochastic
processes which can be used to describe spontaneous collapses.
In subsection 13.2 we set up a relativistic (and stochastically invariant under
Lorentz transformation) model for decoherence (i.e. for ensemble or von Neumann
reductions) which is useful as a first step towards the formulation of relativistic dy-
namical reduction models: these will be considered in subsection 13.3.
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In subsections 13.4 and 13.5 we analyze the invariance and reduction properties
of such models, respectively. In the final subsection, we discuss a specific relativistic
model of spontaneous collapse which has all the desired properties of QMSL and CSL,
except that it induces an infinite increase of energy per unit time and unit volume on
physical system. This model, then, is not fully consistent; actually, this is a feature
of all models in which quantum fields are locally coupled to white noises.
13.1 Stochastic Galileian invariance of QMSL and CSL
To bring out some concepts which will be useful in the following subsections, it is
appropriate to consider the transformation and the invariance properties of non rela-
tivistic CSL.
Let us start by limiting our considerations to the evolution equation for the statis-
tical operator and let us consider two observers O and O′ related by a transformation
of the Galilei group. We take the so–called passive point of view according to which
the two observers look at the same physical situation. For simplicity, let us suppose
that the transformation connecting O and O′ is a translation in space of an amount
a and a translation in time of an amount τ , so that
r′ = r− a, t′ = t− τ (13.1)
Let the observer O describe the physical situation at his subjective time t by the
statistical operator ρ(t). ObserverO′, at the same objective time, i.e., at his subjective
time t′ = t− τ , will describe the physical situation by the statistical operator
ρ′(t′) = U(a) ρ(t)U †(a) (13.2)
where U(a) = eiP·a is the usual unitary operator inducing the space translation. The
dynamical equation for the statistical operator for observer O′ is then
d ρ′(t′)
dt′
= U(a)
d ρ(t)
dt
U †(a) (13.3)
Substituting equation (7.51), describing the evolution of the statistical operator for
the observer O, into the right hand side of equation (13.3), one gets68
d ρ′(t′)
dt′
= −i U(a) [H(t), ρ(t)]U †(a) + γ
∑
i
U(a)Aiρ(t)Ai U
†(a)
− γ
2
U(a)
∑
i
{A2i , ρ(t)}U †(a). (13.4)
If H is invariant under space and time translations
H ′(t′) ≡ U(a)H(t)U †(a) = H(t′) (13.5)
and if, moreover ∑
i
U(a)Ai U
†(a)X U(a)Ai U
†(a) =
∑
i
AiX Ai (13.6)
for any bounded operator X , then equation (13.4) implies
d ρ′(t′)
dt′
= −i [H, ρ′(t′)] + γ
∑
i
Aiρ
′(t′)Ai − γ
2
∑
i
{
A2i , ρ
′(t′)
}
. (13.7)
68Throughout this section, we set h¯ = 1.
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i.e., the theory is invariant for space and time translations. If the same holds for all
transformations of the restricted Galilei group, we have invariance for the transfor-
mations of this group. QMSL and CSL actually possess this invariance property.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that there is a difference between equations
of the type we are considering and the usual case in which one has a purely Hamilto-
nian evolution, with respect to the connection between invariance and representations
of the symmetry group. This key difference arises from the fact that while in the stan-
dard case one can always relate the statistical operators used by O and O′ to describe
the physical situation at the same subjective time t, in the present case this cannot be
done in general, when one considers negative values of t in equation (13.1). In fact, let
us suppose that O, at his own time t = 0, is dealing with a physical system described
by a pure state ρ(0) = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Since the dynamical evolution transforms pure states
into statistical mixtures, there is no way for O to prepare a physical situation at his
own time τ < 0 (corresponding to t′ = 0 for O′) such that it evolves into the pure
state ρ(0) at t = 0. Correspondingly, there is no way for O′ to prepare at his own
time t′ = 0 a statistical operator such that its evolved state at his time −τ > 0 is
|ψ〉〈ψ|69.
However, if the active point of view is taken and O′, at his time t′ = 0, prepares
the same state ρ(0), and the above stated invariance requirements are satisfied, then
O and O′ will observe the same dynamical evolution at the ensemble level for the
same (subjective) initial situation.
Coming now to the group theoretic point of view, since for the above reasons the
map Σt[ρ(0)], for a pure state ρ(0) is not defined for negative t, one has to consider
the proper Galilei semigroup G+, with only forward time translations [142]. Any
transformation g ∈ G+ can be expressed as a transformation of the subgroup G0 of
G+ which does not contain time translations, times a forward time translation
g ∈ G+ : g = gτg0 (13.8)
The map on the Banach space of the trace class operators
g : ρ −→ ρg, ρg = Στ [U(g0) ρU †(g0)] (13.9)
where U(g0) is the usual unitary representation of G0 and Στ is such that, for τ > 0,
Στ [ρ(t)] = ρ(t+ τ) is the solution of equation (7.51), is then easily checked to yield a
representation of G+.
Up to now we have discussed the invariance properties of dynamical reduction
models from the point of view of the statistical operator. However, since we are
mainly interested in the evolution equation for the statevector, it is appropriate to
discuss the problem of the invariance also at this level. For simplicity, we will limit
ourselves to the discussion of space translations.
Let us start by considering the simpler linear Stratonovich equation (yielding only
ensemble reduction, i.e. decoherence)
i
d
dt
|ψV (t)〉 = V (r, t) |ψV (t)〉 (13.10)
If we denote by O′ an observer whose reference frame is translated by an amount a
with respect to the frame of O, he will experience the potential
V ′(r′, t) = V (r′ + a, t) (13.11)
69Concerning this point, we call the attention of the reader to D. Albert’s investigations [141] on
the impact of dynamical reduction models on statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. He points
out that, precisely due to their fundamentally irreversible nature, such models allow, in his opinion,
a much more satisfactory derivation of the thermodynamical tendency to equilibrium.
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so that, for a particular realization of V , there is no invariance.
However, since we are dealing with a fundamentally stochastic theory, the invari-
ance requirement has to be formulated in the appropriate way. We will say that the
theory is stochastically invariant under space translations if, for all observers O′,
translated by any a with respect to O, the stochastic ensemble of potentials is the
same and characterized by the same probabilities. This is equivalent to requiring
that, if V (r, t) is a possible sample function for O, then V (r−a, t), for any a, is also a
possible sample function for him, having the same probability of occurrence of V (r, t),
i.e.,
PRaw[V (r, t)] = PRaw[V (r− a, t)] (13.12)
Note that this is automatically guaranteed by the form (8.7) for the mean value and
covariance function of the gaussian noise.
In the case of the model based on equation (8.8) describing Heisenberg reduction
processes, a separate discussion is needed, since the stochastic invariance requirement
has to be referred to the cooked probabilities which depend on the initial statevector.
Let us therefore consider two observers O and O′ and suppose they prepare the same
(subjective) state |ψ(0)〉 at time t = 0. The probability density of occurrence of the
same (subjective) potential V (r, t) is, for the two observers,
PO
′
Cook
[V (r, t)] = PO
′
Raw
[V (r, t)] ‖|ψO′V (t)〉‖2
(13.13)
PO
Cook
[V (r, t)] = PO
Raw
[V (r, t)] ‖|ψOV (t)〉‖2
Since |ψO′V (t)〉 and |ψOV (t)〉 are the solutions of equation (8.8) with the same (subjec-
tive) potential and satisfy the same initial conditions, they coincide. Moreover, due
to equation (13.12), PO
′
Raw
[V (r, t)] = PO
Raw
[V (r, t)], implying
PO
′
Cook
[V (r, t)] = PO
Cook
[V (r, t)] (13.14)
This guarantees the invariance from the active point of view, i.e., the observers cannot,
by making physical experiments in their own frames, discover that they are displaced.
They agree on the statistical distributions of future outcomes.
13.2 Quantum Field Theory with a Hermitian stochastic cou-
pling: the case of decoherence
In trying to set up the framework for a relativistic generalization of reduction models,
we adopt the quantum field theoretic point of view. We remark that the analogue
of the idea of considering, within a non–relativistic framework, a stochastic potential
V (r, t) consists in assuming that the Lagrangian density for fields contains a stochastic
interaction term. In this subsection we consider a model analogous to the non–
relativistic ones discussed in subsection 3.2, yielding only ensemble, not individual
reductions.
Let us consider, in the context of quantum field theory, the Lagrangian density
L(x) = L0(x) + LI(x)V (x) (13.15)
where L0 and LI are Lorentz scalar functions of the fields (for the moment we do
not need to specify the fields we deal with). We assume that LI does not depend on
the derivatives of the fields, and that V (x) is a c–number stochastic process which
is a scalar with respect to transformations of the restricted Poincare` group, i.e., that
under the change of variables x′ = Λx+ b, it transforms according to
V ′(x′) = V [Λ−1(x′ − b)]. (13.16)
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We will also assume that V (x) is a Gaussian noise with zero mean and, to get a
relativistic stochastically invariant theory, that its covariance is an invariant function
〈〈V (x)V (x′)〉〉 = A(x− x′) (13.17)
with A(Λ−1x) = A(x).
As discussed in the previous subsection, stochastic invariance requires different
observers to agree on the unfolding of physical processes. This, in turn, is guaranteed
by the condition that the family of all sample functions V (x) and the probability
density of occurrence of the same (subjective) sample function be the same for all
observers. This is achieved by requiring that, for a single observer,
PRaw[V (x)] = PRaw[V (Λ(x + b))] (13.18)
We stress that property (13.18) holds automatically if the covariance is a relativisti-
cally invariant function. In fact, from
PRaw[V (x)] =
1
N
e
−1
2
∫
dx dx′ V (x)A˜(x− x′)V (x′)
(13.19)
[where we have denoted by A˜(x−x′) the function satisfying ∫ dx′′A(x−x′′)A˜(x′′−x′) =
δ(x− x′)], one gets immediately, using the scalar nature of A and consequently of A˜,
that
PRaw[V (Λ(x+ b))] = PRaw[V (x)]. (13.20)
The most natural generalization of the case discussed in the previous subsection is
obtained by assuming that V (x) is a white noise in all variables, i.e.,
〈〈V (x)V (x′)〉〉 = A(x− x′) = λδ(x− x′). (13.21)
We study, first of all, the physical consequences of the stochastic coupling LI(x)V (x).
In Schro¨dinger’s picture we have, for a given V (x), the evolution equation:
i
d
dt
|ψV (t)〉 =
[
H0 −
∫
d3xLI(x, 0)V (x, t)
]
|ψV (t)〉 (13.22)
where H0 is the Hamiltonian corresponding to L0. Equation (13.22) implies
|ψV (t)〉 = T e
−iH0t + i
∫ t
0
dτ
∫
d3xLi(x, 0)V (x, τ)
|ψ(0)〉 (13.23)
This equation shows how, for a given initial state |ψ(0)〉, one gets an ensemble of states
|ψV (t)〉 at time t, according to the particular realization of the stochastic process.
The statistical ensemble can then be described by the statistical operator obtained
by averaging over the sample functions. In the case under consideration one gets a
closed evolution equation for the statistical operator. In fact, we observe that, due to
the fact that LI(x) does not depend on the derivatives of the fields
[LI(x, 0), LI(x
′, 0)] = 0. ∀ x, x′ (13.24)
We then have:
ρ(t+ ǫ) =
〈〈[
1− iH0ǫ+ i
∫ t+ǫ
t
dτ
∫
d3xLI(x, 0)V (x, τ)
−1
2
∫ t+ǫ
t
dτ dτ ′
∫
d3x d3x′ LI(x, 0)LI(x
′, 0)V (x, τ)V (x′, τ ′)
]
|ψV (t)〉〈ψV (t)|
[
1 + iH0ǫ− i
∫ t+ǫ
t
dτ
∫
d3xLI(x, 0)V (x, τ)
−1
2
∫ t+ǫ
t
dτ dτ ′
∫
d3x d3x′ LI(x, 0)LI(x
′, 0)V (x, τ)V (x′, τ ′)
]〉
(13.25)
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We recall now the properties associated with a zero mean gaussian probability distri-
bution
〈〈V (x1, t1) . . . V (xn, tn)〉〉 = 0 for n odd
(13.26)
〈〈V (x1, t1) . . . V (xn, tn)〉〉 =
∑
all pairs
〈〈V (xi, ti)V (xj , tj)〉〉 ·
·〈〈V (xk, tk)V (xl, tl)〉〉 for n even.
¿From (13.25) we then have
d
dt
ρ(t) = −i[H0, ρ(t)] + λ
∫
d3xLI(x, 0)ρ(t)LI(x, 0)− λ
2
∫
d3x
{
L2I(x, 0), ρ(t)
}
.
(13.27)
Note that the obtained equation is of the Lindblad type.
The non–Hamiltonian terms in equation (13.27) imply a suppression of the off–
diagonal elements of the statistical operator in the basis of the common eigenstates
of the commuting operators LI(x, 0). Putting
LI(x, 0) | . . . ν . . .〉 = ν(x) | . . . ν . . .〉 (13.28)
one gets, when the Hamiltonian term in (13.27) is disregarded,
〈. . . ν . . . |ρ(t)| . . . ν′ . . .〉 = e
−λ
2
t
∫
d3x [ν(x) − ν′(x)]2
〈. . . ν . . . |ρ(0)| . . . ν′ . . .〉
(13.29)
As in the non–relativistic case, however, for a single realization of the stochastic
potential V (x, t), the statevector is not driven into one of the eigenmanifolds charac-
terized by a given ν(x), since |〈. . . ν . . . |ψV (t)〉|2 does not change with time. These
considerations point out that, in order to have Heisenberg reductions, one has to
resort to a skew–hermitian coupling with the noise.
Equation (13.27) for the statistical operator is not manifestly covariant, even
though, from the procedure which has been followed to derive it, we know that the
theory is stochastically invariant. To obtain a manifestly covariant description of the
statistical operator evolution, we note that the model presented above is obviously
equivalent to the following scheme:
1. Assume that the fields are solutions of the Heisenberg equations obtained in the
standard way from the Lagrangian density L0(x) (note that we do not require
L0(x) to describe free fields).
2. Assume that the evolution of the statevector is governed by the Tomonaga–
Schwinger equation
i
δ|ψV (σ)〉
δσ(x)
= −LI(x)V (x)|ψV (σ)〉, (13.30)
LI(x) being a function of the fields considered in 1) which does not involve
their derivatives. As a consequence of the assumptions about LI(x), for any
two points x, x′ ∈ σ, σ being a spacelike surface, [LI(x), LI(x′)] = 0, and
consequently equation (13.30) is integrable.
Let us consider the formal solution of equation (13.30):
|ψV (σ)〉 = T e
i
∫ σ
σ0
d4xLI(x)V (x)
|ψ(σ0)〉. (13.31)
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Defining
ρ(σ) = 〈〈|ψV (σ)〉〈ψV (σ)|〉〉 (13.32)
using (13.32), and following the procedure outlined in equations (13.25)–(13.27), we
get the Tomonaga–Schwinger equation for the statistical operator
δ ρ(σ)
δσ(x)
= λLI(x)ρ(σ)LI(x) − λ
2
{
L2I(x), ρ(σ)
}
(13.33)
which is manifestly covariant.
13.3 White noise relativistic dynamical reduction models
In this subsection we present a stochastically invariant theory yielding Heisenberg
reductions. To this purpose we keep assumption 1) of the previous subsection and we
replace 2) by the requirement that |ψV (σ)〉, instead of being governed by equation
(13.30), obeys the following equation of the Tomonaga–Schwinger type:
δ|ψV (σ)〉
δσ(x)
= [LI(x)V (x) − λL2I(x)]|ψV (σ)〉. (13.34)
The main difference between the two equations (13.30) and (13.34) derives from the
skew–hermitian character of the coupling to the stochastic c–number field. On the
right hand side of (13.34) a term guaranteeing the conservation of the average value
of the square norm of the state appears. It is important to remark that equation
(13.34), for a given sample potential, does not conserve the norm of the statevector.
Let |ψV (σ)〉 be the solution of equation (13.34) for a given realization of the
stochastic potential
|ψV (σ)〉 = T e
∫ σ
σ0
d4x [LI(x)V (x)− λL2I(x)]
|ψV (σ0)〉 (13.35)
and let us define the stochastic average
ρ(σ) = 〈〈|ψV (σ)〉〈ψV (σ)|〉〉. (13.36)
Following the same procedure of the previous subsection one sees that ρ(σ) still sat-
isfies equation (13.33) derived in the Hermitian case.
As in the non–relativistic case we have then two conceptually different dynamical
evolutions for the statevector, i.e., (13.30) and (13.34), which give rise to the same
dynamics for the statistical operator and therefore to the same physical predictions
at the ensemble level. The very definition (13.36) of the statistical operator, when
confronted with the fact that the equation for the statevector does not preserve the
norm, implies the adoption of the point of view that a cooking procedure, analogous
to the one discussed in section 7.1, is necessary. This means that one has to con-
sider normalized vectors |ψV (σ)〉/‖|ψV (σ)〉‖ and has to attribute to the considered
realization V (x) of the stochastic potential, having support in the spacetime region
lying between the two spacelike hypersurfaces σ0 and σ, not the probability density
P [V (x)] given by (13.19), but a cooked probability density PCook[V (x)] given by
PCook[V (x)] = PRaw[V (x)] ‖|ψV (σ)〉‖2 (13.37)
In the above equation |ψV (σ)〉 is the solution of equation (13.34) satisfying
|ψV (σ0)〉 = |ψ0〉. (13.38)
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Before discussing the cooking procedure, the role of the counterterm, and the relativis-
tic invariance of the theory, an important remark is necessary. As has been discussed
in [67], at the level of the statistical operator the map Σt does not exist when t < 0.
For this reason, even at the statevector level, we will only consider equation (13.34)
as yielding the evolution from the statevector associated to a given spacelike surface
σ0 to spacelike surfaces lying entirely in the future of σ0.
For what concerns the properties of the cooking procedure one can immediately
see that equation (13.33) preserves the trace of ρ, which amounts to the statement
that equation (13.34) preserves the average of the square norm of the statevector. In
particular, this implies∫
D[V ]PCook[V (x)] =
∫
D[V ]P [V (x)] ‖|ψV (σ)〉‖2 = 1 (13.39)
which shows that the requirement that the cooked probability density sums to 1, is
satisfied.
13.4 Transformation properties and invariance of the theory
We discuss now the transformation properties of the theory for a given realization of
the stochastic potential, in going from a given reference frame O to another one O′
related to it by a transformation of the restricted Poincare´ group
(Λ, b) : x → x′ = Λx + b (13.40)
We remind the reader that in the Tomonaga–Schwinger formalism of conventional
quantum field theory each reference frame O is able to assign a statevector to each
spacelike hypersurface. Our first concern is to demonstrate that the consistency of
the composition law for Lorentz transformations remains intact when one resorts to
the Tomonaga–Schwinger formalism.
Suppose that the transformation (13.40) involves a boost and consider a given
spacelike surface σ for O. The surface which is subjectively the same for O′ involves
points which lie in the past of the surface σ for O. Our previous discussion has
pointed out that we will only use the Tomonaga–Schwinger equation to go from a
given spacelike surface σ to surfaces lying entirely in the future of σ. Therefore,
contrary to the standard case, we are not allowed to raise here the following question:
which state vector |ψ′(σ)〉 would O′ associate to his subjective surface σ to describe
the same physical situation described by O who assigns the statevector |ψ(σ)〉 to his
subjective surface σ?
We can, however, legitimately consider subjective surfaces σ∼′ for O′, such that
they lie in the future of the surface σ for O. Suppose the observer O associates the
statevector |ψO(σ)〉 to his subjective surface σ to describe the physical situation. Let
us denote by σ∼ the surface of O which is objectively the same as the above–mentioned
surface σ∼′ for O′. Then O associates to σ∼ the state |ψO(σ∼)〉 obtained by solving
equation (13.34) with the initial condition that it reduces to |ψO(σ)〉 on σ. We have
|ψO(σ∼)〉 = SV (σ
∼, σ)|ψO(σ)〉
‖SV (σ∼, σ)|ψO(σ)〉‖ (13.41)
with
SV (σ
∼, σ) = T e
∫ σ∼
σ
d4x [LI(x)V (x)− λL2I(x)]
(13.42)
Then the observer O′ will associate to his surface σ∼′ the statevector
|ψO′(σ∼′)〉 = U(Λ, b)|ψO(σ∼)〉 = U(Λ, b)SV (σ
∼, σ)|ψO(σ)〉
‖SV (σ∼, σ)|ψO(σ)〉‖ (13.43)
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In equation (13.43), U(Λ, b) is the unitary operator whose infinitesimal generators Pµ
and Jµν are obtained in the standard way from the Lagrangian density L0(x). Let
now σ, σ∼, σ∼∼ be three spacelike surfaces for O each lying entirely in the future
of the previous ones. Let us consider two other observers O′ and O′′ related by two
successive Lorentz transformations (the generalization to Poincare´ transformations is
straightforward): O′ = Λ1O, O
′′ = Λ2O
′, and let us denote by σ′, σ∼′, σ∼∼′ and σ′′,
σ∼′′, σ∼∼′′ the above surfaces as seen by O′ and O′′, respectively.
The map (13.42), for a given realization of the stochastic potential, has the fol-
lowing property. Suppose O assigns the state |ψO(σ)〉 to the surface σ. Then O′
assigns the state (13.43) to the surface σ∼′. For O′ this state evolves according to the
Tomonaga–Schwinger equation (13.34) with V ′(x′) = V (Λ−11 x
′) from σ∼′ to σ∼∼′:
|ψO′(σ∼∼′)〉 = S
′
V ′(σ
∼∼′, σ∼′|ψO′(σ∼′)〉
‖S′V ′(σ∼∼′, σ∼′)|ψO′(σ∼′)〉‖ . (13.44)
The observer O′′ will describe the final situation by assigning the statevector
|ψO′′ (σ∼∼′′)〉 = U(Λ2)|ψO′(σ∼∼′)〉 (13.45)
to the surface σ∼∼′′. On the other hand, one can consider the evolution from σ to
σ∼∼ as seen from O,
|ψO(σ∼∼)〉 = SV (σ
∼∼, σ)|ψO(σ)〉
‖SV (σ∼∼, σ)|ψO(σ)〉‖ . (13.46)
and then look at it from O′′ = Λ2Λ1O, getting the state
|ψ∗O′′(σ∼∼′)〉 = U(Λ2Λ1)|ψO(σ∼∼)〉. (13.47)
For consistency, |ψ∗O′′(σ∼∼′)〉 must coincide with |ψO′′(σ∼∼′)〉. This can be easily
proved to hold.
Although we have just seen that the theory implies an assignment of a statevector
to a hypersurface by any observer that fulfills the Lorentz (also Poincare´) group
requirements, this does not mean that the description is Lorentz invariant. In fact,
because a particular realization of the stochastic potential V looks different from two
different reference frames, the map SV (σ
∼, σ) obviously depends upon the reference
frame O. This shows that, at the individual level, the theory does not posses the
property of standard (i.e., non–stochastic) Lorentz invariance. However, for stochastic
Lorentz invariance, one must consider the ensemble of possible sample potentials.
When one takes into account the Lorentz invariance of the requirement (13.17) for
the correlation function 〈〈V (x)V (x′)〉〉, and the invariance of the cooking procedure
that must be performed to get the physics of the problem, one can easily prove, along
the same lines as in the non relativistic case, that there is stochastic invariance in the
statevector language, i.e., the stochastic ensemble of evolution operators SV (σ
∼, σ) is
the same in each reference frame.
In the language of the statistical operator, invariance is evident from the manifestly
covariant Tomonaga–Schwinger form (13.33) of the evolution equation.
13.5 Reduction properties
Once we have guaranteed the invariance of the formalism by using its Tomonaga–
Schwinger formulation, in order to discuss specific features of the process, we can
consider t = const hyperplanes in the Schro¨dinger picture. In so doing, the equation
corresponding to (13.34) is
d |ψV (t)〉
dt
=
[
−iH0 +
∫
d3x
(
LI(x, 0)V (x, t) − λL2I(x, 0)
)] |ψV (t)〉 (13.48)
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This is a Stratonovich equation for the statevector. By standard procedures one can
consider the corresponding Itoˆ stochastic dynamical equation
d |ψV (t)〉 =
[(
−iH0 − λ
2
∫
d3xL2I(x, 0)
)
dt +
∫
d3xLI(x, 0)dV (x)
]
|ψV (t)〉,
(13.49)
where dV (x) is a real Wiener process satisfying
〈〈dV (x)〉〉 = 0 〈〈dV (x)dV (y)〉〉 = λδ(x− y)dt. (13.50)
Note that both equations (13.48) and (13.49) do not conserve the norm of the stat-
evector but they conserve the average of its squared norm.
As discussed in section 7 one can take two equivalent attitudes to describe the
physics of the process. One can solve equation (13.48) or (13.49) for a given initial
condition, and then one can consider the normalized vectors |ψV (t)〉/||ψV (t)〉‖ at
time t and assume that the probability of their occurrence is obtained by cooking
the probability density of occurrence of V (x), i.e., by multiplying it by ‖|ψV (t)〉‖2.
Alternatively, one can consider the nonlinear stochastic dynamical equation
d |ψV (t)〉 =
[(
−iH0 − λ
2
∫
d3x [L2I(x, 0) − 〈LI(x, 0)〉]2
)
dt +
+
∫
d3x (LI(x, 0) − 〈LI(x, 0)〉) dV (x)
]
|ψV (t)〉, (13.51)
(where 〈LI(x, 0)〉 = 〈ψV (t)|LI(x, 0)|ψV (t)〉), without cooking, i.e., using just the
probability weighting of V (x).
As we know from the discussion of the previous sections, when one disregards the
Hamiltonian term in (13.51), the evolution leads the state vector to enter one of the
common eigenmanifolds of the commuting operators LI(x, 0). The theory induces
therefore Heisenberg reductions, as required.
13.6 The models so far proposed
In this subsection we will consider some specific choices for the Lagrangian densities L0
and LI which, when used in connection with the formalism presented in the previous
subsections, yield stochastically invariant relativistic reduction models. The goal is
to build up a framework leading to localization in position of the basic constituents
of all matter.
The simplest and most immediate idea would be to introduce a fermion field for
particles of mass M and to choose for the Lagrangian density the expressions
L0(x) = ψ(x) (iγ
µ∂µ −M)ψ(x), LI(x) = ψ(x)ψ(x) (13.52)
However, in the non relativistic limit, the dynamics induced by the above choice
would lead to infinitely sharp position localizations for the fermions, and this, as is
well known [143], is unacceptable.
We have then to enrich the formalism. This can be done by following the proposal
put forward in reference [89]. One considers a fermion field coupled to a real scalar
meson field and chooses
L0(x) =
1
2
[
∂µφ(x)∂
µφ(x) −m2φ2(x)] + ψ(x) (iγµ∂µ −M)ψ(x) +
ηψ(x)ψ(x)φ(x)
LI(x) = φ(x). (13.53)
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The introduction of the meson field coupled to the fermion field allows one to overcome
the difficulty of the infinitely sharp localization for fermions met by the previous
model. In the Schro¨dinger representation the evolution equation for the state vector
corresponding to the choice (13.53) is
d |ψV (t)〉
dt
=
[
−iH0 +
∫
d3z
(
φ(z, 0)V (x, t) − λφ2(z, 0))] |ψV (t)〉 (13.54)
Let us consider now the non–relativistic infinite mass limit for fermions and let us
confine our discussion to the sector containing one fermion (note that in the limit the
fermion number is a conserved quantity). The state of a fermion at position q is the
“dressed” state
|1q〉 = a†(q)A(q) |0〉 (13.55)
where a†(q) is the creation operator for a fermion at q and A(q) |0〉 = |mq〉 is a
coherent state which can be characterized as either the common eigenstate of the
annihilation operators of physical mesons with eigenvalue zero or as the common
eigenstate of the annihilation operators b(k) of bare mesons with momentum k, with
eigenvalues (η/
√
2)e−ik·q/(2πk0)
3/2.
To be rigorous, in the three–dimensional case, one should introduce an ultravio-
let cut–off on the momentum of mesons in the interaction term to avoid ultraviolet
singularities. In the limit in which the cut–off is removed the meson states |mq〉,
|mq′〉 tend to become orthogonal for q 6= q′. In this way, due to the coupling of the
fermion field to the meson field, the “position” of one fermion turns out to be strictly
correlated to states of the meson field which are approximately orthogonal.
We note that the mean value of φ(z, 0) in the state |mq〉 turns out to be
〈mq|φ(z, 0)|mq〉 = f(z− q) = ηe
−m|z−q|
4π|z− q| . (13.56)
In what follows, in order to discuss the localization properties of the model for physical
fermions, we make a gross simplification (which coincides with the non relativistic
approximation), i.e., we treat the states |mq〉 as eigenstates of φ(z, 0) pertaining to
the eigenvalue f(z− q). Let us then consider the physical state for one fermion
|ψ(t)〉 =
∫
d3q ψ(q, t)|1q〉. (13.57)
By substituting (13.57) into equation (13.54) and disregarding the standard Hamil-
tonian H0, we get the equation for ψ(q, t):
∂ψV (q, t)
∂t
=
∫
d3z f(z− q)V (z, t)ψV (q, t) − λη
2
8πm
ψV (q, t), (13.58)
i.e.,
∂ψV (q, t)
∂t
= V ∼(q, t)ψV (q, t) − λη
2
8πm
ψV (q, t), (13.59)
with V ∼(q, t) a Gaussian noise with zero mean and covariance
〈〈V ∼(q, t)V ∼(q′, t′)〉〉 = λη
8πm
e−m|q−q
′|δ(t− t′). (13.60)
Equation (13.59) is essentially the same as equation (8.8) of CSL for the case of a single
particle. If one considers the sector with N fermions, in the above approximations,
one gets an equation of the CSL type [see equations (7.9) and (8.1)] with the operator
D(x) =
m2
4π
∫
d3z
e−m|x−z|
|x− z| a
†(z)a(z) (13.61)
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taking the place of N(x), and (λη2)/m4 taking the place of γ.
Thus it appears reasonable that the model (13.53) possesses the desired localizing
features. However, it also presents a serious difficulty. The evolution equation (13.27)
for the statistical operator, specialized to the Lagrangian (13.53), is:
d
dt
ρ(t) = −i[H0, ρ(t)] + λ
∫
d3z φ(z, 0)ρ(t)φ(z, 0) − λ
2
∫
d3z
{
φ2(z, 0), ρ(t)
}
.
(13.62)
Let us consider the Hamiltonian H for the free meson field; by using (13.62) one can
evaluate the increase per unit time of the mean value of H , getting
d 〈H〉
dt
= −λ
2
∫
d3z 〈[φ(z, 0), [φ(z, 0), H ]]〉 (13.63)
i.e.,
d 〈H〉
dt
=
λ
2
∫
d3z δ(0) (13.64)
Therefore, the increase per unit time and per unit volume of the mean value of the
energy of the meson field turns out to be infinite. So, in addition to the desired reduc-
tion behaviour, the model displays an undesidered additional behaviour: because the
white noise source is locally coupled to the meson field, it copiously produces mesons
out of the vacuum70. We note that the now outlined difficulty does not show up in
the non–relativistic approximation of the model discussed above [equations (13.58)–
(13.61)] due to the gross simplification of treating the states |mq〉 as eigenstates of
φ(z, 0).
Since the divergences originate from the local coupling between the quantum fields
and the white noise, the natural way to cure the infinite vacuum fluctuations is to
replace the white noise with a more general Gaussian stochastic process; this possi-
bility has been explored by P. Pearle [90, 91]. He considers an evolution equation for
the statevector which is the straightforward generalization of the white noise equation
(13.35). He then proves that — in the lowest order in perturbation theory — only
the time–like components of the spectrum of the noise are responsible for the vacuum
excitations; accordingly, he chooses as the spectrum of the noise that of a tachion
of mass µ = h¯/αc ∼ 1 eV, where α is the QMSL localization parameter. Anyway,
at higher orders in perturbation theory there are still vacuum excitations; to avoid
such excitations, Pearle proposes to remove the time–ordering product from Feyman
diagrams.
Recently, Nicrosini and Rimini [92] have proposed a different solution to the prob-
lem arising from the appearance of divergences. They couple the noise not to the
quantum fields, but to “macroscopic operators” which are defined as the integral of
the usual quantum fields over appropriately chosen (Lorenz invariant) spacetime sur-
faces. In other words, the coupling between the quantum fields and the white noise
is not local anymore.
Both the attempts by Pearle and by Nicrosini and Rimini are promising; anyway,
they still have to be studied in detail. In particular, it is not clear yet whether the
evolution can be expressed in terms of a integrable Tomonaga–Schwinger equations:
this is a necessary requirement in order to put on solid grounds any relativistic theory
of dynamical reductions.
70A similar conclusion has been reached also by Adler and Brun in recent investigations on rela-
tivistic statevector collapse models [144].
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14 Local and nonlocal features of relativistic CSL
As is well known, the quantum theory of measurement, in addition to the difficulties
discussed in section 2 which constitute the main motivation for the consideration of
dynamical reduction models, presents some further difficulties arising specifically from
the assumed instantaneous nature of the collapse of the wavefunction. In particular,
at the individual level of description, nonlocal features as well as odd aspects (from
the relativistic point of view) emerge. Such problems have already been extensively
discussed in the literature [13, 145, 146, 147], in the case of standard quantum me-
chanics: we will review them in subsection 14.1. It is interesting to look at them
from the perspective of the relativistic dynamical reduction models, analyzed in the
previous section: this will be the subject of subsection 14.2.
In the final section we discuss the problem of parameter dependence in dynamical
reduction models. We will show that in the non linear model there is a set of real-
izations of the stochastic process for which parameter independence is violated for
parallel spin components in a EPR–Bohm–like setup. Such a set has an appreciable
probability of occurrence (≃ 1/2). On the other hand, we will prove that the linear
model exhibits only extremely small parameter dependence effects.
14.1 Quantum theory with the reduction postulate
14.1.1 Objective properties of individual systems
Suppose one accepts it as meaningful, within standard quantum theory, to consider an
individual level of description with the possibility of attributing objective properties
to a quantum system. As discussed in section 2.4, a natural attitude corresponding
to the one first introduced in the celebrated EPR paper [5] is to assume the following.
If an individual physical system S is associated to a definite statevector |ψ〉 which
is an eigenstate of an observable A pertaining to the eigenvalue a, then one can
state that “S has the property A = a” or that “there exists an element of physical
reality” referring to the considered observable. We remark that if we denote by Pa
the projection operator on the closed linear manifold of the eigenstates of A belonging
to the eigenvalue a, then
〈ψ|Pa|ψ〉 = 1 (14.1)
We want to stress, however, that even within non–relativistic standard quantum me-
chanics, one is compelled to take the attitude of attributing objective properties to a
system even when condition (14.1) is valid only to an extremely high degree of accu-
racy. To clarify this statement, we can think, for example, of the spin measurement
of a spin–1/2 particle by a Stern–Gerlach apparatus. In such a case, the two spin
values are strictly correlated to two states ψ1 and ψ2 describing the spatial degrees
of freedom. Even though these wavefunctions are appreciably different from zero in
two extremely narrow and distant regions, their supports cannot have a void inter-
section. As a consequence even an arbitrarily precise measurement of the position
cannot reduce the statevector exactly to an eigenstate of the spin component. The
final state unavoidably exhibits an (extremely slight) entanglement of position with
spin variables and as such cannot be an eigenstate of a spin component operator.
Incidentally we remark that the above considerations are even more appropriate
in the case of dynamical reduction models. In fact, on the one hand, such models,
with the requirement that they induce Heisenberg reductions, are introduced just
with the purpose of implying, at the individual level, the emergence of objective
properties for macroscopic objects (in particular the property of being in one place
rather than in another). Correspondingly, they induce indirectly the appearance of
objective properties also for microscopic systems, at least when they interact with
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macroscopic measuring–like devices. On the other hand, as is well known and as has
been repeatedly stressed in references [67, 148, 89], within dynamical reduction mod-
els, the unavoidable persistence of the tails, the tiny but nonzero terms corresponding
to the parts of a linear superposition which have been suppressed by the sponta-
neous localization process, prevents us from asserting with absolute certainty that
the “macroscopic pointers” are in a definite space region, if one adopts the standard
probability interpretation.
The conclusion is the same we have drawn in Section 11 concerning the tails
problem, i.e., that within the dynamical reduction program is perfectly consistent to
accept that it makes sense to attribute appropriate objective properties to individual
systems even when the mean value of the projection operator on the eigenmanifold
associated to the eigenvalue corresponding to the attributed property is not exactly
equal to 1, but is extremely close to it.
14.1.2 Non locality
Nonlocal features71 of quantum mechanics arise from the fact that, due to the in-
stantaneous nature of the collapse of the wavefunction, possible actions performed in
a certain space region can, under specific circumstances, induce immediate changes
in distant regions. In this connection two important questions arise: first, do these
changes correspond to some modifications of the physical situation in the distant re-
gion? Secondly, are these modifications detectable, so that one can take advantage of
them to send faster than light signals?
To make precise and unambiguous these questions, it is necessary to specify the
level of description of physical processes one is considering. In particular, it is im-
portant to make a clear distinction between the ensemble and the individual levels of
description.
To understand the above situation, one can make reference either to the well–
known EPR–Bohm type setup for an “entangled” state of a composite system S =
S1+S2, the components being far apart and non–interacting, or to the position mea-
surement of a particle whose state is the linear superposition of two distant packets. In
the first case, as is well known, at the level of the individual members of the ensemble,
the far away system (let us say S2) is [150] “steered or piloted into one or the other
type of state” according to the measurement which is performed on S1 and the specific
result which is obtained. In the second case, let us write ψ(x, t) = ψ1(x, t) + ψ2(x, t),
where the states ψ1(x, t) and ψ2(x, t) have equal norms and are appreciably different
from zero only in two far apart regions α1 and α2, respectively. Then, a measurement
aimed to test whether the particle is in α1 and yielding, for example, the answer
“no” (“yes”), instantaneously collapses ψ(x, t) to ψ2(x, t) (ψ1(x, t)). Correspondingly
the quantity
∫
α2
dx |ψ(x, t)|2 (i.e., “the mean value”72 of the projection operator on
region α2), changes from 1/2 to either 1 or 0 according to the outcome of the position
measurement at α1. This puts into evidence how, if interpreted as a theory describing
individual systems, quantum mechanics exhibits nonlocal features.
The situation is quite different when looked at from the ensemble point of view.
In fact, as is well known [71, 72, 73, 74], no measurement procedure in a given region
can change the statistical distribution of prospective measurement results in a distant
region. Of course, this does not mean that, from the ensemble point of view, Quantum
Mechanics displays a local character. The theory is still highly nonlocal (for example,
Bell’s inequalities hold), but this non locality cannot be used in any way to send faster
that light signals to distant observers.
71For an exhaustive discussion, the reader is referred to the excellent book by M. Redhead [149].
72We are using the common phrase “mean value” to represent diagonal matrix elements like (14.1),
even though the statistical connotation of this phrase has no meaning in our discussion.
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These remarks, although made in the context of ordinary quantum theory with
the reduction postulate, are not essentially modified (i.e., the word “instantaneously”
must be changed to “in a split second” [32]) in the case of the CSL theory with its
reduction dynamics.
14.1.3 Relativistic oddities with observations
In the above analysis we have discussed a measurement process in a given reference
frame O. The consideration of the instantaneous change of the statevector induced
by a measurement raises interesting questions when looked at by different observers.
Since the distance between the two space regions α1 and α2 mentioned above can be
arbitrarily large, even the passage to a reference frame which is moving with respect
to O with an arbitrarily small velocity can change the time order of simultaneous (for
O) events occurring in the two regions.
To illustrate briefly the main points of the problem, we consider the observer O
looking at a system of one particle in the state ψ(x, t) = ψ1(x, t) + ψ2(x, t) which is
a superposition of two well–localized wavepackets propagating in opposite directions
with respect to the origin x = 0. Disregarding the extension and the spreading of the
wavepackets, we can represent the situation by the spacetime diagram of figure 5,
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Figure 5: World lines of two well–localized wavepackets 1 and 2,
belonging to a single particle which is detected at event C.
in which the two world lines 1 and 2 are associated with ψ1 and ψ1, respectively.
Suppose that, at the spacetime point C = (x1, t1) there is a device designed to test
whether the particle is there, and let us suppose that, in the specific individual case
we are considering, the result of the test is “yes”. This is a covariant statement on
which all observers must agree. If one adopts the wavepacket reduction postulate of
standard quantum theory and one assumes that the collapse occurs for each reference
frame along the hyperplane t′ = const, where t′ is the subjective time of the event C
for such a frame, one meets a puzzling situation. Let us in fact consider an objective
point B on world line 2, which is spacelike separated from C and which is labeled by
(x2, t2) (see figure 5). For O, t2 < t1 and, by the above assumption, no reduction has
occurred at time t2 and the statevector is ψ(x, t2). If one considers the projection
operator P2 on the space region around x2, one has 〈ψ|P2|ψ〉 ≃ 1/2. Accordingly,
we could say that the situation is such that, at time t2, O cannot attribute to the
particle the “property” of being or not being in the region around x2.
However, there exists an observer O′ such that t′2 > t
′
1, where t
′
2 and t
′
1 are the
time labels attributed by O′ to the events B and C, respectively. For O′ the particle
has triggered the detector in C at t′1. Therefore at t
′
2 the state of the system is ψ1.
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Then, for O′, the mean value of the projection operator P2 at t
′
2 is zero
73. Observer
O′ can then state that the particle has the property of “not being around B”. Thus,
O and O′ do not agree on a statement referring to a local property at an objective
spacetime point.
It is useful to note that this ambiguity occurs only for the points of the world line
2 which are spacelike with respect to C; for a point B in the past of C all observers
agree in stating that the particle has no definite location while for a point B in the
future of C all observers agree in saying that the particle “is not around B”.
The above discussion follows essentially the one given in reference [145]. The
consideration of these kinds of difficulties have led various authors to take different
attitudes. Bloch [145] and Aharonov and Albert [147] derive from this the conclusion
that one cannot attach an objective meaning to wavefunctions for individual systems.
Hellwig and Kraus [146] have tried to solve the ambiguity about the wavefunction at
a given objective spacetime point by requiring that the collapse of the state vector
due to the measurement at C takes place along the past light cone originating from C.
Thus, at points outside the past light cone the statevector is reduced, while at points
inside the past light cone the statevector is unreduced. This is a covariant statement
and leads the authors to the identification of a unique statevector to be associated
to any given spacetime point. However, such a prescription implies that there are
spacelike surfaces (those crossing the past cone of C) to which it is not possible to
associate a definite state vector. This, as nicely illustrated by Aharonov and Albert
[147], forbids the consideration of nonlocal observables on these hypersurfaces; for
example it does not allow one to speak consistently of the total charge of the system.
Moreover, the assumption that the reduction occurs on the hypersurface delimiting
the past light cone raises conceptual difficulties with the cause–effect relation.
14.2 Relativistic reduction models
We discuss here the local and nonlocal features of reduction models in the relativistic
case. In order to investigate whether the dynamics presented in section 13.4 has
nonlocal effects, we make reference to the procedure outlined in reference [151], i.e.,
we consider whether a modification of the Lagrangian density in a spacetime region
C can have effects in a region B which is spacelike separated from it (this will be
discussed in subsections 14.2.1 and 14.2.2). In particular, since we want to study the
possibility of nonlocal effects due to the reducing character of the dynamics, we will
take into account modifications of the Lagrangian density LI coupled to the noise.
The problems which we want to discuss require the consideration of “local observ-
ables.” By this expression we mean the integral of a function of the fields and their
derivatives in the interaction picture:
AI(σ) =
∫
σ
dx′ fα(x
′)F [φI(x
′), ∂µφI(x
′)] (14.2)
with fα(x
′) a function of class C∞ with compact support α on the spacelike surface
σ. The physically interesting quantities, for our analysis, are the mean values of such
local observables. As usual it is necessary to make precise the level at which the
nonlocality problem is discussed. We will consider it, as before, both at the ensemble
and at the individual level.
At this last level, we will discuss also questions analogous to those considered in
subsection 14.1.3 which originate from looking at the wavepacket reduction postu-
late, taking the point of view of relativity theory. In the present context, they emerge
73Obviously, to be rigorous, both the statement that the state is ψ1 or ψ2, as well the consideration
of the projection operators P1 and P2, are not correct, because one should consider a relativistic
description of the system and of the observables. However, since O′ is moving with a very small
velocity v ≪ c with respect to O, the above approximations are appropriate.
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naturally from the relativistic dynamics described by the Tomonaga–Schwinger equa-
tion. In particular, it turns out that, for all Tomonaga–Schwinger surfaces coinciding
on α, the mean value of the local observable depends upon the specific Tomonaga–
Schwinger surface on which it is evaluated (see subsection 14.2.3). This is not the case
with the Tomonaga–Schwinger description of an ordinary relativistic quantum field
theory, and such a difference gives rise to interesting questions about the possibility
of attributing objective properties to the systems which we will discuss in subsection
14.2.4.
14.2.1 Ensemble level
As already emphasized, at the ensemble level, the statistical operator and therefore
the physics of the two models considered in sections 13.2 and 13.3 coincide. Thus,
to investigate properties referring to the statistical ensemble, one can make reference
to the stochastic dynamics with hermitian coupling, which can be easily handled by
familiar methods.
With reference to the model of section 13.3, we consider the mean value of a local
observable AI(σ):
〈AI(σ)〉 = Tr [AI(σ)ρI(σ)] (14.3)
Let us denote by UV (σ, σ0) the evolution operator
UV (σ, σ0) = T e
i
∫ σ
σ0
dxLI(x)V (x)
(14.4)
and by AHV (σ) = U
†
V (σ, σ0)AI(σ)UV (σ, σ0) the observable in the Heisenberg picture
which corresponds to AI(σ) when the realization V of the stochastic potential occurs.
Let AH(σ) be the stochastic average over V of AHV (σ)
AH(σ) =
∫
D[V ]PRaw[V ]AHV (σ). (14.5)
We then have
〈AI(σ)〉 = Tr [AH(σ) ρ(σ0)]. (14.6)
The support of AI(σ) defines a partition of spacetime into three regions: the future,
the past, and the set of points which are spacelike separated from all points belonging
to this support (see figure 6).
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Figure 6: The support of the local observable AI(σ), and the set
(3) of points bearing a spacelike relation to this support.
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We choose now a spacetime region C entirely contained in region 3 and we consider a
modification of the Lagrangian density LI(x) coupled to the noise. We replace LI(x)
with a new density L∼I (x) = LI(x) + ∆LI(x), with ∆LI(x) different from zero only
for x ∈ C. If A∼HV (σ) denotes the local observable in the Heisenberg picture, when
we replace LI(x) with L
∼
I (x), we have
A∼HV (σ) =
[
T e
i
∫ σ
σ0
dx∆LI(φHV (x))V (x)
]†
AHV (σ)
[
T e
i
∫ σ
σ0
dx∆LI(φHV (x))V (x)
]
.
(14.7)
The fields φHV (x) which appear in ∆LI(x) are the fields in Heisenberg picture for the
original Lagrangian density L0(x) + LI(x)V (x). The appearance of ∆LI(x) actually
restricts the integration in the exponential to the spacelike region C, which is spacelike
separated with respect to the support of AHV (σ). It follows that the exponential
commutes with AHV (σ), and therefore
A∼HV (σ) = AHV (σ) (14.8)
for any given realization of the stochastic potential. One then has
A∼H(σ) = AH(σ) (14.9)
i.e., due to equation (14.6), at the level of the statistical ensemble any modification
of LI(x) in a spacetime region C cannot cause physical changes in regions which are
spacelike separated from it. We stress that this conclusion is true for the case of
non hermitian coupling as well as for the case of hermitian coupling, even though
the argument was carried out in terms of the hermitian coupling alone, as it depends
solely upon the consideration of the statistical operators which are identical for both
cases.
14.2.2 Individual Level
¿From the result (14.8) it is also evident that, in the case of hermitian coupling [i.e.
for (13.30)] a variation of the Lagrangian density LI(x) in a region C has no effect on
the mean value of any local observable with support which is spacelike separated from
C, even at the level of an individual system (i.e., for any realization of the stochastic
potential). This property is related to the fact that, in this case, no Heisenberg
reduction takes place.
The situation is quite different in the case of a non hermitian coupling. In fact, let
us consider equation (13.34) and the operator SV (σ, σ0) given by (13.42). The mean
value of a local observable AI(σ) is then
〈AI(σ)〉 = 〈ψV (σ)|AI(σ)|ψV (σ)〉‖|ψV (σ)〉‖2
=
〈ψ(σ0)|S†V (σ, σ0)AI(σ)SV (σ, σ0)|ψ(σ0)〉
‖SV (σ, σ0)|ψ(σ0)〉‖2 (14.10)
We now replace in (13.34) LI(x) by LI(x)+∆LI(x), ∆LI(x) being different from zero
only for x ∈ C, and we denote by S∆V (σ, σ0) the corresponding evolution operator.
The mean value 〈A∆I (σ)〉 of the same local observable, for the same initial condition,
is now
〈A∆I (σ)〉 =
〈ψ(σ0)|S∆†V (σ, σ0)AI(σ)S∆V (σ, σ0)|ψ(σ0)〉
‖S∆V (σ, σ0)|ψ(σ0)〉‖2
. (14.11)
Note that in general
〈A∆I (σ)〉 6= 〈AI(σ)〉 (14.12)
in spite of the fact that [∆LI(x), AI(σ)] = 0, ∀x.
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14.2.3 Mean values of local observables and oddities in relativistic reduc-
tion models
Let us consider a physical system satisfying the initial condition |ψ(σ0)〉 = |ψ0〉 on
the spacelike surface σ0, the local observable A, and two arbitrary spacelike surfaces
σ1 and σ2 coinciding on the support α of A (see figure 7).
σ0
σ1
σ2
α
Figure 7: The spacelike surfaces σ1 and σ2 coinciding on the
support α of local observable A.
When the dynamics (13.30) ruled by a hermitian interaction is considered, for any
given realization of the stochastic potential, as is well known, the mean value of A
in the state |ψ(σ1)〉 coincides with the one in the state |ψ(σ2)〉. It follows, at the
individual level and for the case of hermitian coupling and, as a consequence, at the
ensemble level for both cases of hermitian and skew–hermitian coupling, that the mean
value of a local observable does not depend on the particular spacelike surface which
one chooses among all those coinciding on its support (and therefore on the specific
statevector |ψ(σ1)〉 or |ψ(σ2)〉 which describes the physical situation concerning the
two considered surfaces). Incidentally, this represents a different proof that also in
the case of dynamical reduction models, at the ensemble level, one can consistently
define, as in standard quantum field theory, local observables.
Again, the situation at the individual level is quite different in the skew–hermitian
case. In fact, for a given realization of the stochastic potential, one has
〈ψV (σ2)|A|ψV (σ2)〉
‖|ψV (σ2)〉‖2 =
〈ψV (σ1)|S†V (σ2, σ1)ASV (σ2, σ1)|ψV (σ1)〉
‖SV (σ2, σ1)|ψV (σ1)〉‖2 (14.13)
which, in general, is different from 〈ψV (σ1)|A|ψV (σ1)〉/‖|ψV (σ1)〉‖2 even though the
spacetime region spanned in tilting σ1 into σ2 is spacelike separated from the support
α of A, and, consequently
[A,SV (σ2, σ1)] = 0. (14.14)
This dependence, at the individual level, of the mean value of a local observable
upon the spacelike surface (among those coinciding on the support) over which it is
evaluated is not per se a difficulty of the theory. It becomes, however, a difficulty if
one wishes to claim that such a mean value corresponds to an objective property of
an individual system.
Before facing this problem (see next subsection), a deeper analysis of the implica-
tions of relativistic reduction models for microscopic [case (a) below] and macroscopic
[case (b)] systems is necessary.
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Case (a). Let us start by reconsidering the case (subsection 14.1.3) of a micro-
scopic system coupled to a macroscopic one which acts as a “measuring apparatus”
in the sense of dynamical reduction models. Let A1 and A2 be two local observables
of the microsystem whose supports α1 and α2 are spacelike separated, and suppose
the macroscopic system is devised to measure A1. For our purposes we can ignore the
hamiltonian evolution for the operators and we consider the Tomonaga–Schwinger
evolution equation of the statevector, for a specific realization of the stochastic po-
tential
δ|ψV (σ)〉
δσ(x)
= [iL1−S(x) + LI(x)V (x) − λL2I(x)]|ψV (σ)〉. (14.15)
Here L1−S(x) (describing the local system–apparatus interaction) and LI(x) may be
taken as different from zero only in a spacetime region C which is spacelike with
respect to α2 (see figure 8).
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Figure 8: A macroscopic apparatus measures local observable A1
in spacetime region C. A1’s support α1 is spacelike separated
with respect to α2, the support of another local observable A2.
Let us assume that the local observables A1 and A2 have a purely point spectrum
with eigenvalues 0 and 1, and let us consider the initial state
|ψ(σ0)〉 = 1√
2
[|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉] |χ1〉 (14.16)
with
Ai |ψj〉 = δij |ψj〉, i, j = 1, 2 (14.17)
|χ1〉 being the untriggered apparatus state. Let us furthermore assume that the
particular realization of the stochastic potential V (x) is one of those “yielding the
result 1 for the measurement of A1”. The situation is then the following:
1. The state associated to σ0 and σ1 is |ψ(σ0)〉.
2. The state associated to σ2 is (N being a normalization factor)
|ψV (σ2)〉 = 1
N
e
∫ σ2
σ1
dx [iL1−S(x) + LI(x)V (x) − λL2I(x)]|ψ(σ0)〉
(14.18)
which, under the assumptions which have been made, is approximately an eigen-
state of A2 pertaining to the eigenvalue zero.
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3. The state associated to σ∼2 is also |ψV (σ2)〉.
Indeed, the relativistic CSL dynamics considered in section 13.6 is such that, when a
spacelike hypersurface crosses the region C toward the future, no matter what is the
behaviour in regions far apart from C, the statevector associated to this hypersurface
collapses to the eigenstate of A1 corresponding to the eigenvalue which has been
found.
Looking at the problem from the point of view of the evolution from σ1 to σ2,
one could be tempted to say that, since the mean value of A2 has become practically
zero as a consequence of the “measurement” in the spacetime region C, an element of
physical reality associated with A2 has emerged. This is a nonlocal effect of the type
of those occurring in an EPR setup.
However, one must realize that the same change of the mean value of A2 occurs
when one considers the Tomonaga–Schwinger evolution from σ1 to σ
∼
2 , in accordance
with point 3. This gives rise to an ambiguity in the mean value of A2, i.e., in a quan-
tity that, when the support α2 shrinks to zero, refers to a unique objective spacetime
point. This is not surprising; it corresponds simply to the emergence, within the
relativistic reducing dynamics, of the aspects discussed in subsection 14.1.3 for the
standard quantum theory with the reduction postulate. In fact, one can remark that
σ∼1 can be approximately identified with a t
′ = const hyperplane for a boosted ob-
server for which the interaction with the macro–object has already taken place74.
Case (b). Let us discuss now the same problem for macroscopic systems. We
consider a situation analogous to the previous one but in which there are two macro-
scopic systems performing measurements of the observables A1 and A2. The initial
condition is given by assigning to the surface σ0 the state:
|ψ(σ0)〉 = 1√
2
[|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉] |χ1〉 |χ2〉 (14.19)
where |χ1〉 and |χ2〉 refer to the untriggered apparatuses. The evolution equation,
with the usual approximation, is now
δ|ψV (σ)〉
δσ(x)
= [iL1−S(x) + iL2−S(x) + LI1(x)V (x) + LI2(x)V (x)
− λL2I1(x) − λL2I2(x)]|ψV (σ)〉. (14.20)
where the meaning of the symbols is obvious. To clearly define the situation from the
physical point of view, we assume that the time which is necessary in order that the
microsystem triggers the apparatus is sensibly shorter than the typical reduction time
for the apparatus. This means that in the above equation we can consider L1−S(x)
and L2−S(x) to be different from zero only in the regions C1 and B1, respectively,
and LI1(x) and LI2(x) in the regions C2 and B2, respectively, as shown in figure 9.
74The bending of the surface at the left of α2 shown in figure 5 is allowed since, under the
assumptions we have made, LI (x) = 0 in that region.
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Figure 9: Measurements take place in C1 and B1, followed by
reduction dynamics in C2 and B2, of local observables A1 and
A2, respectively.
Let us also assume that the specific realization of the stochastic potential is one
leading to the value 1 for A1. We are interested in discussing the states of the
macro–system used to measure A2 and the mean values of its observables on various
hypersurfaces. In particular, let A∼2 be the observable of the apparatus corresponding
to the yes–no experiment asking whether the result 0 has been found in a measurement
of A2. We consider t = const hypersurfaces σ(t) and also the bent hypersurfaces σ
∼(t)
containing the spatial support of A∼2 at time t (see figure 9). The situation can now
be summarized as follows:
1. For t < t0 the state associated to any surface σ(t) or σ
∼(t) has always the form
of a factorized state; one of the factors refers to the apparatus 2 and it is |χ2〉.
Note that what changes in going from σ(t) to σ∼(t) is the state of the system
+ apparatus 1.
2. For t = t1 the state associated to σ(t1) is
|ψV (σ(t1))〉 = 1√
2
[|ψ1〉 |χ11〉 |χ02〉 + |ψ2〉 |χ01〉 |χ12〉], (14.21)
where, obviously, the superscripts identify the states of the macroscopic appara-
tuses which have been triggered by the interaction with the microsystem, these
states being labeled by the eigenvalues which have been found.
¿From (14.21) one sees that the state |ψV (σ(t1))〉 is not a factorized state and as
a consequence it cannot be an eigenstate of the relevant observable of apparatus
2. In particular, the mean value of A∼2 in the state (14.21) is 1/2.
However, it is important to remark that the state to be associated to the surface
σ∼(t1) of figure 6 is, for the particular realization of the stochastic potential,
|ψV (σ∼(t1))〉 ≃ |ψ1〉 |χ11〉 |χ02〉. (14.22)
This state is factorized and it is an eigenstate of A∼2 .
3. The state to be associated with any surface σ(t) and σ∼(t) when t > t2, is once
more a factorized state with the factor |χ02〉 for the apparatus 2.
The conclusion is that, even though the dependence of the mean value of a local
observable upon the spacelike surface on which it is evaluated is present also in the
case of macro–objects, this dependence occurs only for a time interval of the order of
the one which is necessary for the reduction to take place75.
75Here the argument has been presented with reference to the evolution from one space-like surface
lying below the regions C1 and/or C2 to one which has “crossed” these regions. Obviously analogous
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14.2.4 Objective properties of micro and macroscopic systems
We started this subsection 14.2 by relating the possibility of attributing objective
properties to individual systems to requirement (14.1) being satisfied to an extremely
high degree of accuracy. In the relativistic case, however, as shown with great detail
in the previous subsection, the mean value of a projection operator associated to a
local observable is affected by an ambiguity depending on the spacelike surface used
to evaluate it, and, under specific circumstances, by changing the surface its value can
vary from, for example, 1/2 to almost exactly 1. This shows that the above definition
of objective properties for individual systems is inadequate, and must be made more
precise.
In accordance with the discussion of Section 10 we think that the appropriate
attitude is the following: when considering a local observable A with its associated
support we say that an individual system has the accessible property a (a being an
eigenvalue of A), only when the mean value of Pa is extremely close to one, when
evaluated on all spacelike hypersurfaces containing the support of A.
Thus, according to this prescription, one cannot attribute an objective property
to an individual system when there is an appreciable dependence of the mean value
of the local observable upon the surface used to evaluate it.
Let us analyze the implications of this attitude in the cases of microscopic and
macroscopic systems. For a microsystem, with reference to case (a) of the previous
subsection, we observe that no objective property corresponding to a local observable
can emerge as a consequence of a “measurement process” performed in a region which
is spacelike separated from the support of the considered observable. This does not
mean that microsystems cannot acquire objective local properties as a consequence
of a measurement performed in another spacetime region; in fact, with reference to
the discussion in (a) and to an EPR–Bohm–like setup one can remark that if one
considers the spin component of particle 2, when the particle is in the future of the
region in which the spin of particle 1 has been measured, then one can attribute to
particle 2 the objective local property of having its spin “up” or “down” and that
such a property has emerged just due to the measurement which has been performed.
We wish to emphasize again that in the case of macrosystems the discussion under
(b) has shown that the impossibility of associating local properties to them lasts only
for a time interval of the order of the one which is necessary for the “spontaneous
dynamical reduction” to take place. In fact, before macroapparatus 2 interacts with
the microsystem the state of the apparatus is obviously well defined and corresponds
to the untriggered state, independently of the considered surface. After the reduction
ensuing from the interaction of the microsystem with it, apparatus 2 is again in a
well–defined state, corresponding to the result which it has registered. Moreover, this
result is “correctly” correlated to the result registered by apparatus 176.
considerations hold with reference to the regions B1 and B2 and to the apparatus which is present
there.
76Perhaps it is worth noticing that it would be possible to give another covariant prescription for
the attribution of objective local properties to physical systems. More precisely one could, for any
local observable A, consider the mean value of the projection operator Pa on one of A’s eigenmanifolds
evaluated for the state vector associated to the surface which delimits the future light cone of the
support of A. Then, if this mean value is extremely close to 1, one asserts that the system has the
objective property a. This is quite different from the previously considered criterion (i.e., that the
mean value be extremely close to one on all hypersurfaces containing the support of A) and would,
in case (a) of the previous subsection, lead to the assignment of the objective property corresponding
to the value zero for the observable A2 to the microsystem, contrary to what would occur by the
adoption of the previous criterion.
This attitude would correspond to the following particular interpretation, at the relativistic level,
of the EPR criterion for elements of physical reality: “if there exists at least one observer who can
predict, almost (in the above specified sense) with certainty and without disturbing a system in any
way, the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding
142
In conclusion, relativistic dynamical reduction models, together with the prescrip-
tion for the attribution of objective properties to physical systems proposed in this
section, allows one to overcome the difficulties discussed in subsection 14.1.3. The
theory assigns a statevector to any spacelike hypersurface, and the dependence, at
the individual level, of the mean value of a local observable upon the specific spacelike
surface used to evaluate it, does not constitute a difficulty. It simply requires a precise
and appropriate criterion for relating the objective properties of a physical system to
the mean values of local observables: in particular, this criterion permits practically
always the attribution of objective local properties to macro–objects, at the individual
level. In a sense, the above analysis has proven once more that dynamical reduction
models meet the requirement put forward by J. S. Bell [122] for an exact and serious
formulation of quantum mechanics, i.e., that it should “allow electrons to enjoy the
cloudiness of waves, while allowing tables and chairs, and ourselves, and black marks
on photographs, to be rather definitely in one place rather than another, and to be
described in classical terms”.
14.3 Parameter dependence in dynamical reduction models
As is well known, the locality assumption needed to prove Bell’s theorem [152] is
equivalent to the conjunction of two other assumptions, viz., in Shimony’s terminol-
ogy, parameter independence and outcome independence [153, 154, 155, 74]; in view
of the experimental violation of the Bell inequality, one has to give up either or both
of these assumptions. We now analyze these issues within the framework of dynamical
reduction models.
To start with, let us fix our notation. We will denote by λ all parameters (which
may include the quantum mechanical statevector or even reduce to it alone) that
completely specify the state of an individual physical system. For simplicity we will
refer to a standard EPR–Bohm setup and we will denote by
pLRλ (x, y;n,m) (14.23)
the joint probability of getting the outcome x (x = ±1) in a measurement of the spin
component along n at the left (L) and y (y = ±1) in a measurement of the spin
component along m at the right (R) wing of the apparatus. We assume that the
experimenter at L can make a free–will choice of the direction n; and similarly for
the experimenter at R and the direction m. Both experimenters can also choose not
to perform the measurement. Finally, we assume that the micro–macro interactions
taking place at L and R that trigger the reduction are governed by appropriate cou-
pling constants gL and gR; in particular, the situations in which one of the coupling
constants is made equal to zero corresponds to no measurement being performed.
Bell’s locality assumption can be expressed as
pLRλ (x, y;n,m) = p
L
λ(x;n, ∗) pRλ (y; ∗,m) (14.24)
where the symbol ∗ appearing on the right hand side denotes that the corresponding
measurement is not performed. Condition (14.24) has been shown [155, 74] to be
equivalent to the conjunction of two logically independent conditions:
pLλ(x;n,m) = p
L
λ(x;n, ∗)
to that quantity”.
We do not want to enter here into a detailed discussion of the conceptual implications involved
in adopting the above prescription. We believe that they lead to some conceptual difficulties in
connection with the cause–effect relation. This is not surprising since the considered prescription is
analogous, in the present context, to the Hellwig–Kraus [146] postulate about wavepacket reduction.
For these reasons we drop the criterion considered in this footnote.
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(14.25)
pRλ (y;n,m) = p
R
λ (y; ∗,m)
and
pLRλ (x, y;n,m) = p
L
λ(x;n,m) p
R
λ (y;n,m) (14.26)
where we have denoted, e.g., by the symbol pLλ (x;n,m) the probability of getting, for
the given settings n, m, the outcome x at L.
Conditions (14.25) express parameter independence, i.e., the requirement that
the probability of getting an outcome at L (R) is independent of the setting chosen at
R (L), while equation (14.26) (outcome independence) expresses the requirement
that the probability of an outcome at one wing does not depend on the outcome
obtained at the other wing.
14.3.1 The case of the nonlinear CSL Model
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the initial state |ψ(0)〉 is the singlet state
and we confine our attention to the case in which both spin measurements are in the
same direction, i.e., n =m. We assume that the measurement at R, if it takes place
(i.e., if gR 6= 0), occurs at an earlier time than the one at L.
Consider now the realizations w˜L(x, t) of wL(x, t) that give rise to the outcome +1
for the left apparatus when it is triggered by |ψ(0)〉. The probability of occurrence of
such processes is 1/2. We will denote by pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR = 0|wL) and pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR 6=
0|wL) the conditional probability, given wL, of the outcome −1 at left when the initial
state is |ψ(0)〉 and the R apparatus is switched off or on, respectively. We then have
pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR = 0|w˜L) = 0. (14.27)
We now evaluate the probability pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR 6= 0|w˜L). Since gR 6= 0 and the
measurement at R occurs before the one at L, we have to take into account the
possible realizations of the stochastic process at R. Let us consider the realizations
w˜R(x, t) of wR(x, t) that, when triggered by the singlet state, yield the outcome +1
at R. When one of these processes w˜R occurs, the outcome at L turns out to be −1
irrespective of the particular realization of the stochastic process wL and therefore
also for all processes w˜L considered above. To understand this, recall that within the
nonlinear model, the same stochastic process at L can give rise to different outcomes,
depending on the statevector which triggers the apparatus at L. As a consequence
one has
pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR 6= 0|w˜L&w˜R) = 1. (14.28)
Since the probability of occurrence of a process w˜R is equal to 1/2 and is independent
of the particular realization w˜L, and since if wR is not one of the w˜R, then outcome
−1 on the left cannot occur (barring improbable exceptions), one has
pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR 6= 0|w˜L) = 1/2. (14.29)
We stress that the difference of the probabilities is appreciable,
0 = pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR = 0|w˜L) 6= pL|ψ(0)〉(−1; gR 6= 0|w˜L) = 1/2 (14.30)
and that the probability of occurrence of these realizations w˜L is also appreciable
(= 1/2). Thus the nonlinear CSL model exhibits parameter dependence.
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14.3.2 The case of the linear CSL model
For the linear model, we can easily solve the evolution equation, and thereby show
parameter independence in the t → ∞ limit, once we simplify the description by
considering only the spin Hilbert space.
Thus one has, in the case in which both apparatuses are switched on (gR 6= 0 and
gL 6= 0), a linear dynamical equation analogous to (7.42):
d|ψwL,wR(t)〉
dt
=
{
[(σL · n)wL(t)− γ] + [(σR ·m)wR(t)− γ]
} |ψwL,wR(t)〉 (14.31)
with
〈〈wL,R(t)〉〉 = 0 〈〈wL(t)wR(t′)〉〉 = γ δL,R δ(t− t′). (14.32)
The probability distribution of the stochastic processes is obtained through the cook-
ing procedure. To compare this case with the one in which gR = 0, one has to consider
another stochastic equation, i.e.,
d|ψwL(t)〉
dt
=
{
(σL · n)wL(t)− γ
} |ψwL(t)〉 (14.33)
The solutions of equations (14.31) and (14.33) at time t for the same initial conditions
are
|ψBL,BR(t)〉 = eFLBL(t)eFRBR(t)|ψ(0)〉 (14.34)
and
|ψBL(t)〉 = eFLBL(t)|ψ(0)〉 (14.35)
respectively77. In equations (14.34) and (14.35) we have put
FLBL(t) = σ
L · nBL(t)− γt, FRBR(t) = σR · nBR(t)− γt, (14.36)
where
BL(t) =
∫ t
0
dτ wL(τ), BR(t) =
∫ t
0
dτ wR(τ). (14.37)
We come back now to equation (14.31) and we evaluate the cooked probability density
of occurrence of the Brownian processes BL(t) and BR(t) by multiplying the raw
probability density by the square of the norm of the statevector (14.34). As usual we
have
PCook[BL(t)&BR(t)] = PRaw[BL(t)&BR(t)] ‖|ψBL,BR(t)〉‖2 (14.38)
and
PRaw[BL(t)&BR(t)] = PRaw[BL(t)]PRaw[BR(t)]. (14.39)
Taking into account equation (14.34), one then gets from (14.38)
PCook[BL(t)&BR(t)] = PRaw[BL(t)]PRaw[BR(t)]‖|ψBL,BR(t)〉‖2 =
= PRaw[BL(t)] ‖eFLBL (t)|ψ(0)〉‖2 ·
PRaw[BR(t)]
∥∥∥∥eFRBR (t)eFLBL (t)|ψ(0)〉‖eFLBL (t)|ψ(0)〉‖
∥∥∥∥
2
(14.40)
77In equation (14.34) and following, we change notation for the same reason as we did in equation
(7.45).
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Let us consider the marginal cooked probability density of BL(t)
P#
Cook
[BL(t)] =
∫
D[BR(t)]PCook[BL(t)&BR(t)]
= PRaw[BL(t)] ‖eFLBL (t)|ψ(0)〉‖2 ×∫
D[BR(t)]PRaw[BR(t)]
∥∥∥∥eFRBR (t)eFLBL (t)|ψ(0)〉‖eFLBL (t)|ψ(0)〉‖
∥∥∥∥
2
. (14.41)
Since the equation
d|ψwR(t)〉
dt
=
{
(σR · n)wR(t)− γ
} |ψwR(t)〉 (14.42)
preserves the stochastic average of the square of the norm of the statevector, the last
integral in equation (14.41) takes the value 1. This means that P#Cook[BL(t)] turns
out to equal PCook[BL(t); ∗], i.e., the cooked probability density of occurrence of the
Brownian process BL(t) for the same initial condition if the process were described
by equation (14.33), i.e., if the apparatus at R were switched off.
But now recall from section 7.4 that within linear CSL there is a one–to–one cor-
respondence between the outcome at left (right) at t = ∞ and the specific value
taken by the Brownian process BL(t) [BR(t)] for t → ∞. So the above proof that
P#Cook[BL(t)] equals PCook[BL(t); ∗] amounts to a proof that linear CSL exhibits pa-
rameter independence at the t =∞ limit.
When one considers a finite time t of the order of or greater than the characteristic
reduction time ∆t, the situation is more complicated: the one–to–one correspondence
between the outcomes and the values taken by the Brownian process is only approx-
imate (though valid to an extremely high degree of accuracy). As a consequence,
linear CSL does not enjoy strict parameter independence at finite times. To clarify
this point, consider the values BL(t) = 2γt and BR(t) = 4γt for the Brownian pro-
cesses at time t. The cooked probabi1ity density of occurrence of such values at the
finite time t, though extremely small, is not exactly zero. One can show [156] that
these values lead, through equation (14.34), to a statevector at t which corresponds to
the outcomes +1 at right and −1 at left, respectively. On the other hand, for the case
in which gR = 0, the substitution of BL(t) = 2γt in equation (14.35) leads, at time t,
to a statevector corresponding to the outcome +1 at left. Thus, there are values of the
Brownian process BL(t) for which the outcome at left depends on whether gR is equal
to zero or not. Accordingly, there is parameter dependence at the level of individual
B(t)’s. However, given BL(t), this happens only for values BR(t) of the Brownian
process at right such that the cooked conditional probability PCook[BR(t) |BL(t)] is
extremely small. This in turn implies that the model exhibits only negligibly small
parameter dependence effects.
To conclude, although the linear CSL model exhibits parameter dependence at
finite times, these effects are at any rate extremely small with respect to those of the
nonlinear CSL model78.
78Actually, explicit evaluations of such effects show that they are characterized by probabilities
which are smaller, e.g., than those of classical thermodynamical processes which violate the second
law of thermodynamics.
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Part V
Dynamical Reduction Models and
Experiments
15 Decoherence, quantum telegraph, proton decay,
and superconducting devices
Dynamical reduction models require a precise change of quantum dynamics, so that
they constitute a theory genuinely different from standard quantum mechanics. It
becomes then interesting to analyze the conceptual and practical possibility of testing
them versus quantum mechanics.
In subsection 15.1, we analyze the role of decoherence in experiments, and how
it can mask the physical consequences of the localization mechanism of dynamical
reduction models. In subsections 15.2, 15.3 and 15.4 we discuss three specific experi-
ments, the quantum telegraph, the nucleon decay and dissipation in superconducting
devices respectively, and the role played by dynamical reductions.
15.1 Decoherence and the possibility of testing dynamical re-
ductions
We have discussed in sections 3.2 and 5 that decoherence — i.e., the interaction be-
tween a given physical system and the surrounding environment — by itself does
not constitute a solution of the macro–objectification problem of Quantum Mechan-
ics, since it yields only an apparent collapse of the wavefunction, not a real one.
Nonetheless, decoherence effects on quantum measurements are very important and
often pose serious limitations to the possibility of measuring specific properties of
physical systems, in particular to put into evidence the superposition of different
states of mesoscopic and macroscopic systems, i.e. systems whose interaction with
the environment is more difficult to control.
As regards the possibility of testing dynamical reduction models versus standard
quantum mechanics, the role played by decoherence is very tricky. In fact, in order to
observe dynamical reductions, experiments must be performed on quantum systems
containing a sufficiently large number of particles — this is the case of mesoscopic or
macroscopic systems — otherwise the reduction mechanism would be ineffective for
too a long time. On the other hand, mesoscopic and macroscopic systems are very
rapidly affected by decoherence in such a way that, given a superposition of different
states, what would appear to be a spontaneous reduction into one of such states
might be attributed only to the interactions with the surrounding environment. It is
then important to compare the “reduction rates” and the physical consequences of
specific examples of decoherence mechanisms with those of QMSL and CSL, in order
to understand whether there are situations in which a possibly observed reduction
process is real — thus confirming the predictions of dynamical reduction models — or
only apparent, i.e. it is a result of decoherence. Such a comparison has been presented
in an interesting paper by Tegmark [157], which we are going to discuss.
In the just quoted paper the environment is felt by the physical system of interest
as a background noise due to the (instantaneous) scattering of photons, neutrinos or
air molecules off a system, the effect on the compound initial state ρS+E(ti) being
determined by a transition matrix T
ρS+E(ti) −→ ρS+E(tf ) = T ρS+E(ti)T †. (15.1)
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Let p, k be the momenta of the system and of a background incident particle, respec-
tively, and apk(q) the probability amplitude that the momentum transferred to the
system is q. The author makes the following reasonable assumptions and approxima-
tions about the nature of the scattering processes:
1. Conservation of energy and momentum:
〈p′,k′|T |p,k〉 = δ(p′ + k′ − p− k) apk(p′ − p).
2. Independence of apk(q) from the motion of the system due to the high velocity
of the incident particle:
apk(q) = ak(q).
3. The system is supposed to be exposed to a constant particle flux Φ per unit area
and unit time scattered off with a total scattering cross section σ and a temporal
distribution modeled by a Poisson process with intensity Λ = σΦ. Furthermore,
the background incident particles are supposed to be in momentum eigenstates
or incoherent mixtures of them with probability momentum distribution µ(k).
4. The momentum of the incident particles is isotropically distributed with
µ(k) =
1
4πk2
λ0ν(λ0|k|), (15.2)
where λ0 is a typical wavelength of the hitting particle and ν(x) is a probability
distribution on the positive real axis.
If ρS(ti) and ρS(tf )are the initial (before) and final (after a scattering process)
states of the system obtained by tracing out the environmental degrees of freedom,
and
Pk(q) = |ak(q)|2 (15.3)
Pˆk(x) =
1
(2π)3
∫
R3
d3q e−iqxPk(q) (15.4)
are the probability distributions of momentum transfer and its Fourier transform,
respectively,it follows that, in coordinate representation,
〈x|ρS(tf )|y〉 = Pˆ (x− y) 〈x|ρS(ti)|y〉 (15.5)
Pˆ (x− y) =
∫
R3
d3k µ(k) Pˆk(x− y). (15.6)
Taking into account assumption 3 above and denoting by TSca[ρ] the ρS(tf ) in
(15.5), in the time interval [t, t+dt] a scattering induced process occurs with probabil-
ity Λdt. Consequently the unitary Schro¨dinger evolution becomes a master equation
very much similar to (6.8):
ρ(t+ δt) = − i
h¯
[H, ρ(t)]δt+ (1− Λδt)ρ(t) + ΛδtTSca[ρ(t)]. (15.7)
A comparison of TSca[ρ] and TGRW[ρ] (i.e. the reduction operator given by equation
(6.8)) is possible by looking at the expansions of the Gaussian damping factor that
appears in (6.9) and the factor Pˆ (x), which plays an analogous role in (15.5) (|Pˆ (x)| ≤
1), in powers of x = (x1, x2, x3):
〈x|TGRW[ρ]|y〉 ≃
[
1− α
4
|x− y|2 + . . .
]
〈x|ρ|y〉, (15.8)
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〈x|TSca[ρ]|y〉 ≃

1− i 3∑
j=1
(xj − yj)
∫
R3
d3q qj P (q) − (15.9)
−1
2
3∑
j,k=1
(xj − yj)(xk − yk)
∫
R3
d3q qjqk P (q) + . . .

 〈x|ρ|y〉
According to assumption 4, the linear term in (15.9) vanishes and the quadratic
one (covariance matrix) is completely determined by
l−2
eff
=
∫
R3
d3q q2i P (q) =
∂
∂x2i
Pˆ (x)
∣∣∣∣
x=0
i = 1, 2, 3, (15.10)
which has dimension cm−2 and defines a characteristic length leff of the reduction
processes which has to be compared with (α/2)−1/2 of QMSL. Moreover, a natural
time scale is given by τ = Λ−1. Solving (15.7) for short times Λδt≫ 1, yields:
〈x|ρ(t+ δt)|y〉 ≃ e−Λδt(1− Pˆ (x− y))〈x|ρ(t)|y〉. (15.11)
Off the diagonal (|x − y|l−1
eff
≫ 1) the damping is dominated by e−Λδt, whereas near
the diagonal (|x − y|l−1
eff
≪ 1) the damping goes as e−Λδt|x−y|2/2l2eff . We can then
introduce:
Decoherence time: τ = Λ−1 (15.12)
Decoherence rate: ∆ =
Λ
l2
eff
. (15.13)
The decoherence time τ is fixed by the total scattering cross section σ and the flux
of incident particles per unit area and unit time, while the decoherence rate ∆ by the
differential cross section that enters the expression of Pk(q) in (15.3). Tegmark also
calculates the values of leff and τ for a microsystem (electron) in different physical
backgrounds which we report in Table 1.
Cause of collapse leff [cm] Φ [cm
2 sec−1] τelectron [sec]
300K air at 1 atm 10−9 1024 10−13
300K air in lab vacuum 10−9 1011 1
Sunlight on earth 9× 10−5 1017 107
300K photons 2× 10−3 1019 105
Background radioactivity 10−12 10−4 1018
Quantum gravity 105 – 1012 10109 30
GRW effect 10−5 1016
Cosmic microwave background 2× 10−1 1013 1011
Solar neutrinos 10−9 1011 1033
Comic background neutrinos 3× 10−1 1013 1051
Table 1: leff for various scattering processes and τelectron.
The absence of a second figure in the row describing the GRW situation emphasizes
the deep conceptual difference between collapse and decoherence: there is no particle
flux scattered off the system inducing the localization mechanism on the length scale
leff = (α/2)
−1/2, the effect being due to a completely new dynamics and not to the
environment. Analogously, Tegmark gives estimates of ∆ for various objects in dif-
ferent backgrounds.
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Cause of apparent Free Dust Bowling
wavefunction collapse electron particle ball
300K air at 1 atm 1031 1037 1045
300K air in lab vacuum 1018 1023 1031
Sunlight on earth 10 1020 1028
300K photons 1 1019 1027
Background radioactivity 10−4 1015 1023
Quantum gravity 10−25 1010 1022
GRW effect 10−6 109 1021
Cosmic microwave background 10−10 106 1017
Solar neutrinos 10−15 10 1013
Table 2: ∆ in cm−2sec−1 for various scattering processes.
As is evident from table 2, the GRW effect, e.g. for a free electron, is weaker than
those of air molecules in lab vacuum or photons on earth by a factor in between 1026
and 106, respectively, hence masked by them. There follows that, to put into evidence
effects due to spontaneous localization mechanisms one should isolate the physical
system of interest from the environment to a presently hardly attainable degree of
accuracy. However, the figures in table 2 might lead to erroneous conclusions, if
not correctly understood. In fact, e.g. for bound electrons, QMSL can, as we shall
discuss later, induce, as a result of the localization mechanism, transitions (which are
not considered in the preceding analysis of environment induced decoherence) leading
to excitations or dissociations of the composed systems to which the electrons belong.
As an example, in a recent paper [158], it is argued that the Lyman–α ultraviolet
radiation emitted by hydrogen atoms (about 1 – 10 photons per second per mole) as a
consequence of the spontaneous localizations suffered by electrons could be detected
by an appropriate experimental setup. On the other hand, on the basis of energy
balance considerations, it can be shown that an analogous effect due to collisions
of an atom with 300 Kelvin air molecules at 1 atmosphere is, in comparison, much
smaller .
15.2 Dynamical reduction and the quantum telegraph
In this subsection we do not examine a suggested experimental test for the dynamical
reduction program, but, rather, some recent claims that there exists some already
available empirical evidence that spontaneous collapses, but of a nature different from
either QMSL or CS, are necessary. We quote directly from A. Shimony [125]:
A great weakness of the investigations carried out so far in search of
modifications of quantum dynamics is the absence of empirical heuristic.
To be sure there is a grand body of empirical fact which motivates all the
advocates of nonlinear modifications: that is, the occurrence of definite
events, and, in particular, the achievement of definite outcomes of mea-
surement. But this body of fact is singularly unsuggestive of the details
of a reasonable modification of Quantum Mechanics. What is needed are
phenomena which are suggesting and revelatory ...
No more promising phenomena for this purpose have been found than
the intermittency of resonant fluorescence of a three–level atom.
15.2.1 The phenomenology of the quantum telegraph
The physical system consists of two laser beams of intensities I1, I2 scattered off a
single trapped atomic system which can be treated as a three–level system with a
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ground state |0〉 and two excited states: a higher level |1〉 and a metastable lower
level |2〉, with mean lives
β−11 ≃ 10−8 sec ≪ β−12 ≃ 1 sec. (15.14)
|1〉, β1
|2〉, β2
|0〉
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❪
❫ ✑
✑
✑✑✸
✰
Figure 10: Atomic system in the quantum telegraph phe-
nomenon.
The laser beams are tuned so that the one of intensity I1 excites the atom from
the ground state |0〉 to |1〉, that of intensity I2 provokes the transition |0〉 → |2〉,
followed by emissions of blue, respectively, red photons and return to |0〉.
The emission pattern of an experiment conducted with I1 ≫ I2, nearly 108 vs. 10
photons per second, reveals an intermittent blue fluorescence randomly interrupted
by periods of darkness.
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Figure 11: Emission pattern in the quantum telegraph phe-
nomenon.
15.2.2 Quantum mechanical interpretations
At first glance, the experimental evidence seems to be explainable by a naive argument
based on the concepts of photons and of transitions among energy levels.
A. Because of the higher intensity of the beam I1, the atom is most of the time
excited to the short–lived level |1〉 from which it jumps down to the ground state
in approximately 10−8 seconds with the emission a blue photon. But, every now
and then, a red photon from the beam I2 sneaks in and the atom is excited to the
metastable state |2〉, where it gets shelved for approximately 1 second before emitting
a red photon and starting again a period of blue fluorescence.
However, these conclusions are far too classical (a` la Bohr) and underestimate a
relevant quantum effect, namely the interference between blue and red photons in
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the laser beams which is propagated to the atom by the linearity of the quantum
evolution and results in the emergence of linear superpositions of the atomic levels.
B. After interacting with the laser beams, the atom, initially in its ground state
|0〉, evolves in t seconds into a new state |φ(t)〉 which is the coherent superposition of
the three levels:
|0〉 −→ |φ(t)〉 = c0(t)|0〉+ c1(t)|1〉+ c2(t)|2〉, (15.15)
the probability Pi of a spontaneous emission corresponding to the jump |i〉 → |0〉
being Pi = βi|ci(t)|2.
Since the amplitude |c2(t)|2 ≪ |c1(t)|2 for almost all t, one expects an emission
pattern consisting in continuous fluorescence and, sometimes, the emission of a red
photon, periods of darkness resulting extremely unlikely.
✲
✻
t
photoemission
Figure 12: Emission pattern according to argument B. Thick
lines correspond to red photons.
The above attempt to embody linearity does not explain the occurrence of inter-
mittency in the emission pattern and in reference [159] (compare also corresponding
references in [125]) it is suggested that an explanation is only possible if a reduction
mechanism corresponding to null measurements (seeing no photons) is introduced
into the game.
In view of these facts A. Shimony concludes [125]:
Two propositions seem to me to suggest themselves quite strongly. The
first is that a stochastic modification of quantum dynamics is a natural
way to accommodate the jumps from a period of darkness to a period of
fluorescence. The second is that the natural locus of the jumps is the in-
teraction of a physical system with the electromagnetic vacuum. Whether
stochasticity is exhibited when the system in question is simple and mi-
croscopic like a single atom, or only when it is macroscopic and complex
like the phosphor of a photo–detector, is not suggested preferentially by
the quantum telegraph, for the simple reason that the single trapped atom
and the photo–detector are both essential ingredients in the phenomenon
...
But, whichever choice is made points to a stochastic modification of
quantum dynamics which has little to do with spontaneous localization.
15.2.3 The correct quantum argument
Concerning the alleged impossibility of explaining the intermittent fluorescence of the
quantum telegraph by resorting to a dynamical reduction model with localization, it
must be stressed that
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C. The presence of periods of darkness in the emission pattern can be deduced
within a purely unitary quantum mechanical scheme [160], by taking into account the
whole system
ATOM + RADIATION FIELD
without any need of invoking reduction processes induced by detecting no photons.
To be correct, the analysis must consider states |ψ(t)〉 of the form
|ψ(t)〉 =
2∑
i=0
∑
{n}
ci,{n}(t) |i〉 ⊗ |{n}〉, (15.16)
where |{n}〉 is a state with n scattered photons. Then, with
P =
[
2∑
i=0
|i〉〈i|
]
⊗ |{0}〉〈{0}| (15.17)
the orthogonal projection onto the Fock sector with no scattered photons, the proba-
bility P (t) of periods of darkness extending in the interval of time [0, t] when, initially,
|ψ(0)〉 = |0〉 ⊗ |{0}〉, is:
P (t) = ‖P |ψ(t)〉‖2 =
2∑
i=0
|ci,{0}(t)|2. (15.18)
The study of P (t) leads to the correct prediction of periods of darkness in a purely
quantum dynamical context. Moreover, during a period of darkness the state of the
system ATOM + RADIATION FIELD is
[c0(t)|0〉+ c1(t)|1〉+ c2(t)|2〉]⊗ |{0}〉, (15.19)
so that periods of darkness can end with the emission of both red and blue photons
with an emission pattern like the one of the following picture:
✲
✻
t
photoemission
Figure 13: Emission pattern according to argument C.
As a further remark, it must be noted that a complete account of the quantum
telegraph experiment ought to include the macroscopic detectors that are involved in
the measurement of the emission pattern. Consequently, the physical system to be
dealt with is
ATOM + RADIATION FIELD + MACROSCOPIC DETECTORS
Within the dynamical reduction program the actualization of the different macro-
states of the detecting apparatuses is accounted for by the new dynamics and the
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corresponding objectification of macroproperties is thus obtained. One could raise the
question whether this can have any appreciable influence on the quantum telegraph
phenomenon.
It is sufficient to observe that, according to the analysis of the previous subsection,
the effects of the reduction mechanism are comparable with those of environment–
induced reductions that occur at the detectors level. Indeed, on the basis of the
agreement of the correct quantum mechanical computations of the probability of
occurrence of periods of darkness and of their duration with the experimental results,
one can safely conclude that:
1. QMSL and CSL dynamics play, for the process under consideration, exactly
the same role as for any macroscopic detection process, namely they objectify
macro–properties.
2. There is no need to require that new nonlinear and stochastic modifications
of standard quantum mechanics become effective at the microscopic level to
account for the quantum telegraph phenomenology.
3. In particular, nothing, in the considered experiments, suggests that reductions
take place with respect to an “energy” rather than to a “position” preferred
basis.
15.3 Dynamical reduction and the nucleon decay
The presence in nature of a mechanism that localizes particles would be accompanied
by a corresponding spreading in their momenta. It is thus interesting to study its
effect on the stability of atoms and nuclei. It is possible to get a rough idea of the
consequences of QMSL by modeling atoms and nuclei as one dimensional systems
moving in a harmonic potential so that their ground states can be approximated by
Gaussian wavefunctions ψG(q) of appropriate width γ
−1:
ψG(q) =
[
2γ2
π
]1/4
e−γ2q2 , γ ≃ 10
8cm−1 for an atom,
γ ≃ 1012cm−1 for a nucleus. (15.20)
If the particle undergoes a localization around x as in as in (6.1), ψG(q) changes into:
φx(q)
‖φx(q)‖ , φx(q) =
[α
π
]1/4
e
−α
2
(x− q)2
ψG(q). (15.21)
¿From (6.2), the probability density that a localization takes place at x is given by
‖φx‖2. Accordingly, the probability that, if a hitting process occurs, the state of the
system is still ψG(q) is given by:
PND =
∫
d3x |〈ψG|φx〉|2 = 1√
1 + α/4γ2
≃
{
1− 10−7 for an atom,
1− 10−15 for a nucleus.
(15.22)
Since microsystems are supposed to undergo one localization every 1016 seconds, the
transition rate QE+D to an excited or dissociated state is:
QE+D = λ(1 − PND) ≃ λα
8γ2
=
{
10−23 for an atom,
10−31 for a nucleus.
(15.23)
In [158] Pearle has considered the case of the hydrogen atom and has compared the
flux of Lyman–α ultraviolet photons emitted by intergalactic hydrogen with the one
expected if a GRWmechanism were at work, the latter turning out to be much weaker
than the one observed.
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Applying the same argument to the quark model of a proton one would get a decay
time of the same order of magnitude as the one of a nucleus (1031 sec), whereas the
proton lifetime is estimated longer than 1031 years, that is 1038 sec. This fact seems
to indicate that the reduction rate ∆ should be decreased by a factor 107.
However, the consequences of ∆ ≃ 10−13 cm−2 sec−1 would be unacceptable. In
fact, since α−1/2 = 10−5 cm is a reasonable value for the localization length (leff in
Table 1), it would yield the value τN ≃ 1023/N sec for the macroscopic decoherence
time in (15.12). Thus, linear superpositions of spatially separated states of any rea-
sonable macroscopic “pointer” (N ≃ 1023) would typically take times of the order of
the second to be suppressed.
15.3.1 Reconsidering the argument within the CSL approach
In [107] the authors have considered an initial bound state ρB = |ψB〉〈ψB | which
evolves into ρ(t) according to the dynamics (8.12) of CSL and have studied the tran-
sition probability P (t) to an excited orthogonal state |ΨE〉:
d
dt
P (t)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
∂
∂t
〈ψE |ρ(t)|ψE〉
∣∣∣∣
t=0
. (15.24)
The only contribution is that from the reducing term in (8.12). By developing up
to the first order in α one gets:
d
dt
P (t)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
≃
∑
j
αλN2j
2
|〈ψE |Qj|ψB〉|2, Qj = 1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1
qij , (15.25)
j numbering the species of identical particles making up the system, qij being the
position operators of the particles of type j and Qj their center of mass.
For just one nucleon the result agrees with that of QMSL, while, for macro–
systems, due to the more efficient decoupling rate, it appears that a correction of ∆ =
αλ/2 which would lead to no conflict with the proton lifetime is possible. However,
such a change of the value of ∆ would lead to the limit of acceptability for small
objects: the dynamics will not reduce within the perception time an object containing
1015 particles like a carbon particle of radius 10−3 cm. Similarly, the argument of
[121] discussed in section 12 about the perception mechanism, would no longer be
correct.
15.3.2 The Pearle and Squires argument
Considering a macroscopic body of total massM made up of different types of identi-
cal particles of mass mj , one may think of relating the reduction process to the mass
density operator
M(x) =
∑
k
mk
[ α
2π
]3/2 ∫
R3
d3y e
−α
2
(y − x)2
a†k(y) ak(y), (15.26)
(see the discussion of section 8.6) rather than considering independent stochastic
processes for the various kinds of particles.
The first order analysis that has led to (15.25) can be similarly carried out in this
case; one merely has to consider the total center of mass Q of the system and not
only the centers of mass Qj of the various species
Q =
1
M
∑
j
mj
Nj∑
i=1
qij . (15.27)
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as a consequence the rate of internal excitation and/or dissociation appears as a
second order effect. Indeed, the total center of mass Q cannot excite any internal
degree of freedom:
d
dt
P (t)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
≃
∑
j
M2αλ
2m20
|〈ψE |Qj|ψB〉|2 = 0 (15.28)
If one takes the QMSL value of λ for nucleons, that is if the reference mass m0
is identified with the nucleon mass, one has a remarkable decrease of the QMSL
rate QD+E in (15.23) for atoms: from one atom per mole being either excited or
dissociated every second to every 1012 seconds (105 years). Nevertheless, all the
important features of QMSL are preserved:
• The decoupling of macroscopically distinguishable states is taken care of by the
nucleons of the macroscopic bodies.
• The energy increase is almost identical to acceptable one which is implied by
standard QMSL.
• The collapse induced decay probability of a proton is depressed by a factor 10−16
making the CSL predicted lifetime well compatible with the experimental data.
Some concluding comments are in order at this point: the above analysis has
appropriately pointed out the nice features deriving from relating reduction to the
mass of the elementary particles. However one cannot avoid mentioning that:
1. The dynamical reduction program has made clear that one can try to follow a
new line to solve the conceptual problems that Quantum Mechanics meets with
macro–objects and measurement processes, namely, modifying the dynamics so
that the physics of microsystems remains unaltered, while macro–systems ex-
hibit an acceptable behaviour. However one cannot forget that for the time
being the program still requires many improvements, in particular the crucial
problem to be faced is to work out reasonable relativistic generalizations of
it. Being the quark dynamics fundamentally relativistic, and due to the great
difficulties haunting the so called “non–relativistic quark models”, applying di-
rectly the specific models of QMSL and CSL to nucleons seems a little bit too
hazardous.
2. Other collapse theories are still under consideration. The model presented in
section 8.7 tries to relate the decoherence mechanism to gravity and to reduce
the number of new fundamental constants characterizing CSL. In particular,
the reduction mechanism is linked to the mass of the systems involved, already
meeting the basic request of [107].
3. The difficulties connected with nucleon decay might also be avoided by slight
modifications of the standard CSL, for instance, by using a higher powerN4/3(x)
of the smeared number operator appearing in (8.1).
15.4 Spontaneous localizations in superconducting devices
We conclude the analysis of the experimental implications of dynamical reduction
models mentioning the work of Rae [161], of Rimini [109] and of Buffa, Nicrosini and
Rimini [162] on the effects of spontaneous localizations on superconducting devices.
The argument of Rae [161] goes as follows: consider the BCS wavefunction [163] of a
superconducting state
ψ = ψk1 ψk2 . . . ψkn e
iS(x), (15.29)
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where ψki represents the wavefunction of a Cooper pair of electrons with wavevectors
+ki and −ki, and S(x) is the macroscopic phase associated with the supercurrent.
The most relevant effect of spontaneous reductions of an electron in a superconducting
device is to break one of the Cooper pairs, which would result in the supercurrent
being reduced by about one part in 1020. Assuming that a reduction happens every
10−5 sec, the resulting decay would remain well below the experimental detection
limits which are of the order of one part in 1013 per second.
A more realistic model in which the possibility of re–creation of Cooper particles
is taken into account (a phenomenon which lowers the effects of spontaneous local-
izations) shows that dynamical reduction models are even more compatible with the
existence of superconductivity, something which is not at all trivial.
A much more detailed and mathematical precise analysis of the effect of sponta-
neous localizations on superconducting devices has been performed in refs. [109, 162],
within the framework of CSL: the conclusion is that, by taking into account the in-
distinguishability of electrons, the effects are even smaller than those predicted by
Rae. We refer the reader to the above cited papers for the complete analysis of the
problem.
16 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed in detail a quite radical proposal which, at the non
relativistic level, allows one to circumvent the conceptual difficulties that standard
quantum mechanics meets with the macro–objectification problem. Obviously, even
though the theory is not a reinterpretation (as many of the attempts we have dis-
cussed in part I) of the standard theory, but qualifies itself as a rival theory of it,
up to the moment in which technological improvements will make experimental tests
actually feasible, to accept it is, to a large extent, a matter of taste and of the attitude
one has with respect to the foundational problems of quantum theory. The theory we
have reviewed in this report in its present formulation still has a phenomenological
character and necessitates further hard work before it can be taken as a fundamental
theory of natural processes. As we have already remarked, the real (and, we be-
lieve, relevant) merits which characterize it derive from the fact that it represents a
conceptually new proposal for overcoming the embarrassing questions raised by the
macro–objectification problem. However, finding a consistent relativistic generaliza-
tion of the dynamical reduction theories, remains, as Bell has stressed, the big problem
to be faced.
Having made clear the perspective we consider appropriate for the dynamical
reduction program and its limitations, it seems useful to conclude this report by
recalling the nice features which characterize it.
First of all, according to the theory all natural processes, the microscopic and the
macroscopic ones, as well as those involving interactions between micro and macro
systems, are governed by the universal evolution equation of the theory. Such an
equation has never to be disregarded, contrary to what happens for Schro¨dinger’s
evolution of the standard scheme, on the basis of supplementary, imprecise, verbal
prescriptions. All the embarrassing ambiguities of the standard theory concerning
macro processes are only momentary in the new scheme. Again, in Bell’s words [32],
within the GRW theory the cat is not both dead and alive for more that a split second.
Another feature of the theory which deserves to be stressed is its structural differ-
ence from the (in our opinion) unique other consistent and fully worked out proposal
to solve the measurement problem, i.e. Bohmian mechanics. The GRW theory is
a genuine Hilbert space theory and does not add any kind of variables to standard
quantum mechanics. However, by introducing mathematically precise modifications
to it, it allows one to answer in an unambiguous way to all the fundamental questions
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which characterize the debate on quantum mechanics since its birth: which systems
and processes must be treated as classical and which ones as quantum, which are
essentially reversible and for which ones irreversibility plays a fundamental role, and
so on. Moreover the definite mathematical description of reductions makes also pre-
cise the action at a distance of ordinary quantum mechanics, throwing a new light on
EPR–like situations and on quantum non locality. The nice features of the proposal
we have reviewed have been summarized by Bell in a very concise sentence [32] for
myself, I see the GRW model as a very nice illustration of how quantum mechanics,
to become rational, requires only a change which is very small (on some measures!).
Coming to the relativistic aspect we recall that the theory, even though no con-
sistent relativistic generalization of it has been fully worked out, presents some nice
aspects which, once more, can be taken as interesting hints for the elaboration of a
relativistic theory inducing reductions, an old problem which, as we have discussed in
this report, has drawn a lot of attention. In this respect, it is useful to stress the dif-
ferent conceptual status of the dynamical reduction theories with respect, e.g. hidden
variable theories. We are making reference here to the fact that the locality require-
ment can be split in the two conditions of parameter and outcome independence and
that the linear version of dynamical reduction theories exhibits only outcome depen-
dence, a fact that conflicts less than parameter dependence with a relativistic point of
view. Actually, what J.S. Bell has has proved in ref.[32] is equivalent to checking that
the GRW theory does not present parameter dependence. This analysis led him to
state: the model is as Lorentz invariant as it could be in the non relativistic version. It
takes away the grounds of my fear that any exact formulation of quantum mechanics
must conflict with fundamental Lorentz invariance. Finally, we would like to conclude
by stressing that the natural interpretation of the theories we have reviewed implies
that they do not deal, as does the standard theory, with the probabilities of something
occurring provided some specific action (a measurement) is performed by a conscious
observer, i.e, with what we would find, but they speak directly of what is (i.e. an
objective mass distribution), at the appropriate macroscopic level.
Concerning the philosophical implications of these approaches, if one is interested
also in these aspects of scientific knowledge, it has to be remarked that they allow
one to close the circle in the precise sense of Shimony [1], i.e., to build up a coherent
worldview which can accommodate at the same time what we know about the peculiar
behaviour of microscopic systems and the definiteness of the macroscopic world and
of our perceptions about it. In particular, the theory makes fully legitimate a macro–
realistic position about nature and has no need whatsoever to attribute any peculiar
role to conscious observers, an unavoidable fact within the standard formalism and
most of the proposed interpretations aiming to solve its conceptual difficulties.
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